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1. Introduction 
 
[An effective economics] move beyond the [neoclassic] 
economics of narrow efficiency, in which the key criterion is the 
reduction of unit cost, never mind the social [cultural] and 
ecological destabilization this process brings about, [and it also 
move beyond] “one size fits all” model like neoliberalism or 
centralized bureaucratic socialism, [which] is dysfunctional and 
destabilizing. [Deglobalization] rather, strengthens social 
solidarity by subordinating the operations of the market to the 
values of equity, justice, and community by enlarging the sphere 
of democratic decision-making. To use the language of the great 
Hungarian thinker Karl Polanyi in his book “The Great 
Transformation”, deglobalization is about “re-embedding” the 
economy in society, instead of having society driven by the 
economy. (Bello, 2005: 43). 
 
 
 
 
1.1 Research Background 
 
Post-war Fordist economic theory (de Man, 1919; Gramsci, 1949) focused on 
internal economies of scale (Marshall, 1890; Chipman, 1970) and mass production 
as the source of productive efficiency. Neoliberal economic theories (Hayek, 1943; 
Friedman, 1962) then provided the academic basis for the internationalization of 
economic activities, which cast the spotlight onto multinational companies 
(MNCs) and their global strategy. Apart from the studies of a small group of 
scholars of the School of Florence (Becattini, Dei Ottati, Sforzi, Brusco, Bellandi) 
in the 1970s, the local importance of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) 
and, more generally, the clustering of specialized small firms and related external 
(but in-district) economies of scale, is a theme which has being greatly underrated 
and pushed to the periphery of academic and political discourse1. 
Nevertheless, as shown by the successful growth in the postwar era of the 
“Marshallian industrial district” (MID) in Italy (Prato) and Japan (Bishū), SMEs 
are more than “residual elements of early industrialization”, surviving in 
peripheral areas of the progressive extension of the model of large Fordist firms 
(Piore and Sabel, 1984), or the “result of market imperfections responsible for 
economic backwardness and decline”  (Chandler, 1990): in fact, gathering into 
                                            
1 In the case of internal economies, the solution is the unification of strategic power over decisions and 
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industrial agglomerations which share an homogeneous culture, SMEs, as the 
main actors of an alternative industrial organization model, have indeed been 
demonstrated to be capable of driving local economic development and 
contributing to a sector or even a country’s overall economic growth.  
The rise and development of MIDs also shows that Porter’s Industrial Clusters 
and his Diamond Model (1998), which describes the factors enhancing 
productivity in an industrial location and the merits of the global distribution of 
the manufacturing chain, is affected by a sort of “neoliberal bias” and is not a 
generic and exhaustive model that can explain the rise, success and decline of all 
industrial agglomerations. As Bellandi (2009: 23) states, “the economies of the 
division of labor cannot always be explained in terms of the control of a large – or 
foreign – firm over the value chain, because they may be also realized by an 
appropriate integration of a set of complementary and specialized firms, none of 
them necessarily large in size.” 
However, although recognizing the validity of the MID theory in stressing the 
importance of in-district external economies, the socio-economic relationships - 
based on a shared and embedded subculture - among agents within the local 
system and, last but not least, the activity of local SMEs in fostering the economy 
of a determined area, by isolating these systems from the external environment, 
this theory seems to forget the role of the historical and cultural heritage of the 
context the industrial agglomeration is set in. Furthermore, describing an 
industrial district as a closed system means to understand its relationship with 
the environment as unchanging - or more precisely, to assume the invariance of 
the system with respect to exogenous forces. This idea leads to the 
underestimation of the role of these forces for the internal change, i.e. the fact 
that many changes in the system are produced as a reaction to change in the 
environment. In short, the author believes that the MID theory underestimates 
the role of two types of forces: exogenous forces to the district that are internal to 
the context the district developed in (i.e. socio-historical heritage) and exogenous 
forces to the district that are external to it (i.e. rise of new competitors with 
globalization, changing of the market conditions etc.).  
Inspired by the works of the Italian economists of the School of Florence, the 
author will demonstrate that the so-called “Marshallian industrial district”, a 
concept elaborated by Becattini in the seventies to describe post-Fordist economic 
development of the Third Italy2 (Bagnasco, 1977), is a paradigm that can be used 
                                            
2 The First Italy included the areas of large-scale mass production, such as Turin, Milan, and Genoa, and the Second Italy 
described the undeveloped South. For further research, see Bagnasco (1977). 
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from a macro-economic point of view also to describe Japanese local economic 
reality before globalization. Nevertheless, the comparative research on Italy 
(Prato district) and Japan (Bishu district) demonstrates that it has nowadays 
reached its limits because the way the actors of mature MIDs is reacting to the 
changes of the international context under globalization is strictly connected to 
the difference in the socio-historical and cultural context (in particular, the 
organization of the industry the relations between the different economic actors 
involved), which the original theory doesn’t take into account. 
 I will argue that an analysis from an economic-geographical perspective on the 
way the “contextualized” local culture and system of values and practices are 
affected by globalization and its outwards/inwards disruptive forces, is necessary 
to explain and understand the development path, economic collapse and possible 
renaissance of SMEs in local industrial agglomerations. 
 
 
1.2 Reasons For The Choice Of Bishu And Prato As Case Studies 
 
In contrast with Porter’s Industrial Cluster theory (1990), in which external 
MNCs, attracted by the local competitive advantage, may act as local anchors for 
new companies, suppliers, skilled individuals and capital from different locations, 
MIDs are characterized by groups of locally-embedded SMEs, which operate 
under a sophisticated production system of division of labor in light 
manufacturing sectors of the economy. The development of the district is 
endogenous, based on the exploitation of local resources (entrepreneurs, capital, 
labor) and on the implicit respect of the “code of the district”, a combination of 
experience, beliefs, and behavioral aptitudes, guaranteed by local social, political 
and economic institutions. 
Italy and Japan are, among the developed countries, the two economies with 
the biggest number of textile industrial agglomerations. 
In Japan, the METI recognized, among the seventeen areas of agglomeration of 
textile businesses, as main textile districts of small and medium firms, the 
districts of Hokuriku, Tango, Senshu Banshu and Bishū3. 
 
Table 1.2.1 MAIN DISTRICTS OF SMEs SPECIALIZING IN TEXTILE PRODUCTION IN 
JAPAN 
                                            
3For details see????? (METI)??????????????????????????(Future Tasks of 
the Textile and Apparel Industry)????????? and http://www.seni-search.jp/japan_products.html (?
??????????Seni-search.JP) accessed on August 16, 2012. 
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DISTRICTS NO. OF  
CITIES 
SPECIALIZATION NO. 
FIRMS 
NO. 
WORKER
S 
PRODUCTION 
QUANTITY (x1000) 
Bishū 
(Aichi and Gifu 
Prefectures) 
7 production of combed 
wool for men’s apparel, 
ladies’ outwear and 
carded wool. 
 
778 
(2010) 
11,609 
(2010) 
78,000 m2 (2003) 
Hokuriku 
(Fukui, Ishikawa, 
Toyama Prefectures) 
 
- synthetic fibers (nylon, 
polyester, acryl-nitrile 
filament fabrics) 
for apparel, industrial, 
medical use 
4,118 
(2005) 
43,225 
(2005) 
1,157,482 m2 (2005) 
 
 
Senshu 
(Osaka Pref.) 
 
 
 
 
6 white cotton yarn, 
bleached cotton,   
for the apparel, bedlinen 
and bedding, interior and 
industrial sectors 
310 
(2011) 
1,505 
(2011) 
337,345 m2 (2011, tot 
with synthetic fibers) 
Banshu 
(Hyogo Pref) 
 
6 huge variety of white and 
dyed cotton fabric 
production for shirts 
263 
(2009) 
1,073 
(2009) 
71,262 m2 (2009, tot 
with synthetic fibers) 
Tango 
(Kyoto Pref.) 
 
3 brocaded silk for 
women’s apparel and 
kimono 
 
840 
(2006) 
1,714 
(2006) 
475,989 m2 (2011) 
Source: author’s elaboration on local Industrial Union statistics 
 
The biggest district, for the number of firms and workers and the quantity of 
production, is the district of Hokuriku, comprising municipalities from the 
neighboring prefectures of Fukui, Ishikawa and Toyama, in northern Chubu 
(central part of Honshu). The district specializes in the production of synthetic 
fibers (mainly polyester and, in small part, nylon filament fabrics) for the apparel, 
industrial and medical sectors and contributes 60% of the national production of 
synthetic fibers. Although the district’s advantage rests in the concentration of 
SMEs in the middle-stream textile chain (twisting, weaving, and dyeing firms), 
the productive structure, operating from the postwar era, resembles the keiretsu 
vertical model, with local small firms assembled in “productive teams” under the 
leadership of big synthetic fiber makers, from which (sometimes through the 
mediation of trading companies) they receive commissions4.  
The district of Tango, in the northern part of Kyoto, has specialized since the 
Nara era (710-794), in the production of brocaded silk for women’s apparel. 
Approximately 60% of the national production of kimono is realized in the district, 
through an integrated processing system that goes from yarn production to fabric 
manufacturing. In particular, the district specializes in pre-dyeing (yarn dyeing) 
and after-dyeing (fabric dyeing) operations and the production of double-width 
                                            
4 Since 2000 there have been attempts to break down the vertical hierarchical links and to increase the 
independence of firms through inter-firm cooperation and relations with local trading companies (2004, 
creation of “Toray synthetic cluster” and 2009, “Three Prefectures cluster”). 
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fabric. 
The district of Senshu in Osaka developed from the Muromachi era (1392–1573 
CE) around the production of white “momen” (a fabric made of bleached cotton), 
and during the Edo era the locally-produced “Izumi momen” spread all over the 
country. The district specializes in the production of white cotton yarn and 
bleached cotton fabrics, and accounts for 60% of national production in the sector. 
Recently, the production of cotton and synthetic fiber-blended textiles (11.9% of 
national output) for apparel, bedlinens and bedding, interior and industrial use 
has been introduced. The productive model is an integrated system of production 
that covers yarn making, woven fabric making and fabric processing operations. 
The district of Banshu, in Hyogo prefecture, in the western part of Honshu (the 
central and biggest island of Japan), has specialized, since the end of the 
eighteenth century (1792) in the production of huge variety of white and dyed 
cotton fabrics (poplin, kingdom) for manufacturing shirts. The production is 
realized through a system of division of labor between local SME but it is not an 
integrated system, because it is focused on yarn dyeing and yarn weaving (sizing) 
operations, while yarn is bought from Tokyo and Osaka trading companies and 
wholesalers. 
Finally, Bishū is the biggest wool district in Japan, representing a 70% share of 
the sector nationally. It specializes in the production of combed wool for men’s 
apparel and ladies’ outwear and in the production of carded wool. The operations 
of yarn making, weaving and fabric dyeing are realized through the division of 
labor among independent SMEs. For each productive stage of the manufacturing 
chain, the coordinator-enterprise, converter or master broker (oyabata) designs 
projects the goods, organizes production (purchasing yarn from trading companies 
and usually working on commission for them) and sells the final product. 
Sub-contractor firms (kobata) are responsible for intermediate level processes, 
from the operations of yarn twisting and processing to the manufacture of the 
fabric and its dyeing. Lacking in a predominant brand, the feature of the 
industrial district is the concentration in the area of a complete cycle of textile 
operations and “small lot - big variety” production. 
Apart from Hokuriku district, where the production is organized on the base of 
vertical relations between big fiber makers and local SMEs gathered in productive 
teams, in Senshu, Banshu, Tango and Bishū districts, textile-processing 
operations are realized through a division of labor for each manufacturing stage 
between local SMEs. In Banshu the production does not cover yarn making but it 
does in Senshu, Tango and Bishū, where there is an integrated manufacturing 
process that extends from yarn production to textile making. Anyway, comparing 
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the number of workers locally employed in the textile sector, Bishū appears to be 
the district with the highest number of workers by far (incidentally, it represents 
the 10% of the total workforce employed in the textile sector nationally).  
The MID is, by definition, characterized by groups of locally-embedded SMEs, 
which operate under a sophisticated production system of division of labor in light 
manufacturing sectors of the economy. It is also defined as “a socio-territorial 
entity characterized by the active presence of both a community of people and a 
population of firms” (Becattini, 1990), in which the interaction between social and 
economic actors and the locally shared cultural framework are the engine of the 
economic development of the local economy. Hence I chose the Bishū district, with 
the most numerous community of textile workers and a sophisticated and 
integrated manufacturing system of division of labour, as the case study for my 
dissertation. 
In Italy, among the approximately forty districts in the textile and apparel 
sectors, the main textile districts, as recognized by the Monte dei Paschi di Siena 
Bank report5, are the districts of Prato, Carpi and Biella and Como. 
The district of Carpi specializes in the production of knitwear (pullovers, 
cardigans, shirts, etc.). It is characterized by a highly disintegrated but robust 
network of vertical and horizontal relationships between local firms. Local 
activities are mainly concentrated in the design and marketing of clothing while 
the phases of production are commissioned to in-district or extra-district small 
subcontractors. 
The district of Biella is the center of the domestic production of combed wool 
and, in particular, specializes in the production of high quality standardized 
yarns. Companies in Biella are organized in a vertical production system with a 
complete cycle (from yarn to fabric). In the district, in fact, there are industrial 
groups of great tradition and prestige, recognized internationally (Cerruti, 
Piacenza, Ermenegildo Zegna, Zegna Baruffa) that include all the stages of the 
production process and account for the majority of the district’s exports, due to 
their great financial strength and preferential access to international distribution 
channels. Alongside these big companies, there are many SMEs that, while 
achieving an excellent product in terms of quality and technical characteristics, 
do not have a well-known brand and are not able to attract the customer. For this 
reason these companies often work as subcontractors for in-district clients, or for 
extra-district clothing firms. A large share of the turnover of the local firms comes 
from the relationship with businesses in other Italian provinces or with foreign 
                                            
5 For further details, refer to Monte dei Paschi di Siena (2008). 
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customers, indicating a high propensity to export (European Union, Switzerland, 
Hong Kong, China, Japan, Turkey and the United States). 
The district of Como specializes in the production of silk. It consists of small 
companies and has a strong fragmentation of the production chain. Textile 
operations are almost exclusively concentrated in the weaving and finishing of 
fabrics characterized by high variety and added value. 
 
Table 1.2.2 MAIN DISTRICTS IN THE TEXTILE SECTOR IN ITALY 
DISTRICTS NO. OF 
CITIES 
SPECIALIZATION NO. 
FIRMS 
NO. 
WORKERS 
EXPO 
VALUE 
(million €) 
Prato 12 carded wool (and other textile fibers), 
knitwear and outwear 
4,984 21,380 1,302 
 
Carpi 8 knitwear and shirts 2,238 10,258 801  
Biella 33 combed wool 404 2,453 403  
Como 27 silk (and, in small part, other textile 
fibers and sccessories) for the apparel 
sector 
1,060 15,884 761  
Source: Monte dei Paschi di Siena (2008)  
 
The district of Prato is the largest of the Italian industrial districts in the textile 
sector and one of the most important, worldwide, for the production of woolen 
yarns and fabrics; the district produces fabrics for the apparel industry, textile 
products for interior decoration, yarn for the knitting industry, special textile 
fabrics and nonwoven fabrics for industrial applications, products and knitted 
garments for men and women in carded and worsted wool, and also in cotton, 
linen, silk and synthetic fibers. Within the district there is a highly elaborate 
system of production characterized by the division of labor between independent 
small and micro enterprises that act as subcontractors for local woolen mills or 
impannatori. The district stands for the production of raw materials (wool, cotton, 
synthetic and artificial fibers, etc.), processes (combed and carded yarn, weaving 
and knitting, finishing etc.), diverse market segments (from luxury to mass 
consumption) and final use (clothing, knitwear, furniture). A strong feature of the 
system consists of relations with international markets: the textile industry 
exports more than half of its production and has commercial relationships with 
more than 100 countries. 
All of this implies that, among these districts, Prato district, besides having a 
localized “horizontal” system of division of labor between local firms involved in a 
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complete production cycle (from materials to fabrics), is also the local 
agglomeration of firms with the highest number of businesses and employees. For 
this reason it has been chosen as a case study for analyzing the transition of the 
industrial agglomeration of SMEs under globalization. 
 
 
1.3 Flow, Methodology And Contributions Of The Work 
 
This dissertation is organized in eight chapters, including an introduction and a 
conclusion. For the hearings and the surveys collected in this research, the 
authors has chosen the form of the semi-structured interview, in which the 
framework of themes to be explored -prepared in advance- has been integrated by 
the interwiees’ additional comments, notes and particular remarks. 
Following the introduction, the first part of the second chapter, through a 
review of the previous literature and the definition of the term globalization, as 
used in this context, will describe the characteristics of the MID, its differences 
from the PIC and the comparative advantages of this form of local aggregation 
from the big vertical firm; the second part, then, will focus on the limitations of 
the theory, as originally conceived for the Italian context, and, finally, after 
having underlined the importance of this paradigm in the analysis of the local 
processes of development, the “absystemic” transition of mature MIDs under 
globalization will be described. 
The third chapter will analyze the rate of SMEs in the Japanese and Italian 
economies through the Micro, Small and Medium Enterprise Country Indicators 
(MSME-CI), provided by the International Finance Corporation (IFC) of World 
Bank, the data of the Italian General Confederation of Enterprises, the Japan 
Small and Medium Enterprise Agency, the METI White Paper on Small and 
Medium Enterprises in Japan and the statistics of the Establishment and 
Enterprise Census of Japan and the Eurostat. It will then address the state of the 
textile industry in Italy and Japan from 1985 to 2011 (Statistical Yearbook of 
Japan, ISTAT statistics, Establishment and Enterprise Census of Japan, ICE 
statistics). 
In the fourth chapter, in order to, experimentally, demonstrate that, although 
elaborated to describe the Italian situation, the MID is a pattern of local economic 
development also applicable to Japan, the author, using Markusen’s (1996) 
classification of ID, combines statistics of METI on Industrial Production, 
statistics of the Japanese Small and Medium Enterprises Agency and Gifu and 
Aichi Prefectures, Italian census data and Prato Industrial Union statistics with 
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hearings of local government officials, scholars and representatives of the local 
Industrial Unions and Associations. 
The fifth chapter presents the history and development of the districts of Prato 
and Bishū and the situation of the two districts, on the background of a changed 
international context after globalization. 
The sixth chapter analyzes the transition of the MIDs of Bishū and Prato under 
globalization. In order to depict the manufacturing structure of the districts and 
their changes under globalization, a survey of a group of independent but 
interrelated companies involved in the production of the same final good, in this 
case carded wool6, which is the representative manufacture in both districts, was 
conducted between 2009 and 2011 in Bishū and Prato, with the collaboration of 
Prato Industrial Union and Bishū Wool Manufacturers Association. Changes in 
the economic composition of the two districts will be also described through an 
analysis of ISTAT and ASIA Statistics and Ichinomiya City Council Statistics on 
Industries and Services. 
Finally, in the seventh chapter, the different ways in which the cohesive 
cultural and social texture of the districts has been eroded after globalization will 
be described, with a particular focus on the socio-cultural changes that the local 
reality has been experiencing since the rise of globalization. The differences in the 
socio-economic structure of the two districts will be analyzed to explain the 
different transition the two mature MID districts are undertaking nowadays. 
A series of works on Italian and Japanese SMEs and on the industrial districts 
of Prato and Bishū have been published in Italy (Becattini, 1989; Dei Ottati, 1995) 
and Japan (Okamoto, 1990; Sakai, 1992; Waki 2002; Noda, 2004; Goda, 2005; Ota, 
2008; Matsumoto, 2009)7. However, all the studies consider the Italian and 
Japanese experience separately and have been conducted on a national level. 
In Japan, apart from Ota’s work on business management8, no comparative 
research on the MID as a common paradigm of local development between Italy 
and Japan, and on Bishū and Prato’s similar and distinctive characteristics, has 
been undertaken so far. Furthermore, while the debate on Prato industrial 
district and its problems in the globalized arena is quite fervent in both countries, 
                                            
6 Carded wool is wool that has been subjected to the process of carding in preparation for spinning. Carding is a mechanical 
process that disentangles, cleans and intermixes fibers to produce a continuous web or sliver suitable for subsequent 
processing. It owes its name to the plant of the teasel (cardo, in Italian), the dried inflorescences of which (which are covered 
with spines) were used by the wool workers for this work. Since, the shortest wool fibers are submitted to carding, the yarns 
are, therefore, a little more hairy and warmer than the combed wool. 
7 Italian SMEs and Prato industrial district are the subject of works by eminent Italian professors (Becattini, Dei Ottati) and 
scholars (Toccafondi) of the University of Florence, and eminent professors of the Japanese universities of Hōsei (Okamoto, 
Matsumoto), Tokyo Economics University (Sakai) and Tokuyama (Ota). For details, see the reference list. 
8???? (Ota, Y.)????????????????????????????	 ―????????????????―?
(The Network-Strategy of Japanese and Italian Textile Companies – The Case of Bishū and Prato Districts)???????????????
??−???. 
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in Italy there is not yet any relevant study on Japanese industrial districts, and 
the existence of Bishū district is not yet known in the academic world. 
Despite practical differences in business culture, Bishū and Prato share a series 
of common characteristics. First, they both developed in the post-war period as 
national wool producers. Second, the production of woolen fabrics and clothes in 
both districts is realized through the division of labor among SMEs (large unitary 
manufacturers are almost absent), more than 80% of which register less than ten 
employees (Prato Industrial Union; Gifu and Aichi Prefectural Office Statistics). 
Third, the main production of both districts is carded wool fabric. In this 
production the SMEs of both share a similar productive structure: the textile 
chain is ramified in a series of sub-processes undertaken by specialized firms as 
subcontractors (“kobata” in Bishū, “imprese finali/terzisti” in Prato) and 
coordinated in the middle by a converter firm (“oyabata” in Bishū, “impresa 
finale/lanificio” in Prato), which is in charge of the design and the sale of the final 
product. Finally, nowadays, as unique textile producers among developed 
countries, they are facing the competitive pressure of globalization in the form of 
the increase of procurement of intermediate and final goods from developing 
countries (mainly China). 
Coming after the age of mass production, industrial districts were constantly 
confronted by the concentrated economic and strategic power of large firms, 
powerful capitalists, and big urban systems. This has been particularly true since 
the 1990s when international production fragmentation raised significant threats 
to manufacturing in industrial districts. Furthermore, in new industrializing 
regions – some of them in countries of enormous demographic size and with 
powerful state structures and traditions – global value chains combine with local 
forces and a strong public hand. Finally, in the old post-industrialized countries, 
the continuous increase of inter-regional and international flows of persons and 
information may undermine the local accumulation of social experiences and 
identities. At the same time, in the academic and political field, the mainstream is 
dominated by neoclassical economists in the high quarters of theory, and by the 
“the big firms do it better” view among industrial economists.  
Although it is true that “old” industrial districts in post-industrialized countries 
are facing major challenges, and those which do not react with energy and 
creativity will be doomed, many may still survive, and even make progress if 
appropriate changes are made to their mix of historical, geographical and 
economic structural characteristics and district processes, and with the 
application of appropriate transition mechanisms. If Global competition does not 
threaten their existing base and competitive strength, they may find potential 
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market opportunities and business partners in unknown countries or territories. 
The author believes that, as a theoretical paradigm and research unit, MID 
theory, since it restores locality, society and culture in the economic analysis, 
moves beyond the neoliberalist economics of narrow efficiency and thus allows a 
deep understanding of the economic changes that the process of globalization is 
bringing about in local industrial agglomerations.  
But this model itself proves not to be valid to describe the transition of diverse 
ID cases embedded in differentiated socio-historical and cultural contexts under 
globalization, for the contextual cultural and social factors that sustain the 
economic structure of the districts are reshaped and their differences accentuated 
by the external forces of globalization and, in addition, the theorized systemic 
stability (and its underlying conditions) and “uniformity” in the growth process of 
MID systems are brought into question. This is the reason why the MID approach 
should be overcome through a scientific analysis of comparative case studies, as 
experimentally done in this dissertation, from the economic-geographical 
perspective. 
A comparative analysis of Bishū and Prato’s mutual problems – in the light of 
the differences in the economic structure of the textile sectors of the two countries 
– and the description of the socio-cultural changes the two districts are facing in 
the current globalized era, can make the process of activation of the districts’ 
forces and the reorganization of the textile sector in developed economies more 
practicable, and open a scenario of constructive cross-border cooperation between 
local industrial agglomerations. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 24 
2. The Marshallian Industrial District: Theoretical 
Background 
 
 
 
2.1 Definition Of Marshallian Industrial District 
 
The concept of industrial district (ID) here expressly refers to a concept 
elaborated from the Marshallian concept of external economies and industrial 
atmosphere (Marshall, 1920) by the Italian economist Becattini at the end of the 
1970s to help understand “unusual” regional paths of industrial take-off in some 
Italian regions in the central and north-eastern part of the country, known as 
Third Italy. These regions showed an industrial path of development 
characterized by bursts of local entrepreneurship and the proliferation of 
populations of specialized small to medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). 
These facts were at odds with the traditional view of industrialization as based 
on the central role of big firms. The rejection of a simplistic interpretation of the 
vitality of these sets of small firms as the sole result of production 
decentralization strategies by big manufacturing firms gave rise to a series of 
studies.9 Among these the recovery of Alfred Marshall’s analysis of industrial 
districts and external economies played an increasing though controversial role10. 
Becattini (1979) may be considered as officially inaugurating the Italian debate on 
the ID and its empirical counterparts, that is the “Marshallian industrial district” 
(MID). 
As described by Becattini in Industrial Districts and Inter-Firm Co-operation in 
Italy (1990:38), the so-called Marshallian industrial district is: 
 
A socio-territorial entity characterized by the active presence of both a 
community of people and a population of firms in one naturally and 
historically bounded area with a dominant industrial activity. 
                                            
9 For Italian studies on these concepts and debates see, among others, Bellandi (2003), Garofoli (2003), 
Capello (2004), Fortis and Quadrio Curzio (2006). 
10In Economics of Industry and the Pure Theory of Domestic Values (both first published in 1879), Marshall 
suggests that English IDs, characterized by the presence of small firms empirically, bore out the hypothesis 
that economies of the division of labor cannot always be explained in terms of the control of large firms. Here 
Marshall attained compelling confirmation of the importance of appropriate contexts for sharing social 
experiences and productive knowledge. The idea that economies of the division of labor may be realized by 
specialized firms in an industrial district appears early in Marshall’s writings, whereas the distinction 
between ‘external economies’ and ‘internal economies’ comes quite late, probably not much before the first 
edition of the Principles of Economics in 1890. 
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In Riflessioni sul distretto industriale marshalliano come concetto 
socioeconomico (Reflections on the Marshallian Industrial District as a 
Socio-economic Concept, 1989:111), the same author describes the MID as:  
 
A form of industrial organization and, at the same time, a local community, 
which results from the synergic interplay between a population of persons 
living and working in a certain geographical area and a population of small 
and medium sized firms belonging to a certain industrial branch. 
 
MIDs are characterized by groups of collocated SMEs, competent producers and 
specialized workforce operating in light manufacturing sectors of the economy. 
The industrial structure of a MID is characterized by a certain degree of local 
economic dominance of an industry (local specialization). Productive activities of a 
range of goods and services, with markets progressively and largely external to 
the locality of industry, are carried out by a complex and sophisticated production 
system with a clear division of labor among a dense network of SMEs exchanging 
intermediate resources and outputs through local markets, as well as within 
formal or informal business teams supported by personal trust and knowledge.  
The main industry includes a mix of horizontal (competitive), vertical 
(input-output) and diagonal (related services and instruments) specialized 
activities, each of them carried out by a specialized small firm. As results of 
various evolutionary adjustments and developments, other secondary industrial 
activities may be localized in the district, more and less related to the main one. 
The system achieves economic efficiency primarily through local outsourcing and 
the flexibility of their production arrangements, which owes much to the local 
social texture and the informal relations of production and administration. This 
propels the realization of economies (reduction of costs, increase of revenues) that 
are “external” to the firm but “internal” to the district. 
The development of the productive structure is endogenous, based on the 
exploitation of local resources (entrepreneurs, workforce, political-administrative 
centre). A decisive role in private and public investments to technical, human and 
relational capital is played by locally embedded centers of strategy and 
decision-making.  
Coming after the golden age of mass production, the ID concept had to break 
through entrenched skepticism among economists and policy-makers. Following 
the theorization of the MID by Becattini, the first general explanation of the rise 
of IDs after the mass production age was proposed by M. Piore, C. Sabel, and J. 
Zeitlin, who identified a “second industrial divide”, with the re-emergence of 
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flexible specialization and artisanal modes of production as a viable (but not 
necessarily dominant) alternative to mass production generated by increasing 
demand for variation in many consumer goods by growing numbers of well-off 
households. On the market side, the neo-artisanal tendency includes, of course, 
the demand for a mass of customized goods from expanding segments of 
consumers who had satisfied their basic needs and had surplus purchasing power. 
But it also extends to the demands of a large pool of users for personal services, 
social services, and various artificial aids to remedy weaknesses and handicaps. 
On the production side, the changing nature of needs demanded that capitalist 
production exit from the ‘factory’ and return to ‘workshops’ within society to 
acquire artisanship, customized services, and ties with historical-cultural and 
environmental sources of distinctive experiences (Becattini, 2004). 
The local productive system thus depicted has an economic and social identity 
shaped by an “industrial atmosphere”: meaning that all the local actors share a 
set of shared cognitive, moral and behavioral attitudes that orientate technical, 
human and relational investments.  
The path of local development, influenced by the system’s socio-economic 
structural features, is characterized by processes of reproduction, growth and 
variation of the system itself, including: (a) a continuous and flexible articulation 
and reorganization of the local division of labor; (b) the reproduction and renewal 
of local knowledge with some transferable codified knowledge for productive and 
creative purposes; (c) the preservation of common motivational tracts, such as 
trust and cooperation in productive relations, entrepreneurship and innovation, 
the open participation of workers on the job, the engagement of citizens in 
community life; (d) social and economic mobility and a cohesive social texture 
conducive to the preservation of a local identity and an industrial atmosphere. 
This is the reason why policy designs and tools aimed at supporting district-like 
processes should be more aligned with local development approaches and future 
research should be concerned about the governance of firms and of capitalistic 
process within ID and the centralization and decentralization of strategic decision 
making. 
 
 
2.2 Difference Between MID And Porter’s Industrial Cluster (PIC)  
 
Although both have benefited from Marshall’s work (1920, Principle of 
Economics), the concepts of MID and Porter’s industrial cluster (PIC) should not 
be overlapped. 
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In The Competitive Advantage of Nations (1990:197), Porter defines industrial 
clusters as “geographic agglomerations of companies, suppliers, service providers, 
and associated institutions in a particular field, linked by externalities and 
complementarities of various types”.  
According Porter and Ketels (2009), clusters are based on the interplay of three 
dimensions: 
• a geographic dimension: clusters are often concentrated in particular 
regions within larger nations (sometimes in single towns) which often account for 
a disproportionate share of a nation’s or region’s output and their externalities are 
based on the “proximity” of manufacturing activities and services; 
• an activity dimension:  the companies perform activities in different but 
interconnected industries (virtually, all parts of an economy) and cover both the 
manufacturing of goods and the provision of services. 
• a business environment dimension, or cluster-specific conditions that are 
often the result of actions taken by companies, government agencies, universities, 
other “public” institutions, and the private sector, acting individually and 
collectively. 
The origins of clusters may follow different patterns. Some have developed from 
networks of SMEs and the combination of natural and beneficial endowments. 
Sometimes an anchor company provides the launch pad for new companies, or 
attracts suppliers, skilled individuals and capital from different locations. Others 
have arisen from the spin-offs of the human capital and ideas of an academic 
institution, or by deliberate governmental policies (which, by activating 
pre-existing advantages, accelerate a process that would have happened naturally 
anyway). Recently, then, firms based in the most advanced clusters (often MNCs) 
have seeded or enhanced clusters in other locations, as they disperse some 
activities in the value chain to secure market access, reduce risk, access cheaper 
inputs or serve particular regional customers better. Anyway the role of foreign 
firms is particularly important: “The presence of sophisticated foreign firms often 
enhances the productivity of domestic firms, and vice versa” (Porter, 1998:9) and 
the merits of a global distribution of the value-chain are underlined: “increasingly, 
multinational companies are locating some product line home bases outside of 
their home nation” (Porter, 1998:12), therefore, “locating in an existing or 
developing cluster, then, often lowers total cost, and increases innovation 
potential. Home base or headquarters activities should sometimes move to 
locations outside a company’s home country if there is a more vibrant cluster 
elsewhere.” (Porter 1998:13). 
Porter summarizes the factors that enhance the productivity of an industrial 
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location, in particular technical clusters like Silicon Valley, in the “Diamond 
Model”. The Diamond model is based on several factors, grouped in four categories, 
that are not present in the classical theory of economic development which is, 
instead, based on availability and abundance of productive factors. Factor and 
input conditions refer to the basic, but specialized, inputs that allow competition 
to take place. They range from material things (physical infrastructures) to 
intangible factors that shape the economic environment (the legal system, 
university research institutes, information) facilitating the set-up of a new 
business. The context for firm strategy and rivalry refers to the norms and 
incentives governing the type and intensity of local rivalry and influencing the 
investment climate (macroeconomic and political stability, the tax system, labor 
market policies, intellectual property rules). Demand conditions are the market 
conditions for offered products and services made of local sophisticated and 
demanding customers or “pioneer” customers whose needs anticipate those 
elsewhere. Finally, related and supporting industries refer to the local pressure or 
absence of suppliers of materials, components, machinery and services, as well as 
the existence of related industries. 
On the other hand, as described by Becattini (1990:38), the Marshallian 
industrial district is a “socio-territorial entity characterized by the active presence 
of both a community of people and a population of firms in one naturally and 
historically bounded area with a dominant industrial activity”. 
In particular, the main features of the industrial district are: (a) the process of 
division of labor for a shared manufacturing production between small and 
medium-sized enterprises which generates external economies of specialization; 
(b) the process of the flexible integration of the division of labor in local markets 
characterized by competition and cooperation, which reduces the costs of 
transactions; (c) the process of learning and the acquisition of experience 
generated by the flow of information between a large number of individuals 
specializing in similar and complementary activities (Dei Ottati, 1995). 
All the above implies that the PIC is a general framework for understanding 
the influence of locations on the competitiveness of companies (basically, MNCs) 
and their locational strategies, sources of competitive advantage and the 
globalization/localization of the value chain. Nevertheless, as Bellandi (2007) 
states, many competent authors find it difficult to distinguish between “localities” 
of industry, namely IDs, and “industries” in a locality, namely clusters. 
Scholars supporting the PIC theory focus on the identification of a series of 
universal factors that can explain the industrial localization of firms in a 
determined area. In their approach, the single firm is an abstract unit of analysis 
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and its economic activities are studied in their geographical distribution, while no 
attention is paid to the way the production is locally organized or its interaction 
with the social environment. On this topic, Maskell (2001:10) states: “the term 
cluster is used synonymously in the literature together with industrial 
agglomeration or localization, while the term industrial district ... is often applied 
when wishing explicitly to emphasize the value and norms shared by co-localized 
firms”. 
The MID, instead, is not a sheer concentration of manufacturing and service 
processes realized by (internal or external) firms, which are – horizontally or 
vertically – formally linked, and which are attracted to a determined location by a 
series of local comparative advantages. Neither is the ID a geographical 
distribution of industries, but instead a complex social system, since it is the local 
society that provides the formation of a socio-cultural environment suitable to 
different forms of industrial organization (Sforzi, 2000) and this socio-cultural 
environment is difficult to build using artificial techniques. 
In the MID the region has not benefited from direct governmental support and 
also had minimal influence from Porter’s Diamond Model factors, because the 
local social capital of the cluster had a major impact in its economic development. 
In fact, the local society shares a system of values and normative predispositions 
towards the main aspects of life, such as jobs, consumption, savings, or risk 
propensity, favorable to the economic entrepreneurship that influences industrial 
relations and public administration activity (Sforzi, 2000). The attitudes of 
individuals and families to self-employment (cottage industry, homeworking, 
craftsmanship, small entrepreneurship) promote the formation and diffusion of 
organizational skills, creativity and pragmatism. Organizational intelligence, 
propensity to risk and innovation, creativity, craftsmanship, technical skills are 
the strong points of the MID in the international competition. 
Further evidence of the difference of MID and PIC is the classification of ID 
made by Markusen (1996), to which I will refer in detail in the fourth chapter. 
 
 
2.3 Comparative Advantages Of The MID 
 
Compared with the vertically integrated large firm of the hub-and-spoke 
clustering, the MID’s productive organization boasts a series of positive factors. 
According to Dei Ottati (1995), first of all, because of their size and the 
localization of productive processes, the SMEs of the district are more sensitive to 
internal and external competition and, thus, more flexible. Competitive risks 
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automatically activate a process of quality control for each stage of production, 
which in turns promotes the general efficiency of the production and the flexible 
adaptation to the new market conditions. In the large firm, instead, the control of 
efficiency of each productive stage is hampered by the size of the productive 
system and by the natural friction between the opposite pushes for centralization 
of management and for decentralization of production bases; this makes it 
difficult for the big firm to renovate and promptly adapt to a changing context.  
Secondly, there may be observed among the participants a shared combination 
of experience, beliefs, behavioral aptitudes, the so-called “code of the district” 
(Becattini, 1989; Dei Ottati, 1995) or “industrial atmosphere” (Marshall, 1920), 
guaranteed by and institutionalized in social, political and economic organizations 
and their related codes of rules.  
The main industry of the district (complementary sectors and additional 
services included) provides job opportunities for the local population (elderly and 
young people, men and women). It implies a population of small entrepreneurs, 
independent and employed workers, all equally participating in the 
manufacturing progress, dominates the local society. Extended family is the most 
diffused familiar structure. This explains how in the districts territorial 
identification prevails over firm identification, in contrast with big hub-and-spoke 
clusters. 
The respect of the implicit norms of code of the district reduces the risk of 
opportunism and fosters a semi-conscious collaboration between the actors of the 
district; furthermore, interacting with the setting of price in the free market 
generates a local sub-system of prices, which is less likely to be influenced by 
economic flotation. For this reason, the firms of the districts enjoy a relative 
stability of income prices, production costs and transaction costs. 
On this point, Varalso and Ferrucci (1996) identifies the existence of economies 
external to the firm but internal to the district the foundations of the 
competitiveness of these local production systems11. 
These consist in the fact that the plurality of actors in the district, operating in a 
competitive environment mitigated by the presence of a shared and deeply rooted 
subculture, realizes, at a systemic level, specific competitive advantages, that, 
otherwise, individually, would not be able to get. The nature of the economic 
benefits arising from these external economies, may be under three different 
profiles: reduction of production costs, reduction of transaction costs and dynamic 
incremental of innovation.  
                                            
11 To a large extent, according to this approach, the economies external to the company are not internal to an 
industry as generally understood, but rather internal to an industry spatially concentrated (Becattini, 1979). 
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In fact, the common localization of multiple enterprises, productively 
interpenetrated between them, determines, for the functioning of several factors, 
a reduction of production costs (collectively and generically designed) for each of 
them (Bellandi, 1982). On the other hand, the network between the district 
companies, together with the characteristics of the “communitarian” district 
market - such as transparency of information, marginalization and 
criminalization of opportunistic behavior, the absence of transaction-specific 
investments, frequency of transactions, etc. - may support a reduction in 
transaction costs. Moreover, the rapid circulation of ideas and information in 
horizontal transactions and active interaction between the actors vertically or 
laterally penetrated can lead to the implementation of incremental innovative 
solutions of both product and process (Bellandi, 1989). The identification of these 
external economies at the local level contributes, in addition to explaining the 
competitiveness of manufacturing systems composed of many small businesses, to 
the resolution of another major dilemma of neoclassical economic theory: the 
possible and the simultaneous preservation of competitive pressures of the 
market, on the one hand, and the efficiency of individual firms, on the other. 
Finally, the market the district addresses is not a homogeneous aggregate of 
consumers whose choices are driven by the prices of goods (and services) and who 
are indifferent to producers and production sites. The “low volume, high variety” 
of goods is linked to a distinctive image of the district – related to its qualitative 
standards, its distinctive process of production and so on – such as to be relevant 
for the choices of the economic agents. This ensures the accumulation of 
managerial resources on the long term and strengthens the competitive power of 
the district.  
Therefore, as Sforzi states, the demand for the district’s goods is not 
standardized but instead is characterized by high “quality fragmentation” and 
“temporal variation”, to which the industry of the district, thanks to the workers’ 
specialist skills and the productive stricture, reacts with dynamic adaptability 
both in elasticity (variation in quantity) and flexibility (variation in quality). 
 
 
2.4 Definition Of Globalization 
 
By the term “globalization” I refer to two different but indissolubly related 
meanings, like two faces of the same coin. 
In the first meaning globalization may be described as the integration of 
economies around the world due to free trade and free mobility of capital, 
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supported by technological innovation and the movement of people across 
international borders, that makes markets and production in different countries 
increasingly interdependent. 
This definition of globalization is what can be extracted from the statements of 
the OECD (1993), describing globalization as “the phenomenon by which markets 
and production in different countries are becoming increasingly interdependent 
due to the dynamics of trade in goods and services and the flows of capital and 
technology” and the IMF (2002): 
 
 
A historical process, the result of human innovation and technological 
progress. It refers to the increasing integration of economies around the 
world, particularly through trade and financial flows. The term sometimes 
also refers to the movement of people (labor) and knowledge (technology) 
across international borders. There are also broader cultural, political and 
environmental dimensions of globalization that are not covered here. 
 
Anyway, I do think that the “broader cultural, social, political and 
environmental dimensions” need to be covered when dealing with 
globalization-related issues. Borrowing and developing the definition of 
globalization by Tehranian (1998), Ritchie (1996), Daly (1999) and Harvey (2001), 
I consider it beyond its economic meaning to also embrace an ideologically, 
politically, historically, socially-embedded meaning.  
 
For Tehranian (1998):  
 
Globalization is a process that has been going on for the past 5000 years, 
but it has significantly accelerated since the demise of the Soviet Union in 
1991. Elements of globalization include trans-border capital, labor, 
management, news, images, and data flows. The main engines of 
globalization are the transnational corporations (TNCs), transnational 
media organizations (TMCs), intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), 
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and alternative government 
organizations (AGOs). 
 
According to Richie (1996), globalization is: 
 
The process of corporations moving their money, factories and products 
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around the planet at ever more rapid rates of speed in search of cheaper 
labor and raw materials and governments willing to ignore or abandon 
consumer, labor and environmental protection laws. As an ideology, it is 
largely unfettered by ethical or moral considerations. 
 
For Daly (1999), globalization refers to: 
 
global economic integration of many formerly national economies into one 
global economy, mainly by free trade and free capital mobility, but also by 
easy or uncontrolled migration. It is the effective erasure of national 
boundaries for economic purposes. International trade (governed by 
comparative advantage) becomes interregional trade (governed by absolute 
advantage). What was many becomes one. 
 
According to Harvey (2001:24):  
 
The contemporary form of globalization is nothing more than yet another 
round in the capitalist production and reconstruction of space. It entails a 
further diminution in the friction of distance (what Marx referred to as “the 
annihilation of space through time” as a fundamental law of capitalist 
development) through yet another round of innovation in the technologies of 
transport and communications. 
 
Thus, in this work, globalization also refers to “the spreading of 
market-oriented policies (free-market capitalism) in both the domestic and 
international spheres”, often accompanied by “an easy or uncontrolled migration” 
(Daly, 1999), driven by economic agents (mainly but not only transnational 
corporations) who “move their money, factories and products around the planet at 
ever more rapid rates of speed in search of cheaper labor and raw materials and 
new markets” (Ritchie, 1996) and supported by governments or transnational and 
intergovernmental organizations (symbolized by the European Union, the WTO, 
the IMF, the G8, the UN and the like) “willing to ignore or abandon consumer, 
labor and environmental protection laws” (Ritchie, 1996). It is a phenomenon and 
ideology that significantly accelerated in the 1990s “since the demise of the Soviet 
Union in 1991” (Tehranian, 1998) corresponding with “a further diminution in the 
friction of distance through yet another round of innovation in the technologies of 
transport and communications” (Harvey, 2001). 
From this perspective, globalization entails both positive and negative 
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consequences. It is, from one side, narrowing the distance in time and space 
among and within nations, widening trade in goods and services, and pluralizing 
cultural identities through constant flows of people. On the other side, by 
diminishing national and local control over economic and social processes and 
reorganizing spaces and society on a profit and productivity-oriented logic, it 
neutralizes any ethical or moral considerations. It pushes towards the erosion of 
social welfare schemes or communitarian safety-nets, and exacerbates the brain 
drain of young and skilled people, making local economic realities and cultures 
increasingly vulnerable to the decisions and strategies of multinational 
corporations or delocalized big companies. These are often the engine of social 
injustice, unfair working conditions, lack of concern for the environment, 
mismanagement of natural resources, and ecological damage.  
Analyzing the transition of MID under globalization thus defined, I want to 
re-emphasize the value of the geographical standpoint and the importance of the 
changes in local culture in understanding contemporary globalization, its 
successes and its failures and its specific forms of creative destruction. 
Globalization is not an ethereal and inexorable phenomenon that hits local 
systems of production breeding victims (and winners). It is, actually, the product 
of the choices of individual economic and social agents who renounce a form of 
“moral capitalism” or investment in their locality to embrace the ideas of the 
short-term and all-individual profit of the prevailing “brute capitalism”. 
Moral capitalism is a form of capitalism where social values of responsibility 
prevail over narrowly focused ego needs and the individual standards of brute 
capitalism to serve the public good. 
According to Young (2003), individuals are happier and more productive when 
they believe that their work is not only serving their interests but also has a 
higher purpose of service to important goals. Sustainable profitability of a 
business requires a common sense blending of social responsibility and service of 
customer needs. Virtue and interest must go together for profit maximization. 
Young (2003) set standards for moral capitalism in the Caux Round Table 
(CRT) Principles for Business. The CRT principles describe seven principles and 
then define certain responsibilities towards six stakeholder groups; consumers, 
employees, owners and investors, suppliers, competitors, and communities. 
First of all, in moral capitalism businesses create wealth by meeting the needs 
of consumers and the moral values of capitalism are elaborated by consumers and 
not by the market. Employees should be accepted as agents participating in a 
fiduciary relationship of mutual respect and obligation, not as mere sellers of 
labor. Owners and investors should be responsible for disclosure, honesty and 
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good corporate governance. Business with suppliers should be based on 
relationship ties based on trust rather than one-time purchases based on price 
alone. Again, competition in moral capitalism uses quality and innovation rather 
than price for business success. Finally, business pays a return on social capital in 
order to survive and to maximize its profits. 
The CRT should be a guide for governments, which will foster conditions in 
which companies can prosper and be socially responsible using the CRT principles 
for business. And also business leadership should demand the assertion of values.  
In Young’s words: 
 
Those who seek to lead must first go inside themselves to find the values 
that they will place atop their personal values pyramid. Selfish values will 
not do; the search for meaning does not stop with the self, but transcends the 
self, invoking each person’s moral sense. Moral character, not position, is the 
foundation of leadership. Then, leaders must develop intellectual skills of 
judgment and application of principles to factual situations in the manner of 
law judges. Leaders build Moral Capitalism and prevent the spread of Brute 
Capitalism. (Young, 2003: 71) 
 
The thus-defined “cultural code of the district” that is the pillar of the 
sustainability of the local economy reflects the principle of moral capitalism: the 
intra-district cooperative attitude in competition, which expresses itself in the 
prevalence of spread long-term profits over individual short-term profits and the 
share of information and knowledge, sustains and nurtures the economic 
activities of the districts and distributes the wealth. 
 
 
2.5 Limitations of The MID theory 
 
The limit of the "ideal-type" of MID, as described by the literature, can be 
identified, firstly, in the validation and applicability of the MID theory, as 
originally elaborated by the School of Florence, to the diverse ID cases embedded 
in the differentiated socio-historical and cultural context.  The MID theory is a 
theory elaborated to describe post-Fordist economic development in some Italian 
regions in the central and north-eastern part of the country, and, for this reason, 
it may not necessarily be a theory applicable to other countries; on the other hand, 
the application of this theory in, geographically and culturally, different contexts 
could shed light on the limits (and possible room for improvement) of the theory 
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itself (the fourth chapter will shed some light on the issue). 
Secondly, the spontaneous and self-propelling drive in the generation of 
external economies is, in fact, due to an evolutionary stability and convergence of 
a set of productive, market, socio-economic and institutional conditions, only 
partially endogenous to the mechanisms and logics of operation of the district 
system. 
The productive conditions that keep the stability and profitability of the district 
system can be, mainly, identified in: 
1. the specialization and complementarity between the small businesses of the 
district; 
2. the spatial concentration of manufacturing relations between specialized 
companies based on physical and cultural proximity. 
First, it is assumed, therefore, that, in terms of the intra-district horizontal 
division of labor between the district firms, the efficiency must correspond to a 
single specialized activity; on the same time, in terms of the intra-district vertical 
division of labor, the different activities are defined complementary in the sense 
that their conjunction in a single company would yield constant or decreasing 
performances than those achievable in different companies (Richardson, 1972). 
The most significant effect of these factors is the fact that the productive 
efficiency of the individual enterprise is realized through the achievement of 
economies of specialization at the level of individual manufacturing phases; 
inter-organizational different conditions (for example, groups of companies) or the 
changes in the composition (specialization) of the internal business relations – 
often, in reaction to external changes - are not considered to have a particular 
surplus competitive advantage. 
In addition, the strength of the district is also in its industrial solidarity, 
founded on the thickness of the relations between local businesses. In this sense, 
external economies (and the related competitive advantaged of the district), in the 
relationship between companies, self-generate and nurture, provided that all the 
specialized firms located in the district would, essentially, pursue a logic of spatial 
self-restraint of their manufacturing relations. 
The spatial integration of productive relationships between the different actors 
district supports a process of face-to-face interaction that facilitates the 
intra-district trade, the adoption of specific and common languages and the 
resolution of contractual disputes.  
The informality of the exchange relations is evidently connected with the 
physical and cultural proximity between the different district businesses and all 
this facilitates the exchange of information and technology. All this of course is 
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reflected on the level of inter-organizational transaction costs, supporting the 
local process of manufacturing de-verticalization (Dei Ottati, 1986). The 
emergence inside the district of actors sharing a different socio-economic culture 
or the impact on the district of the establishment of productive relations with 
physically distant actors by local actors is not problematized. 
The market conditions at the base of the profitability of the MID model may be, 
mainly, classified as: 
1. the expansion of the market (or its overall very consistent size); 
2. the absence of substantial changes in the market relations with the 
commercial distribution chain outside the district. 
As already the same Marshall had observed, "it is obvious that the efficiency of 
specialized equipment or specialized skill is not but one of the conditions of their 
economic use, the other condition being to have an amount of work big enough to 
keep them occupied " (Marshall, 1920). 
In addition, the informal inter-company cooperation in industrial districts 
supported by the expansion of the market attenuates the problems of unfair 
competition and destructive price, misappropriation of innovations etc. and the 
incentives towards spontaneous cooperation prevail on the competitive 
advantages derivable from free-riding, emulating or opportunistic behaviour. 
In particular, in the ideal-typical model of MID, the relationships with external 
companies and clients are not problematized in terms of asymmetries in the 
sharing of information, need of functional co-partnerhip, the rise of a logic of 
global supply from the commercial distribution side and any changes in the 
economic relations of power between these operators is described, but is rather 
given a simplified theoretical representation of them.  
This analytical underestimation depends, in part, on the fact that the 
development of the MID in Italy has been engaged, for the most part, in a period 
of, substantially, expansion of, initially, the domestic market and, then, of the 
foreign market, within a very fragmented structure of the retailing system 
(especially on the Italian market) and increasing qualitative and quantitative 
fragmentation of orders. 
Evidently, as Veraldo and Ferrucci (1996) points, the structural growth in 
productive volumes has hidden the critical business relationship, while the 
fragmented structure of retailing has inhibited processes of oligopoly. Today, 
however, there is a substantial change in these vertical relationships between 
firms. Not just commercial distribution is achieving a greater level of 
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concentration12, but in the face of an increasing variety and variability of the 
markets, companies district need to be equipped with better and more appropriate 
marketing sensors13. 
In addition to productive and market conditions, the formation of external 
economies of the district is attributable, in large part, to the local socio-cultural 
and institutional conditions. 
In fact, the cohesion and unity of the entire district system, conceptualized in 
the literature in the identification of a community with its own ethical, cultural 
and social heritage, have historically shaped the production system with 
conditions of efficient operation both in the inter-firms business relations and in 
the intra-firm business relations. The local institutional structure, however, is 
based not only on social components such as the extended family and the local 
community, "but also on specific political components - such as industrial 
relations and activities of local government" (Triglia, 1991). 
Among the main innovative elements of the MID theory there is the fact that a 
key productive resource of the industrial context is society - its history, its 
community, its institutions, its overall production system - and not only plants 
and equipment located within its premises. Yet, this theory seems to forget the 
role of the historical and cultural heritage of the context the industrial 
agglomeration is set in, whether national or global. 
It follows that he MID paradigm, as originally described, has at least three 
major and interrelated strategic vulnerabilities. 
The first vulnerability relates to a problem of the productive, institutional and 
market conditions at the base of the competitiveness of the system. In fact, 
Marshallian external economies appear determined by a sort of “systemic 
stability”. Therefore, any technological or market changes that significantly affect 
the conditions underlying the development paradigm of the district, may attempt 
to the competitiveness of the entire production system. 
The second vulnerability depends on the problem of the generalized and 
widespread adoption of a “system of rules and practices”, in the regulation of 
in-district business activities, consistent with the paradigm district, by all the 
actors. The existing external economies are a protective habitat for enterprises, 
                                            
12 On this logic, as Bettatini states: "the greatest danger to the survival and development of industrial clusters [...] is 
the event that the distribution network (world trade) fall into the hands of a few large chains tightly integrated in the world 
finance capital. The crucial position of this link in the chain can subtract the industry and the society in which it is integrated, 
for example, in the districts, the sweet juice of profit "(Becattini, 1996), thus affecting the total value added of the district and 
the related processes of local accumulation. 
13 Marshall already had warned that the small manufacturing size would be an obstacle to the acquisition of market 
information in a timely, accurate and reliable way: "A large company may spend large sums in advertising; its agents give 
reliable information about the market and people from distant places, and its goods advertise themselves with each other 
"(Marshall, 1920). 
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which is able to structure, condition and vehicle specific developmental 
trajectories. These economies and their advantages reproduce supposing that all 
the local actors comply with the district 'rules of the game'. The district firms may, 
therefore, be extremely flexible in adapting to exogenous changes, provided that 
they do not put into question the widespread adoption of these decisional rules 
and, above all, the district paradigm. 
The third vulnerability derives from evolutionary problems of coherence 
between the historically established bases of knowledge and competence in the 
district and new needs for knowledge management to enable new innovative 
competitive advantages. 
Therefore, if a new competitive phase changes the source of competitive 
advantage, requiring the acquisition of new skills from outside, not belonging to 
the district tradition, or the assimilation of new organizational models, which 
radically alter the canonical network of relationships of the district, this can lead 
to intense and long-lasting systemic destabilization (Ferrucci, Bellini, Pagano 
1998). Thus, in the current phase of sluggish demand for many products made in 
the industrial districts and the rise of global competitive pressure from developing 
countries with better “price conditions”, the structural sustainability of increasing 
returns in the manufacturing sector becomes conditioned by the ability of firms to 
supervise or permanently conquer new markets, diversify production and renew 
themselves (Gaffard, 1990).  
In particular, from the second half of the eighties, the competitive environment 
in which MIDs operate has radically changed. 
The emergence of new competitors on the international level, the growing 
concentration of commercial distribution, the emergence of new markets of 
production (and consumption), the emergence of new technological trajectories are 
some of the current major discontinuities from the district competitive structure 
of previous years. 
These exogenous discontinuities change the structural framework in which, 
historically, district firms have been operating until now. Behavior patterns, 
established information and skills, based on historical experience and on the 
district paradigm, often, do not appear adequate to face these new competitive 
scenario (Ferrucci, 1999).  
These technological and market generators of change are, first, exogenous to 
the district and are, often, based on different skills and physically and culturally 
distant. 
Second, these discontinuities are substantially new compared to the history of 
competitive scenarios in which the district has been operating. The reiteration of 
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the solutions adopted in the past cannot be, thus, a solution in facing these 
exogenous challenges. 
Finally, the possible strategic responses of firms under these discontinuities 
tend to rely on the ability to coordinate and coagulate a multiplicity of actors, 
physically and culturally distant from the district, around innovative projects. To 
the district firm it is required the capacity to enter and to structure networks of 
global enterprises based on the sharing and exchange of experience and 
information, through the use of a codified and decontextualized knowledge.  
In conclusion, the MID paradigm appears to be characterized by an absolute, 
systemic and structuralist vision, with limited variance in the behavior and 
strategies of its actors and business. The system works as long as all the 
companies comply with the principles funding the evolutionary equilibrium of the 
system.  
The exogenous discontinuities of the competitive framework may be the 
catalysts for change of industrial districts. However, these changes are not to be 
passively suffered by the district firms, but they have to become sources for new 
learning opportunities, the activation of an hybridization between different 
contexts, through contact and exchange of their relative knowledge. 
 
 
2.6 Transition of MID Under Globalization: from a “Closed” 
Monomorphic System towards an “Open” Hybrid Form 
 
In the current context of accelerated and overwhelming globalization, the 
opportunities for the creation of new forms of clustering and, at the same time, 
the evolution of old IDs expand. However, such clusters may turn out to be 
different from the ones that occurred in the nineteenth century in the first 
industrializing countries (first wave of IDs) and those reemerging after the mass 
production golden age (second wave of IDs), like in Italy and Japan.  
Bellandi (2007) uses a historical frame to delineate three waves of 
industrialization in which industrial districts have performed a prominent role.  
During the first wave, in the nineteenth century, industrial districts were the 
engine for the first industrial revolution in the UK, France, Germany, and the 
USA before tendencies towards mass production and mass marketing appeared.  
The second wave corresponded to the re-emergence of industrial districts and 
similar forms in the developed countries - such as Italy and Japan - during the 
second half of the twentieth century, after the golden age of mass production. At 
the end of the 1960s, in fact, a new demand for differentiated products in the 
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international industrialized markets forced the end of factory-based capitalist 
production and challenged the success, during the 1950s and 1960s, of large 
multi-divisional vertically integrated firms, with their substantial internal 
investment in R&D, mass production and mass marketing. This led to the 
“return” of a neo-artisan model of production and the customized production of 
goods and services, tied with historical and cultural sources of locally-embedded 
production activities. It was in this context that the second wave of IDs developed. 
The third wave of ID is represented by contemporary tendencies that concern 
the rise of new IDs or the process of transition of second wave IDs at the 
beginning of the twenty-first century, in which the weakening of the second wave 
districts associated with new areas of development - in sectorial, territorial, and 
organizational terms - are combined; they are characterized by neo-Fordist14 and 
neo-technological tendencies, aiming at finding new sources of cheap factors and 
expand the dominance of global value chains.  
The IDs of the first and second waves were both characterized by 
manufacturing sector specialization and embedded production processes. In the 
contemporary age, because of the fast pace of technological change and the 
“intrusion” of science-based knowledge, the distinction between manufacturing 
and tertiary sectors may become less clear and the district identity in a 
locally-integrated manufacturing filiere may be lost. Yet, sometimes the 
expansion of new clusters (and the related opportunities/challenges it poses) 
contributes to the decline of older IDs. The dynamic factors driving the 
development of IDs are related to the generation, application and variation of 
specialized know-how and diffused creativity and the capacity of combining this 
locally-rooted core knowledge with the ideas and innovations coming from 
external science-based knowledge.  
In particular, the local established sets of well-absorbed knowledge and 
practices are challenged, in fast-changing and globalized markets, by external 
forces – for instance, international subcontractors or client firms. This implies the 
need of new channel and new actors to enable the absorption, translation and 
                                            
14 Nowadays, an extreme determinist approach, called “neo-Fordist”, associated with a “neo-technological” 
tendency14, fosters the research of new sources of cheap labor and cheap land (and, thus, expands the 
dominance of global value chains led by big MNEs). It postulates the complete dominance of science-based 
knowledge in the conception, design, management and functioning of automated and flexible production 
processes through sets of integrated hardware and software just assisted by the ancillary services of labor 
according to predetermined routines. In reality, given that every new technology is affected by points of 
discontinuity, by interruption in its automatic working, the importance of skilled labor with tacit, practical 
and first-hand knowledge of the technology and its functioning beyond strict predetermined routines, cannot 
be denied. 
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combination of the incoming knowledge. Secondly, the need to appropriate the 
returns on increasing investment in R&D is altering the delicate balance between 
cooperation and competition that drives IDs’ vitality and dynamism. 
Furthermore, according to the “hyper globalist” position, since the 1990s the 
increasing flows of goods, services, knowledge and people along global networks 
across regions and countries has created a border-less and “global village” peopled 
by a “virtual” international community defined by linkages among 
locally-embedded agents. In fact, one of the main features of the modular, 
multi-plant and multinational organization of production - a global value chain 
with Fordist-type production - to have emerged with the globalization, is the 
“de-territorialization” of production activities.  
Faced with the impact of such exogenous forces, the firms of MIDs - essentially 
monomorphic (=with an homogenous pattern of development) according to the 
dominant district strategy - started to pursue their own strategy, which is the 
result of the district original skills and knowledge, but also, and increasingly, the 
results of other skills and knowledge from other various sites of learning 
(relations with external customers, with research laboratories, etc.). 
In general, district firms under globalization are involved in a choice between 
the continuation of the “logic of exploitation” of the opportunities that the district 
generates, with its own external economies, and, secondly, a “logic of exploration” 
of new strategic solutions that are unrelated, to a certain extent, to the locale 
socio-institutional and local productive system (Ferrucci, 1996). 
As a whole, this evolutionary direction clearly leads to a growing strategic 
variety of the districts businesses within the local system of production. It is clear, 
therefore, that the district firms cannot anymore follow the same monomorphic 
path of growth. As a consequence, the industrial district shows a process of 
qualitative selection of enterprises together with a growing internal strategic 
differentiation: it is not the district systemic strategy alone that supports the 
viability of the business but that of small firms or clusters of firms, able to 
individually deal with external actors in the supply chain.  
Each firm tends to seek its own evolutionary path, made of a complex matrix, 
determined by its own expertise and skills, as accumulates within the district, 
and the technological, organizational, business, market potentialities of the 
geographical context the district is located.  
Innovative strategies of product differentiation (based on new skills, new 
materials, new production techniques) or process diversification (in terms of 
marketing or technological innovations), stable penetration of new markets or 
creation of new market sensors in existing ones, and so on, appear achievable in 
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this new evolutionary trajectory, which comes to be less and less influenced by the 
resources generated by the district. 
It follows that the binomial between the parallel development of the company 
and the of the district is significantly challenged (Varaldo, Ferrucci 1996): in other 
words, the strategic reactions to these mutated competitive scenarios are 
increasingly the expression of individual action or network of companies, rather 
than of the entire industrial district as a compact system. 
It is natural, therefore, that the learning and the implementation of new 
competitive and organizational strategies might imply, within the district, a 
significant inertia to change and opportunistic behaviors or the appearance of 
“free riders”. In this context, hierarchical evolution of the districts, with the 
emergence of firms leaders (as in Prato) or a process of rational corporate merger 
led by the most competitive firms of the district (as in Bishu), for example, is often 
a strategic necessity to induce change, reducing friction and inertial pushes15.  
In the future, in the industrial district there is, therefore, a marked process of 
selective evolution of business strategies which creates new rules of the game that 
are no longer valid for the entire system but specific to different clusters of 
companies that will be generating. 
The reflections over the difference between the ID and the MID concepts 
suggest that in the MID theory every economic process sets in the place it is 
performed and the interaction between economic activities and socio-cultural 
relations are inseparable factors to explain local firms’ competitiveness and the 
social integration of the people living in the area. As a theoretical paradigm and 
research unit it allows us to deeply understand economic changes, since it restores 
locality and society in the economic analysis. 
Hymer (1972), brilliantly, observes that the multinational enterprise is the 
antithesis of the “Marshallian entrepreneur”, in that the head, the arms and the 
legs are not part of the same body, albeit the former controls the latter with 
various forms of hierarchical power. This means that MNCs relying on low labor 
cost “places” to carry out labor-intensive and large-scale tasks while controlling 
core high-value-added functions and by doing so they consolidate patterns of 
uneven development.  
 
[An effective economics] move beyond the [neoliberal] economics of narrow 
efficiency, in which the key criterion is the reduction of unit cost, never mind 
                                            
15 In the evolution of the district the pluralism of the business models and the heterogeneity of their 
conduct strategic must be achieved - preserving the multiplicity of decision-making - in order to realize a 
pragmatic and constructive debate between them. 
 44 
the social and ecological destabilization this process brings about [and it also 
move beyond] “one size fits all” model like neoliberalism or centralized 
bureaucratic socialism [which] is dysfunctional and destabilizing. 
[Deglobalization] rather, strengthens social solidarity by subordinating the 
operations of the market to the values of equity, justice, and community by 
enlarging the sphere of democratic decision-making. To use the language of 
the great Hungarian thinker Karl Polanyi in his book The Great 
Transformation, deglobalization is about “re-embedding” the economy in 
society, instead of having society driven by the economy. (Bello, 2005: 43). 
 
Through this dissertation, firstly, the author means, by clarifying the 
theoretical shortcomings of the original MID model as theorized in relation to the 
Italian context, to experimentally enlarge its applicability to the Japanese context. 
Then, she means to scrutinize, through a comparative analysis on the two MID 
case studies in Italy and Japan, a more efficient and competitive explanation of 
the industrial agglomeration of SMEs under the current globalized era, which is 
adaptable to the differentiated cases and able to resolve the lack of cultural code 
approach and of an economic geographical perspective (in place of a political 
economic one). 
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3. An Analysis Of The State Of The Textile Industry And 
SMEs In Italy And Japan 
 
 
3.1 Definition Of SMEs In Italy And Japan 
 
There is no uniform definition of SMEs: they are usually defined in relation to 
the largest firms, where the size of the largest firms varies according to the 
country, branch, time (short life span) and available statistics and data. 
On May 6, 2003, the European Commission adopted Recommendation 
2003/361/EC regarding the definition of SME, which replaced Recommendation 
96/280/EC as from January 1, 2005. Enterprises qualify as micro, small and 
medium-sized enterprises (SME) if they fulfill the criteria laid down in the 
Recommendation, summarized in Table 3.1.1. In addition to the staff headcount 
ceiling, an enterprise qualifies as an SME if it meets either the turnover ceiling or 
the balance sheet ceiling, but not necessarily both. 
 
Table 3.1.1 DEFINITION OF SME IN ITALY 
ITALY (EU) 
Enterprise category Headcount Turnover or Balance sheet total 
medium-sized < 250 ≤  €  50 million ≤  €  43 million 
small < 50 ≤ € 10 million ≤ € 10 million 
micro < 10 ≤ € 2 million ≤ € 2 million 
Source : European Commission, 
 
Table 3.1.2 DEFINITION OF SME IN JAPAN 
JAPAN 
Enterprise category Headcount Turnover 
medium-sized < 300  
≤  300 million yen 
 
small < 20 ≤ 300 million yen 
micro < 10 ≤ 300 million yen 
Source: Japan Small and Medium Enterprise Agency 
 
As the White Paper on Small and Medium Enterprises in Japan states, the 
term “small and medium enterprises” (SMEs) refers to small and medium 
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enterprises as defined under Article 2, Paragraph 1 of the Small and Medium 
Enterprise Basic Law, and the terms “small enterprises” and “micro enterprises” 
refer to “small enterprises” as defined under Article 2, Paragraph 5 of the same 
law. More specifically, according to the same law, Japanese SMEs may generally 
be categorized as summarized in Tables 3.1.2 and 3.1.3. 
Unlike Italy/Europe, Japanese SMEs are more thoroughly defined as to both 
capital and headcount, and the requirements vary according to the industry. 
Therefore, whether for manufacturing, construction or transport, the term SME 
applies to enterprises with a capital value of up to 300 million yen and a 
workforce up to 300 employees, while for SMEs in the services sector, the required 
capital decreases to 50 million yen and workforce to 100. 
 
Table 3.1.3 DEFINITION OF SMEs PER SECTOR IN JAPAN 
  
Industry 
SMEs (meet one of the following conditions) Of which SE 
Capital No. of regular employees No. of regular 
employees 
1. Manufacturing, construction, transport, 
other industries (excl. 2–4) 
Up to 300 mil. yen Up to 300 Up to 20 
2. Wholesale Up to 100 mil. yen Up to 100 Up to 5 
3. Services Up to 50 mil. yen Up to 100 Up to 5 
4.Retail Up to 50 mil. yen Up to 50 Up to 5 
Source: Japan Small and Medium Enterprise Agency 
 
Apart from the slight difference in number in the ceiling of employee numbers 
(250 versus 300), the most relevant divergence may be observed in the economic 
standards: turnover and total balance sheet for EU/Italy and capital (or 
investment) for Japanese SME. 
This difference may be explained as follows. First of all, as objects of national 
and supranational (EU level) economic financial support, European SMEs need to 
be uniformly classified according to their sales, turnover and total balance sheet 
for governmental economic aid to be fairly distributed. On the other hand, in 
Japan the economic support to SMEs is privately guaranteed by financial 
institutions (mainly banks) to which is referred the determination of standards 
and procedures of financial support. It is for this reason that Japanese SMEs are 
not obliged by law to declare their balance sheet publicly, making it difficult to 
determine the amount of the gross sales turnover (and profits) as deducted from 
the debt (loan). 
In addition, as the Micro, Small and Medium Enterprise Country Indicators 
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(MSME-CI), provided by the International Finance Corporation (IFC) of the 
World Bank demonstrate, the USA, Japan and Italy are the developed countries 
with the highest number of SMEs. Among these three countries Italy and Japan 
register the highest number of firms with, respectively, 77.876 and 44.709 firms 
per 1,000 of population. 
 
Table 3.1.4 NUMBER OF SMEs BY COUNTRY (2007) 
 TOTAL NUMBER NUMBER PER CAPITA 
(per 1,000 people) 
1.Indonesia 41,362,320 195.274 
2.China 8,000,000 6.336 
3.Russia 6,891,300 48.153 
4.USA 5,868, 737 19.985 
5.Japan 5,712,191 44.709 
6.Brazil 4,903,268 27.409 
7.Italy 4,486,000 77.876 
Source: MSME-CI (2007) 
 
 
3.2 SMEs In Italy And Japan: Share Of The Economy 
 
In the EU, SMEs comprise approximately 99% of all firms and employ between 
them about 65 million people. In many sectors, SMEs are also responsible for 
driving innovation and competition. Globally SMEs account for 99% of business 
numbers and 40% to 50% of GDP (European Commission, 2003). 
 
Table 3.2.1  ITALIAN SMEs BY NUMBER OF EMPLOYEES (2009) 
   1–9 10–49 50–249  SMEs >250  Total 
Manufacturing 431,319 77,504 10,375 519,198 1,460 520,658 
Construction 563,817 29,309 1,465 594,591 84 594,675 
Services 3,122,353 89,277 10,027 3,221,657 1,776 3,223,433 
   Motor vehicle trade, maintenance and repairing  140,514 6,762 406 147,682 24 147,706 
   Wholesale trade 390,036 14,671 1,204 405,911 149 406,060 
   Retail trade 678,713 12,743 1,065 692,521 235 692,756 
   Hotels and restaurants 254,311 14,504 683 269,498 106 269,604 
   Transports and communication 143,671 10,768 1,668 156,107 349 156,456 
   Real estate, leasing, computer and research activities 1,037,043 18,825 2,828 1,058,696 622 1,059,318 
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   Other activities and services 478,065 11,004 2,173 491,242 291 491,533 
 Total 4,117,489 196,090 21,867 4,335,446 3,320 4,338,766 
Source: Italian General Confederation of Enterprises, Professional Occupations and Self-employment on Istat data. 
 
In Italy, SMEs are a numerically meaningful economic reality: they account for 
99.9% (4,335,448) of the total number of firms (4,338,766). Furthermore, while 
almost all of them (95%) have less than 10 employees, a further 4.5% have 10–49 
employees (196,090 units) and just 0.5% of the total is made of larger firms with 
50–249 employees (21,867 units). 
 
Table 3.2.2  ITALIAN SMEs BY HEADCOUNT (%) (2009) 
   1–9 10–49 50–249 SMEs >250  Total 
Manufacturing 10.5 39.5 47.4 12.0 44.0 12.0 
Construction 13.7 14.9 6.7 13.7 2.5 13.7 
Services 75.8 45.5 45.9 74.3 53.5 74.3 
   Motor vehicle trade, maintenance and repairing  3.4 3.4 1.9 3.4 0.7 3.4 
   Wholesale trade 9.5 7.5 5.5 9.4 4.5 9.4 
   Retail trade 16.5 6.5 4.9 16.0 7.1 16.0 
   Hotels and restaurants 6.2 7.4 3.1 6.2 3.2 6.2 
   Transports and communication 3.5 5.5 7.6 3.6 10.5 3.6 
   Real estate, leasing, IT and research activities 25.2 9.6 12.9 24.4 18.7 24.4 
   Other activities and services 11.6 5.6 9.9 11.3 8.8 11.3 
 Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Source: Italian General Confederation of Enterprises, Professional Occupations and Self-employment on Istat data. 
 
As for sector, Italian SMEs, above all those with less than 10 employees, are 
concentrated in the service sector (about 76% of all SMEs), in particular, in real 
estate, IT, research and other professional activities (25.2%) and in retail trade 
(16.5%). As the firm size grows (10–249 employees), the number of SMEs active in 
the third sector falls (above 46%) but their presence in the manufacturing 
industry becomes more relevant (47.4%). 
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Table 3.2.3  ITALIAN SMES AND VALUE ADDED (2009) 
 
SMEs 
 
% 
Employees 
 
% 
Surplus 
value 
(1000 €) 
% 
Manufacturing 519,198 12.0 3,492,380 21.1 148,835,402 22.0 
Construction 594,591 13.7 1,793,391 10.8 59,399,186 8.8 
Services 3,221,657 74.3 8,069,880 48.7 274,606,567 40.5 
   Motor vehicle trade, maintenance and repairing  147,682 3.4 471,907 2.8 15,080,408 2.2 
   Wholesale trade 405,911 9.4 1,029,304 6.2 50,893,358 7.5 
   Retail trade 692,521 16.0 1,541,388 9.3 35,043,998 5.2 
   Hotels and restaurants 269,498 6.2 989,171 6.0 18,851,471 2.8 
   Transports and communication 156,107 3.6 657,816 4.0 27,613,451 4.1 
   Real estate, leasing, IT and research activities 1,058,696 24.4 2,173,787 13.1 90,070,813 13.3 
   Other activities and services 491,242 11.3 1,206,507 7.3 37,053,068 5.5 
Total of SME 4,335,446 99.9 13,494,473 81.4 490,030,100 72.4 
Total of firms 4,338,766 100.0 16,578,551 100.0 677,232,011 100.0 
Source: Italian General Confederation of Enterprises, Professional Occupations and Self-employment on Istat data. 
 
SMEs are not just numerically the framework of the Italian productive system, 
their contribution in terms of headcount is also important: they actually, employ 
more than 81% of the total workforce, above all in services (about 49%). This 
situation is wholly reflected in the surplus value creation: 72.4% of which is 
produced by SMEs (more than a half due to the SMEs working in the third sector). 
 
Figure 3.2.4 NUMBER OF SMEs PER INDUSTRIAL SECTOR IN JAPAN (2009) 
  SMEs TOTAL 
 of which small 
enterprises 
INDUSTRY YEAR NO. % of total NO. % of 
total 
NO. % of total 
Mining 
 
 
2001 
2004 
2006 
2,618 
2,306 
2,082 
99.7 
99.8 
99.8 
2,276 
2,027 
1,844 
86.6 
87.7 
88.4 
2,627 
2,311 
2,096 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
Construction 2001 
2004 
2006 
543,397 
507,086 
489,343 
99.9 
99.9 
99.9 
516,405 
484,828 
469,400 
95.0 
95.6 
95.7 
543,760 
507,405 
489,645 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
Manufacturing 2001 
2004 
2006 
549,830 
489,115 
455,621 
99.6 
99.6 
99.6 
489,306 
433,917 
401,597 
88.8 
88.4 
87.8 
550,951 
491,056 
457,623 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
Electricity, gas, heat 
supply and water 
2001 
2004 
2006 
510 
490 
537 
94.8 
94.6 
94.7 
266 
262 
295 
49.4 
50.6 
52.0 
536 
519 
567 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
Information and 
communications 
2001 
2004 
2006 
32,240 
30,815 
33,814 
96.8 
96.5 
96.5 
19,486 
19,356 
20,137 
59.5 
57.5 
57.4 
33,310 
31,944 
35,052 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
Transport 2001 
2004 
86,046 
80,479 
99.7 
99.7 
66,999 
62,345 
77.6 
77.2 
86,327 
80,741 
100.0 
100.0 
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2006 77,132 99.6 59,833 76.0 77,403 100.0 
Wholesailing/retailing 2001 
2004 
2006 
1,309,984 
1,160,117 
1,109,630 
99.5 
99.6 
99.6 
1,092,042 
958,117 
919,310 
83.0 
82.2 
82.5 
1,315,922 
1,165,258 
1,114,421 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
Finance and 
Insurance 
2001 
2004 
2006 
34,291 
30,192 
29,995 
99.1 
99.1 
99.1 
33,126 
29,120 
28,670 
95.8 
95.6 
95.4 
34,594 
30,475 
30,256 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
Real estate 2001 
2004 
2006 
297,092 
267,005 
265,710 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
293,792 
283,704 
282,344 
99.9 
99.8 
99.8 
297,176 
287,096 
285,812 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
Eating and drinking 
places, 
accommodations 
2001 
2004 
2006 
742,710 
677,377 
647,754 
99.9 
99.9 
99.9 
655,641 
597,990 
573,277 
88.2 
88.2 
88.4 
743,624 
678,260 
648,614 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
Medical, healthcare 
and welfare 
2001 
2004 
2006 
175,542 
178,743 
188,514 
99.9 
99.9 
99.9 
134,995 
136,096 
141,992 
76.8 
76.0 
75.2 
175,803 
178,992 
188,752 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
Education, learning 
support 
2001 
2004 
2006 
119,100 
114,720 
115,803 
99.9 
99.9 
99.9 
108,115 
104,167 
104,890 
90.7 
90.7 
90.5 
119,222 
114,843 
115,934 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
Compound services 2001 
2004 
2006 
3,960 
3,586 
3,717 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
3,956 
3,587 
3,707 
99.9 
100.0 
99.7 
3,960 
3,588 
3,718 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
Services (not 
otherwise classified) 
2001 
2004 
2006 
793,906 
763,757 
759,077 
99.8 
99.8 
99.7 
685,773 
662,353 
657,583 
96.2 
96.5 
96.5 
795,225 
765,648 
760,197 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
Non-primary industry 
total 
2001 
2004 
2006 
4,669,608 
4,325,790 
4,197,719 
99.7 
99.7 
99.7 
4,102,169 
3,776,863 
3,663,089 
97.2 
97.1 
97.0 
4,703,039 
4,338,135 
4,210,070 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
Source: METI White Paper on Small and Medium Enterprises in Japan, 2009: as recompiled from MIC, Establishment and 
Enterprise Census of Japan. 
 
According to the 2009White Paper on Small and Medium Enterprises in Japan 
of the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry of Japan (METI), what seems not 
to be different from Italy is the weight of SMEs both in number and employed 
workforce in the whole economy. As Table 3.2.1 shows, Japanese SMEs and small 
enterprises, which number as many as 4.2 million, account for 99.7% of the total 
number of Japanese enterprises in the non-primary sector.  
 
Figure 3.2.5 NUMBER OF EMPLOYEES IN SMEs PER INDUSTRIAL SECTOR IN JAPAN 
(2009) 
 SMEs TOTAL 
   of which small 
enterprises 
  
INDUSTRY NO. % of total NO. % of total NO. % of total 
Mining 21,559 97.3 10,361 42.0 24,686 100.0 
Construction 2,580,524 96.3 1,511,535 50.6 2,988,672 100.0 
Manufacturing 5,603,145 61.4 1,429,868 15.7 9,123,964 100.0 
Electricity, gas, heat 
supply and water 
27,477 14.4 2,416 1.3 190,769 100.0 
Information and 
communications 
662,951 46.6 59,108 4.2 1,422,454 100.0 
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Transport 1,820,994 71.2 242,145 9.5 2,557,336 100.0 
Wholesaling/retailing 5,597,776 62.7 1,017,892 11.4 8,922,379 100.0 
Finance and Insurance 155,016 15.6 55,310 5.6 995,401 100.0 
Real estate 471,241 83.1 226,571 39.9 567,159 100.0 
Eating and drinking 
places, accommodations 
1,994,074 73.1 661,499 24.2 2,728,893 100.0 
Medical, healthcare and 
welfare 
955,592 90.5 262,305 27.7 945,309 100.0 
Education, learning 
support 
322,985 79.0 69,225 16.9 408,722 100.0 
Compound services 3,069 95.4 2,795 96.6 3,217 100.0 
Services (not otherwise 
classified) 
3,930,724 72.1 676,554 12.4 5,451,162 100.0 
Non-primary industry total 24,047,018 66.2 6,227,592 17.1 36,330,141 100.0 
Source: METI White Paper on Small and Medium Enterprises in Japan 2009: as recompiled from MIC, Establishment and 
Enterprise Census of Japan. 
 
As for the industry, apart from the real estate and compounded services sectors, 
and the electricity, gas, heating and water supply sector, where the share of SMEs 
on the total is 100% and 94.7%, respectively, in all the sectors SMEs account for 
more than 99% of the total number of firms. Furthermore, they absorb almost 
70% of Japan’s labor force and generate half of national GDP in the 
manufacturing industry. 
 
Figure 3.2.6 VALUE ADDED OF SMEs IN JAPAN (MANUFACTURING INDUSTRY) (2009) 
 1995 2000 2005 2007 
No. 
WORKERS 
    
4-9 7,322 
6.2 
6,531 
5.9 
4,942 
4.6 
4,321 
4.0 
10-19 7,453 
6.4 
6,760 
6.1 
5,917 
5.7 
6,483 
6.0 
20-99 27,402 
23.4 
26,014 
23.6 
23,349 
22.4 
23,515 
21.7 
100-299 22,935 
19.6 
23,168 
21.0 
23,648 
22.7 
23,261 
21.5 
300-999 25,564 
21.8 
24,707 
22.4 
23,754 
22.6 
24,613 
22.7 
1,000 or more 26,567 23,063 22,726 26,164 
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22,6 20.9 21.8 24.1 
4-299 65,113 
55.6 
62,472 
56.7 
57,756 
55.4 
57,590 
53.1 
10-299 57,791 
49.3 
55,942 
50.7 
52,914 
50.8 
53,259 
49.2 
300 or more 52,091 
44.4 
47,770 
43.3 
46,480 
44.6 
50,777 
46.9 
TOTAL 117,204 
100.0 
110,243 
100.0 
104,236 
100.0 
106,357 
100.0 
Source: METI White Paper on Small and Medium Enterprises in Japan 2009: 
as recompiled from MIC, Establishment and Enterprise Census of Japan. 
 
 
3.3 SMEs In The Textile Sector In Italy And Japan 
 
As for the relative economic weight of SMEs, the textile industry both in Italy 
and Japan seems to reflect the situation of the manufacturing sector. 
According to the Eurostat database, updated to 2007, the SMEs in the textile 
sector account for 99.8% of the total number of firms, 83% of which is composed by 
firms with less than 10 employees. In addition, 81.8% of the workers in the textile 
sector work in SMEs, accounting for the 9% of the total workforce in the 
manufacturing sector (376,452 workers). 
 
Table 3.3.1 ITALIAN SMEs IN THE TEXTILE SECTOR – NUMBER OF FIRMS, BY 
HEADCOUNT (2007) 
 1–9 10–49 50–249 TOTAL 
SME 
>250 TOTAL 
TEXTILE 48,717  
(83%) 9,005 954 58,676 127 58,803 
MANUFACTURING 
431,319 77,504 10,375 519,198  1,460 520,658 
TOTAL 
4,117,489 (95%) 196,090 21,867 4,335,446  3,320 4,338,766 
Source: Eurostat 2007 
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Table 3.3.2 ITALIAN SMEs IN THE TEXTILE SECTOR – NUMBER OF FIRMS, EMPLOYEES 
AND VALUE ADDED (2007) 
 No. of 
SMEs 
%  EMPLOYEES % SURPLUS 
VALUE 
(1000 €) 
VALUE 
ADDED  
TEXTILE 58,676 
 
99.8 
 
308,063 
(9% t.mnf) 
81.8 
 
16,578 
(11%t.mnf) 
77.3 
(9%t.mnf) 
MANUFACTURING 519,198 
 
99.7 
 
3,492,380 
 
75.1 
(25 tot) 
148,835 
 
68.4 
 
TOTAL SMEs 4,335,446 99.9 13,494,473 81.4 490,030 72.4 
Source: Eurostat 2007 
 
The value added of the textile sector in Italy accounts for more than 10% of the 
total value produced by manufacturing activities. In particular, textile SMEs 
produce 77.3% of the value added of the textile sector, which represents 9% of the 
total value produced by the manufacturing sector (€233,473,000). The rate of 
value added produced by textile SMEs exceeds by approximately 5% the rate of 
value added by SMEs in the manufacturing sector overall, confirming the high 
specialization of the textile activities of Italian SMEs. 
In the 2009 METI White Paper on Small and Medium Enterprises in Japan as 
recompiled from the Establishment and Enterprise Census of Japan of the 
Ministry of Internal Affair and Communications (MIC), the SMEs in the textile 
sector account for 99.8% of the total number of firms, 78% of which were composed 
by firms with less than 20 employees.  
 
Table 3.3.3 JAPANESE SMEs IN THE TEXTILE SECTOR – NUMBER OF FIRMS BY 
HEADCOUNT (2009) 
 SMALL FIRMS  
(<20) 
TOTAL SME  
(<300) 
BIG FIRMS 
(>300) 
TOTAL 
TEXTILE 
13,435 17,122 29 17,151 
MANUFACTURING 401,597  
 
455,621  
 
2,002  
 
457,623 
 
TOTAL 3663,069 
 
4,197,719 
 
12,351 
 4,210,070 
Source: METI White Paper on Small and Medium Enterprises in Japan 2009, as recompiled from MIC, Establishment and 
Enterprise Census of Japan. 
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In the textile industry in Japan, SMEs employ almost all the workforce of the 
sector. In fact, 95.4% of the workers in the textile sector (amounting to 311,000 
workers in total) work in SMEs, accounting for more than 5% of the total 
workforce in the manufacturing sector. Japanese textile SMEs produce 93.2% of 
the value added of the sector, which represents approximately 2% of the total 
value produced by the manufacturing sector. If we compare this figure with the 
value produced by SMEs in the manufacturing sector (57.7%), we can deduce how 
fundamental SMEs are in the creation of value for the entire sector. 
 
Table 3.3.4 JAPANESE SMEs IN THE TEXTILE SECTOR – NUMBER OF FIRMS, WORKERS AND 
VALUE ADDED (2009) 
 SMEs RATE  WORKERS  RATE SURPLUS 
VALUE 
(billion yen) 
VA 
RATE 
  
TEXTILE 17,122 
 
99.8% 
 
296,700 
(5.2% t.mnf) 
95.4% 
 
1.566 
(2.1% t.mnf) 
93.2 
 
 
MANUFACTURING 
 
455,621 
 
99.6% 
 
5,603,145 
 
61.4% 
(39.6% tot) 
57.590 
 
57.7 
 
TOTAL 
4,197,719 99.7% 24,047,019 66.2% 138.717 53.8 
Source: METI White Paper on Small and Medium Enterprises in Japan 2009 as recompiled from MIC, Establishment and 
Enterprise Census of Japan. 
 
 
3.4 The Textile Industry In Japan (1985–2011) 
 
Soon after the Second World War, the steel industry, in particular the 
production of coal, was identified by the Japanese government as the key industry 
for the country’s economic reconstruction. In the 1950s, the growth of this 
industry was supported by the demands of special procurement generated by the 
Korean War and the growth of the shipbuilding industry. Also the development of 
the chemical industry, especially the production of fertilizers – important to avoid 
the risk of food shortage – was one of the tasks of the Japanese government after 
the war. 
In reality, the cornerstone of industrial development of Japan after the Second 
World War was the textile industry. In 1955, the export  of goods in the textile 
sector was higher than that of the chemical, steel and transport equipment 
industries, and second only to the food industry. Therefore, in the second half of 
the fifties, Japan became the largest exporter of textiles in the world. At that time, 
the textile industry became the main source of foreign currency and the economic 
base of Japanese economic reconstruction. 
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In the sixties, although the interest of the government moved to processing 
industries, such as electric and transport equipment, the textile industry 
remained in fifth place until the mid-sixties and it kept its importance also in 
terms of employment. 
Notwithstanding this, in the second half of the 1950s there was a 
transformation in the textile industry: in fact, over-capacity in the processing of 
natural fibers (cotton and other staple fiber spinning) caused production cutbacks 
in the sector in favor of synthetic fibers. At the same time, restrictions on imports, 
which were spreading in every country at that time, encouraged the synthetic 
fiber industry to focus its marketing strategies and the activities of sales 
promotion on the domestic market and this stimulated the growth of the domestic 
clothing industry in the 1960s. The high-growth period of the sixties and seventies 
allowed the apparel industry to develop with an average growth rate of 10%. 
Once, in the second half of the sixties, the “quantitative” needs of the demand 
were satisfied, consumers began to demand “quality” and to follow the trends 
dictated by fashion designers and apparel makers from season to season. Until 
the early 1980s, the final market consumption exceeded 10 trillion yen. Thus, in 
the second half of the 1970s, the focus shifted from the textile industry, which 
produced goods and managed the sales of “tangible” goods, to the fashion industry 
which, through fibers and textile manufactures, sells “fashion content and ideas”, 
which are intangible assets. 
For this reason, the textile vision published by the government in November 
1988, promotes fashion (“fashionablization”), along with the promotion of a high 
technology and high value-added fashion industry as the necessary direction of 
development of the textile industry. The process of “fashionablization” of the 
textile industry, although still incomplete, appears still to be the primary means 
for the revitalization of the Japanese textile industry. 
As an analysis of the data from industrial statistics of Japan show, 
notwithstanding its long history and high quality and accuracy of production, 
nowadays the Japanese textile industry, is, unlike Italy, considered a “sunset 
industry” as Japan seems to rely more year by year on foreign imports of textiles 
and clothes.  
In particular, with the entry into the WTO in 2001, all barriers to Chinese 
exports were been removed and, using its powerful productive capacity and 
competitive power based on price, China became the first clothing exporter in the 
world. 
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The abolition of the Multi Fiber Agreement (MFA)16 in 2005, which had been 
promulgated in 1974 and repeatedly renewed every four years, completed the 
transition to a system of free trade, and this has enabled China to extend its 
power of supplying clothing goods and to strengthen its price competition. In this 
context, Japanese textile producers, rather than begin a process of increasing the 
added value and product differentiation, have adopted an industrial strategy 
based on price through a streamlined management and relocation abroad of 
industrial activities. 
The textile industry in Japan is still an important industry that employs 5% of 
the number of the total number of workers employed in the manufacturing sector 
and produces around 2% of the total industrial value (see Tables 1 and 2 in the 
appendix at the end of the dissertation). 
In Figure 3.4.1 the trend in the number of firms and employees in the textile 
and apparel (T&A) sector from 1985 to 2010 is analyzed. After a period of growth 
in the first half of the 1980s, in 1985 the number of T&A firms was stable at 
142,083 (91,106 textile firms and 50,977 apparel firms). But, after the burst of the 
bubble in 1991 a violent decrease started that in 2010 cut it off to just one third 
(44,447 firms) of the number in the 1980s (Table 1 in the appendix). 
 
Figure 3.4.1 NUMBER OF FIRMS AND EMPLOYEES IN THE TEXTILE AND APPAREL 
SECTORS IN JAPAN (1985–2010) 
 
Source: author’s own elaboration on Establishment and Enterprise Census of Japan. 
                                            
16 The Multi Fiber Arrangement (MFA, 1974–2005) imposed quotas on the amount developing countries could export to 
developed countries. It was introduced in 1974 as a short-term measure intended to allow developed countries to adjust to 
imports from the developing world, given that developing countries have a natural advantage in textile production because it 
is labor intensive and they have low labor costs. 
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The same phenomenon happens to the number of employees, which fell from 
1,302,711 in 1985 to 352,945 in 2010, down to almost one third of the peak period 
in the 1980s. Both the decreases were more dramatic in the textile sector, because, 
actually, until 1995 the apparel sector registered a small increase (from 50,977 to 
56,546 firms and from 582,897 to 644,258 employees, see Table 1 in the appendix). 
 
Figure 3.4.2 TREND OF VALUE ADDED IN THE TEXTILE AND APPAREL SECTORS IN 
JAPAN (1985–2010) 
 
Source: author’s own elaboration on Establishment and Enterprise Census of Japan. 
 
Figure 3.4.3 VALUE OF IMPORTS AND EXPORTS OF CLOTHING AND ACCESSORIES IN 
JAPAN (1988–2011) 
 
Source: author’s own elaboration on Statistical Yearbook of Japan. 
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If we consider the added value produced in the T&A sector (Fig. 3.4.2), we can 
note that it kept growing until the 1990s (from 5,028,041 trillion yen to 5,640,082 
trillion yen) to finally decrease in 2010 to less than one third (1,524,138 trillion 
yen) of the peak period. Although the apparel sector continued to grow even after 
the burst of the bubble (1,798,208 trillion yen in 1985 and 2,443,260 trillion yen in 
1995) and the value added of the textile sector was double the total value of the 
apparel sector until the 1990s (3,332,278 trillions yen), nowadays they both 
produce around 1 trillion yen, equal to 2% of the total manufacturing value. Even 
though the value of the T&A sector as a share of the total manufacturing value 
fell from the initial 5% to the current 2%, its change reflects the trend of the 
general economic situation, confirming a general situation of depression of the 
sector (Table 2 in the appendix). 
The reduction of the national production is strictly related to the fact that, since 
the 1990s, Japan has started to cover the national demand for clothing with 
foreign imports (Fig. 3.4.3). More than 80% of the deficit trade of clothing and 
accessories is represented by Chinese clothing, followed by Vietnamese, Italian 
and American products (Fig. 3.4.4, Table 8 in the appendix). 
 
Figure 3.4.4 DISTRIBUTION OF CLOTHING IMPORTS TO JAPAN (2011) 
 
Source: author’s own elaboration on Statistical Yearbook of Japan 
 
On the contrary, Japan registers a surplus in the trade of textile intermediate 
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products (Fig. 3.4.6). The exports of yarn and thread, after a certain decrease in 
the 1990s, from 1995 to 2005 grew from 665 hundred million yen to 749 hundred 
million yen, while the imports registered a decreasing trend (even though 
controverted by a considerable reprise in 2011, Table 3 in the appendix).  The 
same trend can be observed for woven fabrics and textile materials (Table 3.4.6). 
In particular, while the imports reduced to approximately a half from 1990 to 
2011 (from 181,893,406 to 99,030,999 hundred million yen, Table 4 in the 
appendix), the exports of the same type of goods, which were increasing before the 
1990s, sharply decreased between 1990 and 1995 (from 676,659,688 to 
563,260,758 hundred million yen, Table 3 in the appendix), and after a series of 
ups and downs, in 2011 rested at approximately the same level as in the 1980s. By 
the way, the imports of woven fabrics and textile materials account for just one 
quarter of the imports of the same type of product. 
 
Figure 3.4.5 DISTRIBUTION OF CLOTHING EXPORTS FROM JAPAN (2011) 
 
 Source: author’s own elaboration on Statistical Yearbook of Japan 
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Figure 3.4.6 VALUE OF IMPORTS AND EXPORTS OF TEXTILE YARN AND WOVEN 
FABRICS TO JAPAN (1988–2011) 
 
Source: author’s own elaboration on Statistical Yearbook of Japan 
 
This may appear proof of the relative competitive power of Japanese textiles but, 
actually, it is more likely to represent the fact that the production of final goods 
(clothing) is now transferred out of Japan. This reason can explain both the 
increase of exports of textiles and yarn and the decrease of imports of the same. 
Japan still produces intermediate goods (yarn and fabrics), but these are 
processed abroad and re-imported as final goods. In fact, the share of imports of 
textiles from China rests at around 30%. On the whole, the imports from Europe 
are high, with Germany registering 3% and Italy and Holland at 1% (Fig. 3.4.7, 
Table 6 in the appendix).  
As for the exports, almost a half of the total exports are to China (49%) with 
Asian countries on the whole absorbing more than the 80% of the demand for 
Japanese textiles; this demonstrates that textiles, intermediate goods, are 
exported from Japan to low-labor-cost countries like China and Vietnam, 
assembled there to final goods and reimported to Japan (Fig. 3.4.8, Table 5 in the 
appendix). 
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Figure 3.4.7 DISTRIBUTION OF TEXTILE YARN AND FABRICS IMPORTS  
TO JAPAN (2011) 
 
Source: author’s own elaboration on Statistical Yearbook of Japan 
 
Figure 3.4.8 DISTRIBUTION OF TEXTILE YARN AND FABRICS EXPORTS  FROM JAPAN (2011) 
Source: author’s own elaboration on Statistical Yearbook of Japan 
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In conclusion, the trend of the T&A sector in Japan may be summarized as 
follows: 
– although it employs 5% of the number of the workers employed in the 
manufacturing sector and produces around 2% of the total industrial value, 
national production of textiles (and clothing) is in an evident state of 
hollowing-out and stagnation (number of firms and workers and the rate of VA on 
the manufacturing sector amount, respectively, to one third and a little more than 
one third of the relative figures of the 1980s); 
– the deficit of the balance of payments in the trade of clothing and accessories is 
outstanding: exports of final goods (clothing and accessories) amount to just the 
2% of the imports of the sector; 
– the positive trend in the exports of yarn seems, instead, to confirm the 
superiority of Japan in the production of intermediate goods, compared to its 
Asian partners; 
– 90% of the imports of clothing and accessories come from China (81%) and 
Vietnam (8%), where Japan exports almost 60% of its intermediate products (yarn, 
fabrics), this demonstrates that relative low-labor-costs countries like China and 
Vietnam still act as “manufacturing/assembling base” for the production of 
clothing which, once finished, is reimported to Japan. 
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3.5 The Textile Industry In Italy (1981–2011) 
 
The Italian textile and apparel industry is the European leader. Italy belongs to 
the leading global exporters of both textiles and apparel (Fig. 3.5.1).  
The T&A sector is an important part of the European manufacturing industry. 
It plays a crucial role on the economy and social wealth in numerous regions of the 
EU-27. According to the latest structural data available, in 2006 there were 
220,000 companies employing 2.5 million people and generating a turnover of 
€190 billion. The T&A sector accounts for 3% of total manufacturing value added 
in Europe. 
 
Table 3.5.1 VALUE ADDED AND EMPLOYEES OF TEXTILE INDUSTRY IN EU (2005) 
 HIGHEST VALUE ADDED (1) LARGEST NO. OF PERSONS 
EMPLOYED (2) 
MOST SPECIALISED: 
SHARE IN THE NON 
FINANCIAL BUSINESS 
ECONOMY 
 COUNTRY EUR MIL % OF 
EU-27 
COUNTRY x1000 % OF 
EU-27 
VALUE ADDED 
(3) 
PERSONS 
EMPLOYED (4) 
1 Italy 21,766 33.6 Italy 636,0 21.2 Romania (5.3) Romania (11.6) 
2 Germany 7,806 12.1 Romania 425,1 14.2 Bulgaria (4.7) Bulgaria (10.9) 
3 France 7,483 11.6 Poland 278,1 8.8 Italy (3.4) Lithuania (5.6) 
4 Spain 5,937 9.2 Spain 223,7 7.5 Lithuania (2.9) Estonia (5.1) 
5 United 
Kingdom 
5,067 7.8 Bulgaria 195,7 6.5 Slovenia (2.7) Slovenia (4.9) 
(1) Denmark, Latvia, Malta, Portugal and Slovakia, not available; Bulgaria, the Netherland, Austria, Poland and 
Slovenia, 2005. 
(2) Denmark, Malta, Portugal and Slovakia, not available; the Netherland, Austria, Poland and Slovenia, 2005. 
(3) Denmark, Latvia, Malta, Portugal and Slovakia, not available; Bulgaria, Cyprus, Austria, Poland, Romania and 
Slovenia, 2005. 
(4) Denmark, Malta, Portugal and Slovakia, not available; Bulgaria, Cyprus, the Netherland, Austria, Poland, Romania 
and Slovenia, 2005. 
Source: Eurostat (2006) 
 
In 2006, the principal textile manufacturing member state was Italy, with €8.7 
billion of value added accounting for around 28.9%value added of the sector in the 
EU-27. The textiles manufacturing sectors in Germany, the United Kingdom and 
France were the next largest, together contributing just over one third (36.0%) of 
the EU-27’s value added. Looking at the number of persons employed in the sector, 
we can deduce that all three countries were relatively unspecialized in textile 
manufacturing, while, in contrast, Bulgaria (2005), Romania and Italy were 
relatively specialized in the manufacture of textiles, as this sector contributed 
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from the 3 to the 5% of the total value added in their respective non-financial 
business economies in 2006, between two and a half and three times the EU-27 
average. 
In Italy, this sector has grown successfully since the 1970s and revenues from 
this trade have contributed greatly to compensate for the negative balance in 
other economic sectors (power industry, food industry). The T&A sector is an 
essential part of the Italian manufacturing industry. It has a 10% share in Italy’s 
turnover, employment and exports, and generates one third of the Italian trade 
balance surplus. According to the latest ISTAT statistics, in 2011 over 50,000 
enterprises with over 4.5 million personnel were engaged in the T&A sector in 
Italy (Fig. 3.5.1, Table 9 in the appendix). 
 
Figure 3.5.1 NUMBER OF FIRMS AND EMPLOYEES IN THE TEXTILE AND APPAREL 
SECTORS IN ITALY (1981–2011) 
 
Source: author’s own elaboration on ISTAT statistics 
 
Although the industry decreased by more than 25% in the number of firms, more 
than 20% in the number of employees, and 10% of added value between 2001 and 
2011 (Fig. 3.5.2, Table 9 in the appendix), it still registers a positive trade balance 
both in trade of textile materials and in exports of clothing (Fig. 3.5.3, Tables 11 
and 12 in the appendix). 
In the 1990s, the Italian T&A industry and market experienced the effects of the 
globalization process. The response to this challenge was the strong 
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internationalization of Italian T&A enterprises, which is demonstrated by the 
substantial share of exports in the turnover, accounting for 60%. 
 
Figure 3.5.2 TREND OF VALUE ADDED IN THE TEXTILE AND APPAREL SECTORS IN 
ITALY (1981–2011) 
 
Source: author’s own elaboration on ISTAT statistics 
 
Figure 3.5.3 VALUE OF IMPORTS AND EXPORTS OF INTERMEDIATE AND FINAL 
PRODUCTS IN THE TEXTILE AND APPAREL SECTORS IN ITALY (1997–2011) (million €) 
 
Source: author’s own elaboration on ICE statistics 
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Italy’s positive trade balance concerns both the T&A industries, which 
distinguishes Italy from other European Union countries. In 2011, the export 
value of the T&A industries amounted to €19.950 million (€4.621 million surplus) 
which meant a 7% increase in the trade surplus in relation to the previous year 
(Table 12 in the appendix). 
The major consumers of Italian T&A goods are the European countries (Fig. 
3.5.5, Fig. 3.5.7, Fig. 3.5.9, Tables 14, 16 and 18 in the appendix), above all 
Germany (9–12%), France (7–12%), Spain (5–6%) and the UK (4–6%). In fact, the 
production activity of Italian enterprises plays the largest role in both the textile 
and the apparel sectors: 27% of the turnover and 24% of the investment of the old 
EU15 in the textile sector went to Italy (2003 Euratex Bulletin). 
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Source: ICE statistics (2011 
 
Romania’s high share in the exports of raw materials (11%) and intermediate 
materials (8%) demonstrates the role of manufacturing base the country has been 
playing for Italy in these years. Recently, a substantial increase has been 
observed with regard to exports of clothing to Russia (7%), which aligns with the 
US and exceeds that of Japan (5%). 
The same year, the import value amounted to €14.968 million, which meant a 
10% increase (Table 11 in the appendix). The major supplier of yarn, fabrics and 
clothing is China (Fig. 3.5.4, Fig. 3.5.6, Fig. 3.5.8, Table 13, 15 and 17): the 
imports of intermediate and finished goods from this country amounted to one 
third of the total imports. In the imports of raw materials or semi-finished goods – 
apart from the developing economies of Turkey, India and Pakistan – Germany 
and, among East Asian countries, Japan, stand out as suppliers of raw and 
intermediate materials for fabrics. 
To summarize the trend illustrated above in the T&A sector in Italy, it can be 
said that: 
– notwithstanding the decrease of more than 25% in the number of firms, more 
than 20% in the number of employees and of 10% of the value added between 2001 
and 2011, the T&A sector generates one third of the Italian trade balance surplus 
(exports account for the 60% of the turnover). In 2011 the sector registered a 7% 
increase in the trade surplus in relation to the previous year: this is proof of the 
high internationalization of the T&A sector in Italy; 
– the major consumers of Italian T&A goods are the European countries: in 2006, 
the principal textile manufacturing member state in the EU was Italy, whose 
 68 
value added accounted for around 28.9% of value added of the sector in the EU-27; 
– Romania’s high share in the exports of raw materials (11%) and intermediate 
materials (8%) demonstrates the role of manufacturing base the country has been 
playing for Italy. As for the export of clothing, recently, a substantial increase has 
been observed with regard to exports to Russia (7%), which aligns with the US 
and exceeds that of Japan (5%); 
– the major supplier of yarn, fabrics and clothing is China: the imports of 
intermediate and finished goods from this country amounted to one third of the 
total imports. In the imports of raw materials or semi-finished goods – apart from 
the developing economies of Turkey, India and Pakistan – the role of Germany 
and, among East Asian countries, of Japan, of supplier of raw and intermediate 
materials for fabrics stands out. Anyway, apart from China, the distribution of 
imports is balanced and this avoids the subordination to any foreign country for 
the supply of textile goods, above all yarn. 
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4.  The MID In Italy And Japan: Bishū  And Prato Districts 
As Typical MID, Pre-Globalization 
 
 
4.1 The MID As A Particular Category Of Industrial District 
To explain the distinctive features of the MID it would be useful to refer to the 
classification of IDs by Markusen (1996). Here the MID is depicted as one of the 
four main variants of industrial agglomeration (Marshallian Industrial District, 
Hub-and-spoke District, Satellite Industrial Platform and State-anchored 
Industrial District) according to a set of criteria like the presence/absence of a 
leader firm, structure (firm size), inter-firm relations and internal versus external 
orientations. This is a theoretical framework and, of course, a real cluster may 
have a mix of features of different clusters categories and over time they may 
mutate from one type to another, depending on industry, country characteristics 
or historical/economic circumstances. 
 
Table 4.1.1 MARKUSEN’S CLASSIFICATION OF ID 
 Marshallian Hub-and-spoke Satellite  State-anchored  
Leadership absent hub firm parent company state-financed anchor 
Structure local SMEs one/several large firms and suppliers 
external 
large firms 
one/several 
governmental 
institutions providing 
infrastructure 
Intra-district 
trade highly developed 
between large firms 
and suppliers minimal 
between institution 
and suppliers 
Cooperation with 
outside firms low high 
high with 
parent company 
high with 
parent institution 
Local firms 
level of activity high 
low 
(except for services) low/moderate low/none 
Buyer-producer 
cooperation high low low/none low 
Regulation of 
relationships long-term contracts 
long-term 
contracts short-term contracts 
short-term 
contracts 
Local cultural 
identity developed developed (intra-firm) virtually absent developed 
Sources of financial 
and technical 
assistance 
internal large firm external external (institution) 
Local trade 
associations strong presence virtually absent absent weak 
 Source: author’s rearrangement of Guerrieri and Pietrobelli (2001)’s own elaboration from Markusen (1996) 
 
The hub-and-spoke ID occurs when one or more firms act as anchors or hubs to 
the regional economy, with suppliers and related activities spread around them 
like the spokes of a wheel. There may be a single large – often 
vertically-integrated – firm (Toyota in Toyota City ,Japan or Fiat in Piedmont, 
Italy) or several large firms in one or more sectors which act as hubs surrounded 
by smaller suppliers (like Ford, Chrysler GM and their suppliers in Detroit). It 
implies that the ties between the hub-firm and the spokes-suppliers may be 
strong, as in the first case, or loose (externalities derived from proximity) as in the 
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second example.  
Unlike the MID, the large hub-firms in the hub-and-spoke ID have links to 
suppliers, competitors and customers outside the district, which channel the 
transfer of new ideas and technology to the district and may also drive the hub 
company to a more profitable area out of the region. The lack of cooperation about 
competitors is substituted by inter-firm, often long-term and hierarchical, 
relationships between the large firms and their suppliers. Since the relationships 
between the large firms and their suppliers are not equal, the former may 
deliberately play off one supplier against another in order to get more favorable 
conditions. 
The hub-firm, often active in more than one industry, thanks to the multiple 
linkages with other firms and providers, may lead the ID to venture into new 
sectors and foster the diversification/reorganization of production of the district, 
with the spoke-firms setting up alternative links and benefiting from the 
agglomeration economies generated by the district. It is hard to imagine that the 
same process of development could happen within the Marshallian ID, because 
the SMEs would not be able to undertake the same radical change and they have 
hardly any ties with outside firms. 
The satellite platform is an agglomeration of branch facilities of 
externally-based large firms, induced by governmental selected policies. Key 
investment decisions are made out of the district and sources of financing and 
technical assistance are external. Since platform firms are often engaged in 
different industries and activities (processing of parts and components, assembly, 
research etc.), intra-district trade and collaboration among inside firms is 
virtually absent and the firms are independent from upstream and downstream 
operations. Thus type of ID appears more adequate to portray the situation in 
industry-oriented developed countries (i.e. Oita in Japan for electric parts and 
components). 
A state-anchored district emerges as a consequence of government-planned 
policies. Industrial activities are anchored to a region by a public or non-profit 
entity, such as a military base, a university or a concentration of government 
offices. Examples of “business parks”, “science parks” or the like, set up through a 
government initiatives to finance and promote a local institution (training center, 
quality control agency, laboratory, R&D facility etc.) may fall within this category 
(i.e. research complex like Tsukuba in Japan). The growth of local firms in this 
district category appears to be highly influenced by the existence of local 
additional competitive factors, such as local demand, presence of skilled labor, 
financial institutions and  the like. 
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Of course a real cluster may be a mix of features of different cluster categories 
and over time they may mutate from one type to another, depending on industry, 
country characteristics or historical/economic circumstances. Thus, a Marshallian 
ID may turn into a hub-and-spoke ID with the emergence of larger oligopolistic 
companies (Detroit, cars). Inversely, a hub-and-spoke might convert into a MID 
following the failure or loss of influence of the hub-firm and a 
democratization/fragmentation of inter-firm relations (Los Angeles, aerospace 
industry). Still, satellite platforms may transform into MID by strengthening and 
intensifying backward and forward linkages among SMEs which are suppliers of 
intermediate goods and competitors for the same final market (Japanese car 
plants in the US); however, if larger firms prevailed and established hierarchical 
hub-and-spoke links, a hub-and-spoke district might in turn prevail (Japanese car 
plants in the US). 
Unlike the Hub-and-spoke ID, Satellite Industrial Platform and 
State-anchored Industrial District, the MID, instead, is not a sheer concentration 
of manufacturing and service processes realized by (internal or external) firms, 
which are – horizontally or vertically – formally linked, and which are attracted to 
a determined location by a series of local comparative advantages. Neither is the 
ID a geographical distribution of industries boosted by governmental or research 
organizations, but instead a complex social system, since it is the local society that 
provides the formation of a socio-cultural environment suitable to different forms 
of industrial organizations (Sforzi, 2000).  
 
 
4.2 Bishū And Prato Districts As Typical MID, Pre-Globalization: 
Common Points 
 
The author analyzed statistics from METI on Industrial Production, statistics 
of the Japanese Small and Medium Enterprises Agency and Gifu and Aichi 
Prefectures, Italian census data and Prato Industrial Union statistics, hearings 
conducted in Bishū at the Industry Promotion Division of Gifu Prefecture and 
Gifu Wool Manufacturers Association in Ichinomiya and in Prato at the local 
Industrial Union (Studies Area) and at University of Florence (Department of 
Economics, Industrial Districts and Political Economic) and interviews realized 
with ten SMEs (textile converters, yarn spinning and processing firms suggested 
by the local Industrial Union and Wool Manufacturers Association) involved in 
the production of carded wool between 2009 and 2011. These have shown that, 
despite practical differences in their business culture and geographical location, 
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the districts of Bishū and Prato share a series of common points (a resumptive 
table of the tracks and subjects of the hearings and interview may be found at the 
end of the paper). 
 
Table 4.2.1 SHORT PRESENTATION OF THE DISTRICTS 
 BISHU PRATO 
DISTRICT  
COMPOSITION 
Seven municipalities from the 
neighboring prefectures of Aichi 
(Ichinomiya, Inazawa, Tsushima, 
Konan, Nagoya) and Gifu (Hajima, 
Nakamigahara) in western Japan. 
Twelve municipalities from the provinces 
of Prato (Prato, Cantagallo, Carmignano, 
Montemurolo, Poggio a Caiano, Vaiano, 
Vernio), Pistoia (Agliana, Montale, 
Quarrata) and Florence (Cadenzano and 
Campi Bisenzio) belonging to the region of 
Tuscany in central Italy. 
AREA/POPULATION 1,686.53 km²/4,994,773 inhabitants 700 km²/300,000 inhabitants 
PERIOD OF 
FORMATION 
Nara Era (710–794 CE, 
north-western part of Aichi)/ Meiji 
Era (1868–1912) 
Middle Ages (twelfth century) 
MAIN ACTIVITY wool production (70% of national 
production, first place in the country) 
wool production (textile district with the 
highest number of firms, employees and 
export sales) 
 
If we focus on the presence of a structure based on local SMEs, a sophisticated 
internal system of division of labour17 and a shared and embedded sub culture 
(long-term contracts based on trust relationships and a developed local cultural 
identity) as main elements by which classify industrial agglomerations as MIDs 
we may verify the applicability of the MID category to the district of Bishu (as it 
has already be done for Prato by the School of Florence exponents). 
First, the production of fabrics and clothes in both the districts is realized by 
SMEs: in Bishū, textile firms with fewer than 30 employees account for 92% of the 
total number of firms, the reason for which is likely that they absorb most of the 
district’s workforce (Table 4.2.3); in Prato, firms with fewer than 50 employees are 
more than half of the total number of firms, and they absorb more than 80% of the 
local workforce (Table 4.2.4). 
 
Table 4.2.2 TEXTILE DATA ON BISHU DISTRICT (2010)* 
 FIRMS WORKERS 1–29 EMPLOYEES 30–299 EMPLOYEES 
   FIRMS EMPLOYEES FIRMS EMPLOYEES 
TEXTILE 853 12,591 785 (92) - 68 (8) - 
FASHION  465 4,708 328 - 137 - 
T&F 1,318 17,299 1.113 - 205 - 
Note: given the absence of district-based statistics, Bishū district data are elaborated as aggregated data from the district 
single city data. 
Source: author`s own elaboration from 2010 METI Statistics on Industrial Production. 
 
                                            
17  The elements of higly-developed intra-district trade (low cooperation with outside firm), high buyer 
(converter) and producer (sub-contractors) cooperation, internal source of financial and technical assistance 
of Markusen’s classification of IDs may, in fact, be considered as sub-elements of the “division of labour”. 
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Table 4.2.3 TEXTILE DATA ON PRATO DISTRICT (2008) 
 FIRMS WORKERS 1-9 EMPL. 10-49 EMPL. >50 EMPL. 
   FIRMS EMPL. FIRMS EMPL. FIRMS EMPL. 
TEXTILE 4,984 21,380 3,176 (64) 9.005(42) 413 7,261 43 5,114 
FASHION 2,896 2,216   355 1.034 62 1,016 2 166 
T&F 8,898 30,511 3,193 10.170 822 15,010 60 5,331 
 Source: author`s own elaboration on Prato CCIAA 2008 data. 
 
In particular, the field research has revealed that both districts’ main 
production is carded wool fabric, in the production of which the SMEs of both 
districts share a similar productive structure. After the completion of spinning 
operations, the textile chain can be mainly divided into the two main stages of 
yarn twisting and processing (dyeing and finishing) and fabric making (weaving) 
and processing (dyeing and finishing), activities undertaken by specialized firms 
or sub-contractors (“kobata” in Bishū, “imprese contoterzi/terzisti” in Prato). To 
coordinate these apparently fragmented manufacturing activities, there is a 
converter firm (called “lanificio/impresa finale” in Prato and “oyabata” in Bishū) 
that is in charge of the design and sale of the final product. Along the entire 
manufacturing chain, a set of independent SMEs work closely together taking on 
a single stage of production. 
Economics has traditionally conceived of transactions between steps in the 
same manufacturing chain as being temporary and opportunistic relationships or 
hierarchies of common ownership. At least in theory, whenever a non-integrated 
company deals with another company that performs the next phase of the chain, 
both stand to benefit from the other’s success. But usually, such companies 
struggle to keep any economic gains to themselves and often try to weaken a 
supplier or customer to ensure their profits, because in the widely followed 
competitive business model, it is strongly believed that companies will lose 
bargaining power and the ability to control profits as suppliers or customers gain 
strength. 
This implies that the relationship between companies connected only by 
free-market business transactions and guided by such a model of competitiveness 
is often guarded and rooted in fear that the other will become a competitor or 
engage in some other opportunistic behavior. Naturally, such companies tend to 
share as little information as possible, and consequently managers often lack 
knowledge of the activities elsewhere along the chain. 
The conventional solution for ending such destructive games and for controlling 
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resources is vertical integration. When organizations along the value chain are 
under one management, it is presumed that they can coordinate their activities, 
work toward a common purpose and, at the same time, realize economies of scale. 
But vertical integration has its weaknesses. In the process of exploiting their 
distinctive competences, many large, integrated companies emphasize one 
competitive dimension. In an integrated company, such focus can actually be a 
drawback, because the “centralized” strong culture makes it hard to perform tasks 
that require distinctly different orientations and values. So, for example, a large 
manufacturer that emphasizes mass production may have trouble responding to 
the market as an independent competitor.  
Furthermore, big makers and small sub-contractors do not always share the 
same business culture, especially for firms involved in transnational production 
processes and set apart from the headquarters site. Then, the big, very often 
transnational, scale of the production process hampers the control of efficiency, 
and the natural friction between centralization of management and 
decentralization of production makes it difficult for the big firm to renovate and 
promptly adapt to a changing context.  
But, at the same time, small size alone is not the answer. Many small 
companies that have open-market relationships with other businesses survive 
only at the whim of a larger competitor, customer, or supplier that could readily 
drive them out of business or acquire them if the margins become attractive 
enough. Always constrained by fierce competitiveness and trading partners that 
know no loyalty, they have little freedom to make financial and operating 
decisions that are best in the long run. 
The position and status between a small sub-contractor and the big 
commissioner is unbalanced: squeezed by the pressing delivery times and highly 
influenced by economic floatation of costs and prices, SMEs violently compete 
with each other to preserve their competitive advantage.  
In the MID the situation is different: in such a district a set of independent 
companies work closely together managing the flow of goods along the entire 
manufacturing chain. 
 At the center of each set of small companies is an independent master broker 
or converter. The converter manages the relationships among the various firms 
involved in the manufacturing process. They are facilitators and problem solvers 
who carry information from one place along the textile chain to wherever it will be 
most useful. They get involved in all aspects of the textile business: raw materials 
purchases, fabric design, production contracts, transportation, and sales. They 
look at the weaver’s samples for next year and if they think they will sell, take 
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them to customers all over the world. If the market objects to the weaver’s price, 
the converter may help the weaver find ways to trim costs. They also negotiate 
with raw materials suppliers and transportation providers.  
In Japan the role of the converter and of the trading company overlaps: it is 
often the trading company that examines samples from apparel companies, 
submits them to the converter and then manages the marketing and sales of the 
product in the national or international market. In this bottom-up process the 
converter often turns out to be nothing but an executor of external orders, 
although it is still in charge of the coordination of the overall manufacturing 
process. Anyway, the realization of production through an in-district highly 
specialized and efficient process of division of labor among independent but 
coordinated firms is unchanged. 
Each firm has certain special skills. One may be particularly good at producing 
high-quality fabrics, another may be expert at mixing colors. Work is contracted 
out to whichever firm can meet the market’s needs at the time. Each, therefore, 
has great incentive to stay in touch with fashion trends and environmental 
changes and to be ready to react quickly. Otherwise, it would lose business to 
other producers and might even go out of business. 
Therefore, a manufacturing chain organized according to the MID model seems 
to offer the best of both worlds: the coordination and scale associated with large 
companies and the flexibility, creativity, and low overheads usually found in 
small companies. The district firms share knowledge and insight but are not 
burdened with guidelines from a distant headquarters. They can act promptly, 
without having to consult a thick manual of standard operating procedures. 
 
 
4.3  The Manufacturing Chain Of Carded Wool Before Globalization 
In Prato And Bishū: The presence of a Sophisticated System of 
Division of Labour 
 
Natural conditions (in Japan, the Kiso and Nagara rivers’ plentiful and soft 
water, the Nobi plane’s rich soil and the mild weather in Bishū, and in Italy the 
Bisenzio and Arno rivers’ plentiful and soft water, Monteferrato hill’s scouring soil 
and the geographical position of Prato) favorable to textile dyeing and finishing 
operations, and the entrepreneurial spirit and risk propensity of local people 
(introduction of foreign machinery, starting up of innovative businesses) summed 
up with the effort of local research centers (Industrial Institute of Aichi Prefecture, 
University of Florence) and industrial bodies (Gifu Prefecture Wool 
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Manufacturers Association, Prato Industrial Union), are the main elements which 
boosted the rise of textile activities in both the districts. 
In pre-globalized Bishū, the district was a compact manufacturing centre (Fig. 
4.3.1).  
Figure 4.3.1 BISHU: MANUFACTURING STRUCTURE FOR CARDED WOOL 
(PRE-GLOBALIZATION) 
	 
Source: author`s own elaboration on 2009–2011 local survey 
 
Textile shosha (trading companies) are in charge of the supply of raw materials 
and yarn; apparel wholesalers examine the samples provided by textile firms, 
develop the project of the fabrics and commission the production to it. The 
converter (oyabata), a vacant textile firm (with no machinery), is the “in-district” 
manufacturing coordinator: it brings samples to apparel wholesalers, take orders 
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orders from it, transmits them to subcontractors and collects the final product, 
organizing production. Textiles are then sent to apparel companies for confection, 
through the trading companies’ distribution chain. The final user is the national 
market. 
Before globalization and its effects, Prato’s manufacturing structure was almost 
the same as that of Bishū, apart from the fact that the converter alone, without 
the mediation of trading companies and wholesalers, was in charge of the 
purchase of raw materials, project-making and the final products sale phase (Fig. 
4.3.2).  
Fig. 4.3.2 PRATO: MANUFACTURING STRUCTURE FOR CARDED WOOL 
(PRE-GLOBALIZATION) 
	 
	 
	 
Source: author`s own elaboration on 2009–2011 local survey 
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In both the cases, anyway, the source of financial and technical assistance 
remains internal to the district. 
Orders are executed by independent “commission processing plants”, which, as 
in Bishū, are in charge of a single manufacturing phase of carded wool production 
(yarn spinning, twisting, dyeing, weaving and fabric finishing operations). 
As a result of this, both in Bishū and Prato, local firms’ level of activity, which 
expresses itself in the division of labor in the manufacturing of carded wool, and 
intra-district trade in the related intermediate goods, is highly developed. While 
cooperation in production with outside firms is absent, the cooperation between 
locally-embedded buyer (converter) and producer (sub-contractors) is strong and 
based on long-term contracts and trust relationships. 
The last, but not least, point in common between the two districts is the fact 
that nowadays, as unique textile producers in the developed countries, they are 
pushed toward a reorganization of their productive structure in the light of the 
competitive pressure of globalization in the form of the increase of procurement of 
intermediate and final goods from developing countries (mainly China). 
 
 
4.4 Differences Between Prato And Bishū Districts 
 
Despite the similarities between the two districts, they also present a series of 
differences that, basically, concern the marketing and distribution process, and 
the targeted market. 
First of all, one of the differences between the two districts can be observed in 
the active role of trading companies in the marketing and distribution process. 
In Japan, general trading companies originated in the Meiji era from a number 
of large financial conglomerates (Mitsui, Mitsubishi, Sumitomo), while textile 
trading companies (Itochu, Marubeni, the old Tomen now Toyota Tsusho, the old 
Nichimen now Sojitsu, the old Gosho now Kanamatsu, Toyoshima, Moririn, and 
Chori) originate from textile wholesale houses established in the second half of 
the Edo period to sustain the development of local spinning industry. 
After the Edo period ended, in the Meiji era, when the government directed the 
modernization of the country, under the policies of “rich country, strong army” (?
???) and “promotion of industry” (????), the role of trading companies was 
to procure foreign currency by the exports of national mining resources, textile 
materials and food and to use it to import technologies and commodities from the 
more developed Western countries. 
In the 1950s, when the special procurement demand related to the Korean War 
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boosted Japanese economic development and the government, after the effort to 
make Japan a trading nation, started to promote business rationalization, 
Japanese trading companies also managed the procurement of raw materials from 
abroad and through “barter transaction” (trade with foreign trading companies) 
promoted the expansion of exports. With the era of rapid economic growth in the 
196s, Japanese makers started to develop their own marketing and distribution 
channels, but they still lacked the experience and business expertise in trading, or 
a large international network. They depended on the support of trading 
companies for conducting transactions in foreign languages, for the introduction 
of foreign technologies, machines and equipment, and the provision of information 
on national and international market trends. As representatives and mediators of 
makers in international and national transactions, trading companies promoted 
the development of national and international new markets and also executed the 
role of fund procurement and credit enhancement.  
The role of trading companies remains fundamental for Japanese SMEs 
nowadays. In particular, trading companies specializing in the textile sector serve 
as intermediaries between apparel manufacturers and textile producers: procure 
raw materials from the optimal source and, often, involve themselves directly in 
the production process and in the development of innovative materials.  
In addition, Japanese textile trading companies with their subsidiaries, branch 
offices and representative offices located abroad conduct a series of operations, 
from procurement of raw materials and textiles to production, but also market 
surveys and product planning, aimed at anticipating future trends as well as the 
logistics and marketing of finished products. Thanks to the exploitation of foreign 
business connections and the knowledge of foreign distribution channels, 
production and processing operations may be focused in the most suitable 
locations and final products are sold in markets where demand is high. 
Meanwhile, they promote the establishment of joint ventures abroad with 
Japanese and local investment partners, and work to enhance collaboration with 
leading local companies and promote local sales. 
In Italy, in contrast, the absence of big financial conglomerates and the relative 
fragmentation of markets prevented the formation of big trading companies. 
Consequently, commercial transactions and investments by manufacturers have 
been conducted on an individual base or with the support of private trading 
agents.  
In particular, in the T&A industry, enterprises are relatively numerous and 
limited in size; regarding distribution, a larger share of the Italian market 
belongs to traditional and independent retailers, while in the rest of Europe large 
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enterprises and specialized distribution networks prevail in the T&A industry. 
Finally, the customers of Italian T&A enterprises are highly heterogeneous: 
primarily manufacturing companies, then come retailers and finally large 
distributors from a large number of countries, including both traditional markets 
such as Germany, France and the United States and emerging markets 
(Romania). 
Independent retailers represented over half of apparel sales in the Italian 
market in 2002, while in Europe the share of retailers marginally exceeds 30% 
(Table 4.4.1). In the 1990s, independent retailers lost part of their share in the 
markets of EU member countries to specialized chain stores, department stores, 
hypermarkets and supermarkets. In Italy, the share of independent retailers has 
declined, but not as steeply as in other countries and it still remains at a very high 
level. 
 
Table 4.4.1 MAIN DISTRIBUTORS IN ITALY – SALES (1999, 2002, 2005) 
DISTRIBUTORS 1999 
% 
2002 
% 
2005 
% 
Independent retailers 55.7 54.0 52.0 
Specialized chain 
stores 
14.0 14.5 16.0 
Large wholesalers 15.0 16.0 18.0 
Door-to-door selling 9.8 10.8 10.0 
Other 5.5 4.7 4.0 
Source: Greta and Lewandoski (2010, p.23) 
 
The Italian distribution system has been seen as the main reason 
manufacturers in this sector have a strong competitive position. This special 
demand could have contributed to an improvement in the innovative capability of 
enterprises in the local systems (Greta and Lewandoski, 2010). 
Not only the distribution structure but also the markets are considerably 
fragmented, thus the importance of returns to scale for an individual enterprise is 
limited. This led to avoiding standard production and a focus on small market 
niches. In addition, textile manufacturers, apparel manufacturers and retail 
vendors participate collectively in the formulation of an offer for customers 
(Guercini, 2005) and are linked by asymmetric power relations with other entities 
that manage the distribution process (also large distributors of brand-name 
apparel), which is aimed at the market rather than at production. 
Another relevant difference between the districts may be found in the fact that 
 81 
in Prato, unlike Bishū, the final user, apart from large national fashion makers, is 
mainly the international market. This difference may be explained by the 
different historical background of the two districts: the historical rivalry with the 
Wool Guild of the neighboring city of Florence (the major municipality of the area) 
in the so-called Eta’ dei Comuni (Communes Era, 1100–1250) pushed the 
merchant-entrepreneurs of Prato (a minor municipality) from the beginning to 
seek the “support” of the international market. Thus thanks to the “cross-border” 
entrepreneurial spirit of the first local merchants-entrepreneurs and also the 
proximity to an already industrialized context as Europe was at the time, links 
with foreign economic realities were made long ago (France, Germany, England). 
In Japan, instead, the process of economic development, rationally driven and 
oriented by the government in Meiji era, allowed the district to focus its 
production on the domestic market, at the time large enough to absorb the whole 
production. This is particularly true for the T&A sectors and in contrast with 
what happened for the electronics and automobile sectors. In fact, products 
related to the T&A sector (and also beauty goods) did not have the margins or the 
market scale to rebuild the manufacturing infrastructure, create jobs or support a 
national economy that was eager to develop and become independent of the threat 
of Western colonialization, the way that electronics and automobiles did; and this 
is the reason why the internationalization of the textile (and apparel) sector was 
not conceived as a national priority. 
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5. Bishū  And Prato: Historical Background 
 
 
5.1 Presentation Of The Textile District Of Bishū 
 
The Bishū region is located in the middle of Honshu island, the main island of 
Japan, and lies in the Nobi plain, extending from the Aichi and Gifu prefectures 
whose boundary line is drawn by the course of the Kiso river. The textile district 
of Bishū includes seven municipalities from the neighboring prefectures of Aichi 
(Ichinomiya, Inazawa, Tsushima, Konan and Nagoya – the fourth largest city in 
Japan) and Gifu (Hajima and Nakamigahara). 
This area has become Japan’s 
representative textile industrial 
districts thanks to its peculiar and 
favorable natural conditions, 
among them the Kiso river’s 
plentiful and soft water, the Nobi 
plain’s rich soil and the mild 
weather. All the conditions above 
were suitable for mulberry 
cultivation (sericulture), cotton 
cultivation and for textile dyeing 
and finishing operations. 
Apart from a small production of 
chemical fibers and fabrics for 
curtains and interiors, the district, basically, 
specializes in wool production: the wool production of 
the district is 70% of national production and holds the first place in the country. 
The fine patterned thread and the elaborate weaving frame are the main 
characteristics of wool fabric produced the district. 
In Bishū, for each productive stage, there is a system of division of labor 
between a coordinator-enterprise, converter or master broker (oyabata), who 
projects the product, organizes production and sells the final product, and 
sub-contractor firms (kobata) responsible for intermediate level processes, from 
the operations of twisting and processing of the yarn to the manufacture of the 
fabric and its dyeing. Lacking in a predominant brand, the feature of the 
industrial district is the “small lot, big variety” of production, the short delivery 
time and the relatively competitive price of local makers. 
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Moreover, ever since before World War Two, the district has been accumulating 
all the main technology of the sector for the production of yarn and fabric, knitting, 
sewing and dyeing operations, apparel design technologies and so on. Hence the 
manufacturing process is realized without dispersion; for this reason, it was 
easier and more convenient to get any product at a shorter delivery time and a 
cheaper price rather than going to other manufacturing places. All the above 
implies that, as the main activity of the area, textile manufacturing is deeply 
interrelated with the overall economic development of the region. 
According to the 2008 industrial census of Bishū (Gifu and Aichi Prefecture), 
SMEs account for 99% of all manufacturing companies in the region and employ 
77.1% of the total workforce. Then, to prove the importance and the weight of the 
district in the sector, it should be stressed that nearby 30% of the national 
workforce in the textile industry is employed in Bishū industrial district. 
The textile industry was introduced into Japan from England during the 
Westernization of the Meiji era and it soon grew to become the leading industry of 
reconstruction and the leading sector of exports after the Second World War. In 
the 1960s textiles became the first controversial object of frictions with the US 
and in 1971 Japan was obliged to agree to self restriction of textile products on 
exports versus the American market. This generated an over-capacity crisis, 
which in conjunction with the endaka (evaluation of yen), the shortness of 
workforce, and the pay rises of the workforce, a large number of SMEs went out of 
business and pushed Japan toward the relocation of textile production to the NIEs 
(Taiwan, Korea) and ASEAN countries. As a result, in 1985 the textile industry 
switched from an export industry to an import industry. Japan started to import 
luxury brand goods from the US and middle or low cost products from Korea, 
Taiwan and Asean countries. 
A group of firms that applied rationalization and switched to national demand, 
by upgrading product quality and technology, managed to survive against 
commercial frictions, endaka, lack of workforce, the problem of generational 
succession, high labor and distribution costs. 
In the middle of this process, the north-western part of the prefecture of Aichi, 
including Ichinomiya, Bisai, Inazawa and Nakajima, had been prospering since 
the Nara era (710–794) as textile center (for flax fabrics), to the point that in just 
half a century-long industrialization period it became to be known before the 
Second World War as “The Kingdom of Wool” and, recently, as the greatest 
producing center of woolen fabrics in Japan.  
Originally, the district of Bishū became famous throughout Japan for weaving 
silk and cotton mixed textiles. Around 1800, in the Edo era, sumptuary laws by 
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the feudal government prohibited the production silk fabrics and the local 
manufacturers were forced to use cotton materials instead of silk. Since then, the 
region has prospered as a production center of cotton fabrics, above all patterned 
fabrics. From the Meiji era (1868–1912) the government strongly promoted the 
textile industry based on the measures for the national industrial promotion. 
Towards the end of the Meiji era the district succeeded in producing wool fabrics 
from worsted spun yarns and the region shifted to produce high quality wool 
fabrics in step with the times. The combination of changed materials with the 
preservation of accumulated textile traditions was made possible by the attitude 
to risk taking of a number of local entrepreneurs and the effort of local research 
bodies. 
 
 
5.2 Pre-Meiji And Meiji Period (1868–1912) 
 
Although “The Annals of the Three Kingdoms” proved that in Japan a fulled 
cloth, like felt, made of animal hair, and a fabric which mixed antelope hair and 
silk, was used as a precious gift to the gods and the imperial court, what is 
commonly known as wool officially entered Japan at the end of the Muromachi 
period (1336–1573). It was indeed in 1553 that a trading ship from Portugal 
brought to Japan a type of plain-weave carded wool (made of short and thick 
sheep hair), named “rasha” by local people. In this way, along with cultural 
penetration, wool started to penetrate Japan, even though it was a valuable good 
reserved to the samurai and imperial class. 
During the isolationism of the Edo period (1603–1867), wool was one of the 
goods carried by the foreign ships – more or less 300 – licensed to trade by the 
shogunate. It is at the end of this period that it starts to spread among the 
merchant class and also a more economical version of rasha made by the Dutch 
especially for Japanese people begun to be used for the clothes of ordinary people. 
National production of wool started to be promoted during Meiji period to 
respond to the needs of the newly established military corps (1870), whose 
uniforms resembled Western ones. Under the proposal of the minister Toshimichi 
Okubo, in 1875 the first government-run sheep farm and in 1879 the first wool 
processing firm (equipped with German machinery) were established in Tokyo 
(Senjuseujusho). This opened the way to the first private wool firm, established in 
1896 by Hirosaku Kondo. 
In contrast with national trends, during the Meiji era, Bishū was basically 
dedicated to the production of silk and cotton mixed woven textiles and in 1885 it 
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became the second textile area after Osaka. Famous since the Meiji era is the 
Sanhachi-ichi, the biggest clothes market at the period, held periodically in front 
of the Shinsoda temple, where wholesalers, sheep yarn traders and textile traders 
gathered. 
The development of infrastructure during the so-called “transport era” (stations 
of Ichinomiya city, Kisogawa along the Tokaido line railway, bridges over the Kiso, 
Nagara and Ibi rivers in 1886, and Gifu station in 1887) and the introduction of 
loom machines from abroad, made Bishū, already known in Japan for cotton yarn, 
hemp and silk clothes, Japan’s first cotton textile producing area in 1894. The 
region started, then, to produce serge fabrics and cotton and wool mixed weave 
from 1898 onwards. However, we need to wait for the effects of the First World 
War to see wool becoming the main product of the district. 
 
 
5.3 The First World War And Taisho Era (1912–1926) 
 
The causes of this shift from silk and cotton production to woolen textiles are 
attributable to the Nobi plain earthquake that affected silk production causing its 
slowdown, the growing westernization of clothes, technical progress (quadruple 
loom machines) and the entrepreneurial spirit of local businessmen. In 1929 the 
output for serge and rasha for clothing amounted at 10 millions yard. 
In Bishū area, wool production started at the beginning of the twentieth 
century, thanks to the efforts of the three “fathers of wool”: Harakichi Kataoka, 
Saichiro Kikuda and Seitaro Sumi. Kataoka, from Tsushima, after importing 
dyeing and processing machineries and quadruple looms from Germany, in 1909 
succeeded in mass production of serge, so drawing the attention of local textile 
makers. In the meantime, Kikuda, first director of the newly established 
Industrial Institute of Aichi Prefecture (1901) and Kataoka’s professor, managed 
to bring from Europe the district’s first and unique dyeing machine. Finally, the 
cotton producer Sumi, from Tsuyakin, bravely decided to embark on the new 
business and, after investing huge capital in German and English machinery, 
started his wool business in 1908. 
Thanks to the work and courage of these three men, from 1907, along with 
cotton and silk production, wool production was started in Bishū and it gradually 
rose to become the district’s main product: the district wool production amounted 
to 280,000 yen in 1907, 610,000 yen in 1908 (after the establishment of the 
Tsuyakin wool firm) and 1,380,000 yen in 1911. 
After the First World War, with the reduction of imported goods and the 
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introduction of the power loom in place of the wooden loom, that the district’s wool 
production rose to finally outstrip in 1924 the traditional cotton production. The 
diffusion of Western clothes and the rise of import tariffs were additional 
elements, which helped Bishū to develop until it was known as the “Wool 
Kingdom” or “Mecca of Wool”. 
 
 
5.4 Showa Period (1926–1989) And The Second World War   
 
Despite the previous success, the outbreak of the Second World War brought on 
a shortage of workforce and national interest shifted from textile to military 
industry. Bishū, which also experienced a terrible air raid, was severely damaged. 
During the war, apart from military-oriented production, enforcement 
measures and the new regulations negatively affected the textile industry. 
Materials procurement, production and product distribution, and woolen 
materials were strictly rationed. This caused the disappearance of virgin wool 
production, replaced by staple-fiber mixed wool. 
Passing through the chaos after World War II, the textile industry played an 
important role and driving force for the national economic restoration and it was 
designated by the government as one of the Japan’s key industries. Since then, 
the Bishū wool textile industry has attained a steady growth, well supported by 
the continued expansion of national consumer demand as well as the high 
popularity of European style clothing in Japan. 
After the end of the war, the demand for food and clothes grew and after the 
ban on wool imports and war regulations were lifted (1947), the textile industry 
started to flourish again18. In the 1950s, along with the special procurements for 
the Korean War, the labor-intensive textile industry, which unlike steel industry 
does not require big equipment facilities, was the real engine of the Japanese 
economic recovery. 
The end of the Korean war was followed by over-production and over-capacity 
crises and the 1954 Stability Law for SMEs made the registration of spinning 
machines compulsory and banned a further expansion of spinning factories. 
The 1960s are known as an era of chronic depression for the textile industry: 
the 1965 liberalization on imports of raw wool and on wool textiles and 
                                            
18 “Gachaman Era”, “Itohen boom” and textile makers’ “bank rush” are expressions used to describe the vitality of the sector 
at the time. For details refer to ???? (Waki, Y.)????????????????	 ????????????
??(The Mecca of Wool Bishū – 90 years of the Wool Industry in Bisai)????????????????. 
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preferential tariffs towards developing countries exposed Japan to severe 
international competition. Furthermore, self-limiting regulations on exports 
versus the US, adopted after the long and controversial Structural Impediment 
Initiatives (SII) negotiation, fixed quotas on Japanese exports. The 1971 oil crisis 
and the related reductions in orders, 1977–78 endaka and the second oil shock in 
1979, caused a recession in textiles production. 
From the second half of the 1980s, growth of the textile industry slowed down 
to the point it came to be listed as “sunset industry”. However, thanks to the rise 
of the “department store culture” and the related growth of ready-made clothes, 
supported by an effective growth in demand, the textile industry continued to 
grow. The wool boom, which lasted about ten years, definitely had the merit of 
having increased the country’s wealth but, from another side, with its idea of 
“unlimited demand” it is responsible for having weakened the sector’s project 
planning capacity. 
At the end of 1980s the textile sector tried to overcome the crisis through 
internal rationalization and kaizen activity, purchasing the overcapacity and 
reducing the number of businesses. In the Bishū district, the textile sector was 
one of the designated sectors of the District Reconstruction Law of 1979; the 
region committed to the development of new products, while preserving wool as 
the main product, and to expansion of national demand. Mass production was 
replaced by “high variety, small lot” production. 
To end this period, the 1990s bubble economy burst and the freezing of national 
demand, definitely drove consumers’ attention to low priced foreign goods. Unable 
to cope with high manufacturing costs, and following the appreciation of the yen 
in 1985, a high number of textile makers from the middle of the 1980s were forced 
to cease business.  
 
 
5.5 The International Context And Bishū (Ichinomiya) After 
Globalization 
 
In the late eighties and early nineties, the sudden increase of international 
competition due to the spread of globalization and the contraction of domestic 
demand highlighted the lack of competitive power of the Japanese textile industry. 
In this context, the Japanese textile industry was faced with a choice: 
– conduct competition based on price, through streamlined management and 
relocation abroad of industrial activities (i.e. China). 
– outsource the production of clothing or definitely leave it to developing countries 
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and shift towards the production of high-functionality fibers and industrial fibers, 
which require high technology and skills of product development and technology. 
– strengthen competitive power and target international luxury markets through 
an increase in added value and differentiation of products, developing a higher 
fashion content. 
In the nineties most of the Japanese textile industry chose to conduct 
competition based on price and to relocate their production abroad to take 
advantage of the lower costs of workforce, equipment and other resources (Table 
5.5.1). This strategy, even though it is a “stopgap measure” to react to the crisis of 
competitiveness, in reality, is not sustainable in the long run and will lead to a 
gradual decline. As a consequence of the relocation of production abroad of some 
firms and the cessation of local businesses, in Bishū, the number of firms 
decreased by 38% between 1990 and 1995 and 33% between 1995 and 2000.  
 
Table 5.5.1 RELOCATION OF JAPANESE UP-STREAM* FIRMS IN ASIA (2007) 
COUNTRY NUMBER OF FIRMS 
China 20 firms, 54 factories 
Malaysia 4 firms, 11 factories 
Philippines 1 firm, 1 factory 
Korea 2 firms, 2 factories 
Thailand 7 firms, 10 factories 
Indonesia 13 firms, 37 factories 
Note: *Manufacturers of synthetic fibers and spinning mills 
Source: METI, The State of Textile Industry and the Environmental Change, 2007 
 
Between 1990 and 1995 the district experienced the sharpest reduction in both 
the number of firms and of workers: the number of workers fell by approximately 
34% in just five years. The decreasing trend in the number of firms continued 
until 2005, although at a slower pace, to finally register an increase of 20% in the 
2009, probably due to the sudden increase of outerwear firms in the district, as 
revealed by the change in the composition of the textile sector in Ichinomiya – a 
representative city of the district for the concentration of textile activities – 
between 2006 and 2010. The decrease rested at 7% between 2000 and 2005, to 
further increase to 13% between 2005 and 2010 despite the relative increase in 
the number of firms and workers in the same period (Table 5.5.2, Fig. 5.5.1). This 
may also indicate a decrease in the price of the final goods due to the increasing 
imports of yarn and, above all, final goods from Chinese suppliers. The number of 
employees experienced a more than proportional decrease: the number of workers 
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employed in the textile sector in the district decreased by 52% in just five years, 
between 1990 and 1995, and by 35% between 1995 and 2000 (Table 5.5.2, Fig. 
5.5.1).  
 
Table 5.5.2 ECONOMIC DATA OF BISHU DISTRICT (1988–2010) 
?
NUMBER OF 
FIRMS 
NUMBER OF 
WORKERS 
SALES 
 (10,000 YEN) 
GVA 
(10,000 YEN) 
1988 2,061  30,826  56,710,811  12,538,970  
1990 1,888 28,381  56,060,524  14,125,951  
1995 1,180 18,726  35,945,332  10,174,600  
2000 794 12,213  22,682,254  6,975,322  
2005 718 11,239 20,958,666 5,858,709 
2009 853 12,591 19,329,187 7,438,313 
2010 778 11,609 18,154,889 6,959,409 
Note: aggregation of economic data from Nagoya, Hanejima, Ichinomiya, Tsushima, Kakamigahara, Konan, Inazawa  
Source: author’s own elaboration from METI Industrial Statistics  
 
Figure 5.5.1 NUMBER OF FIRMS AND WORKERS IN THE TEXTILE INDUSTRY IN BISHU 
(1988–2010) 
0  
5.000  
10.000  
15.000  
20.000  
25.000  
30.000  
35.000  
0  
500  
1.000  
1.500  
2.000  
2.500  
1988 1990 1995 2000 2005 2009 2010 
N
U
M
BE
R 
O
F 
W
O
RK
ER
S?
N
U
M
BE
R 
O
F 
FI
RM
S 
NUMBER OF FIRMS NUMBER OF WORKERS 
 
: Note: aggregation of economic data from Nagoya, Hanejima, Ichinomiya, Tsushima, Kakamigahara, Konan, Inazawa  
Source: author’s own elaboration from METI Industrial Statistics  
 
According to the METI Industrial Statistics, the number of firms and of workers 
and the amount of sales in the Bishū textile sector in 2010 was just one third of 
what it had been in the 1980s (Table 5.5.2, Fig. 5.5.1). At the same time, in 
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proportion with the reduction of the number of firms and workers, between 1990 
and 2000, the sales registered a sharp decline of approximately 60% and the gross 
value added declined by about 51% (Fig. 5.5.2). 
In this context, the rapid economic growth of China appears to be an obstacle. 
With the entry into WTO in 2001, all barriers to Chinese exports have been 
removed and, using its powerful productive capacity and competitive power based 
on price, China became the first clothing exporter in the world. The abolition of 
the Multi Fiber Agreement (MFA)19 in 2005, which had been promulgated in 
1974 and repeatedly renewed every four years, completed the transition to a 
system of free trade and this has enabled China to extend its supplying power of 
clothing goods and strengthen its price competition. 
Moreover, in 2007 the Japanese Ministry of Labor published a report on the 
“Relative Poverty Rate” of the country, denouncing a reduction of the rich layer, a 
reduction of wages of the middle layer and an increase in the rate of poverty up to 
15.7%, which means that one out of every six–seven people is in a state of poverty. 
This rate makes Japan the country with the fourth highest poverty rate among 
the thirty countries of the OECD. 
 
Figure 5.5.2 TREND OF SALES AND GROSS VALUE ADDED IN THE TEXTILE INDUSTRY 
IN BISHU (1988–2010) 
  
Note: aggregation of economic data from Nagoya, Hanejima, Ichinomiya, Tsushima, Kakamigahara, Konan, Inazawa  
Source: author’s own elaboration from METI Industrial Statistics 
 
                                            
19 The Multi Fiber Arrangement (MFA, 1974–2005) imposes quotas on the amount developing countries could export to developed 
countries. It was introduced in 1974 as a short-term measure intended to allow developed countries to adjust to imports from the developing 
world, given that developing countries have a natural advantage in textile production because it is labor intensive and they have low labor 
costs.. 
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Actually, in textiles and fashion products, there is an aesthetic sensitivity, 
symbolic and emotional aspects to fashion products that form a value added that 
cannot be determined by price. Moreover, once the demand for cloths as “necessity 
goods” has been filled, “trendy” apparel products become the vehicle for raising 
the quality of the standard of living of the population and demand and 
consumption are geared towards goods of higher quality and differentiation. So, 
as happened in Japan in the sixties and seventies, even the wearing habits in 
China are experiencing a progressive “fashionablization”. 
If the clothing items are considered as fashion products, rather than the price, the 
originality of materials and design, then the fashion content and the branding 
power, constitute the added value that appears to be a prerequisite for the 
maintenance of growth and competitive strength in the actual market. The 
Japanese textile industry benefits from prominent textile processing technologies, 
excellent skills of product development, eminent quality management capabilities 
and design skills. Furthermore, due to the presence of the “ancillary” industries 
present in the sector, like manufacturing firms of textile machinery and IT 
technology firms, the Japanese textile industry has an additional potential 
competitive power compared with China20. In fact, if we compare the figures of the 
gross value added with the number of workers and calculate the rate between 
then, we can notice that, although between 1990 and 2000 both the gross value 
added and the number of workers decreased, between 2000 and 2005 it increased 
by about 2 points to finally remain stationary at the value of 2000 (Fig. 5.5.3).  
In general, after 1990, the gross value added per head fluctuates by 3 points 
between 0.0017 and 0.0020 notwithstanding the reduction of working inputs, and 
this seems to confirm the high productivity and know how accumulated in the 
region. And this is in contrast with the decreasing trend of the gross value added 
in the textile sector registered nationally (Fig. 5.5.4). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                            
20 According to the government report “Textile Vision”, by eliminating the wastefulness related to the long manufacturing process and 
quickening the delivery process (the so called QR system which, basically, aims at reducing the intermediary role of wholesalers), a revival 
of the Japanese textile industry, whose strengths are a high technological level and a high value production, is extremely likely. 
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Figure 5.5.3 GROSS VALUE ADDED PER HEAD IN THE TEXTILE INDUSTRY IN BISHU 
(1988–2010) 
 Note: 
aggregation of economic data from Nagoya, Hanejima, Ichinomiya, Tsushima, Kakamigahara, Konan, Inazawa  
Source: author’s own elaboration from METI Industrial Statistics 
 
 
Figure 5.5.4 TREND OF GROSS VALUE ADDED IN THE TEXTILE INDUSTRY IN BISHU 
AND IN JAPAN (1985–2010, national textile sector: 10,000,000 yen; Bishū textile sector: 1,000,000 yen) 
 
Note: aggregation of economic data from Nagoya, Hanejima, Ichinomiya, Tsushima, Kakamigahara, Konan, Inazawa  
Source: author’s own elaboration from METI Industrial Statistics 
 
 
 93 
Despite this, Japanese textile producers, rather than begin a process of 
increasing the added value and product differentiation, have adopted an 
industrial strategy based on price through streamlined management and 
relocation abroad of industrial activities. 
Since the second half of the 1980s, imports of textile products have increased 
from year to year, and import penetration in the sector has reached 89%. The 
Japanese national market shares for low-price goods have been held by Asian 
countries, primarily China, and, with regard to luxury goods by major western 
brands – especially in Europe. Instead, with regard to the middle layer, however, 
the share of Asian countries that have increased the quality of their production is 
reducing the share of “made in Japan” products. 
Japan, which once internationally dominated the textile industry, is losing its 
market share and competitive power to other Asian countries. Moreover, the 
apparel industry, focusing exclusively on the domestic market, and developing a 
marketing and design oriented at chasing information on foreign fashion trends, 
has lost the chance to enhance its international competitive power. Competition 
based on quality and a high added value, and not on quantity or on the price, is 
the key through which Japan can recover its competitiveness in the international 
market. 
If we consider the main economic data (number of firms, number of employees, 
total wage, cost of raw materials, sales, profits and gross value added) of the 
textile industry of the individual cities of the district of Bishū, according to what 
was reported by METI in 2010, it is inferred that Ichinomiya is the city with the 
greatest concentration of textile activities. In Ichinomiya, in fact, 43% of the 
textile firms and 49% of the textile workers of the district concentrate. In addition, 
the city realizes 49% of the sales, produces 46% of the profits and 48% of the value 
added of the textile industry of the district (Tables 5.5.3 and 5.5.4). Analyzing the 
situation of Ichinomiya, therefore, can help us to understand better the changes 
that occurred with the advent of globalization in the district.  
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Table 5.5.3 NUMBER OF FIRMS AND WORKERS IN THE TEXTILE DISTRICT IN BISHU 
PER TOWN (2010) 
DISTRICT TOWN 
NUMBER OF FIRMS 
WORKER
S TOTAL 
No. 
WORKERS 
No.  
WORKERS 
30?299 >300 
	  ?  
NAGOYA 216 6 - 2,446 
HANEJIMA 56 9 - 1,088 
KAKAMIGAHARA 51 4 - 753 
ICHINOMIYA 336 35 - 5,666 
TSUSHIMA 28 1 - 305 
KONAN 49 3 - 617 
INAZAWA 42 3 - 734 
TOTAL BISHU 778 61 - 11,609 
Source: author’s own elaboration from METI Industrial Statistics 
 
Table 5.5.4 COSTS, SALES PROFITS AND GROSS VALUE ADDED IN THE TEXTILE 
SECTOR IN BISHU PER TOWN (2010) 
DISTRICT TOWN 
SALES 	  GROSS  
	  
PROFITS 
VALUE 
ADDED 
	   	  
?10,000 YEN? ?10,000 YEN? ?10,000 YEN? 
NAGOYA 3,548,544 96,245 1,477,081 
HANEJIMA 2,015,150 21,855 723,194 
KAKAMIGAHARA 1,153,198 11,878 482,702 
ICHINOMIYA 8,884,394 166,222 3,358,591 
TSUSHIMA 275,662 9,570 112,046 
KONAN 966,852 9,626 298,413 
INAZAWA 1,311,089 43,738 507,382 
TOTAL BISHU 18,154,889 359,134 6,959,409 
Source: author’s own elaboration from METI Industrial Statistics 
 
In line with what happened in the district, in Ichinomiya also the number of 
businesses and workers in the textile industry underwent a drastic reduction in 
the decade between 1990 and 2000. In particular, during these years, the number 
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of firms and workers reduced by more than a half' (respectively 54% and 52%) (Fig. 
5.5.5, Table 26 in the appendix). Proportionally, sales fell by 56% and the value 
added fell by 31% (Fig. 5.5.6, Tables 25 and 26 in the appendix).  
 
Figure 5.5.5 NUMBER OF FIRMS AND WORKERS IN THE TEXTILE SECTOR IN BISHU 
AND ICHINOMIYA (1988–2010) 
 
Source: author’s own elaboration from Ichinomiya City Industrial Statistics 
 
Figure 5.5.6 TREND OF SALES AND GROSS VALUE ADDED IN THE TEXTILE SECTOR IN 
BISHU AND ICHINOMIYA (1988–2010) 
 
Source: author’s own elaboration from Ichinomiya City Industrial Statistics 
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Despite an increase of seven companies and about 10 billion yen in sales 
between 2000 and 2005, and an increase of 1,352 workers between 2005 and 2009, 
in total, between 1988 and 2010 the number of firms reduced by 65%, the number 
of workers by 58% and, in proportion, sales fell by 65% (Fig. 5.5.5, Table 24 in the 
appendix). Regarding the value added the situation is different: it reduced by only 
9% between 1988 and 2010 (in the district, the total reduction was 44%) (Fig. 5.5.7, 
Table 27 in the appendix). 
Notwithstanding the notable reduction in the number of firms and workers, the 
GVA per head, which measures the value of the production created by labor on the 
cost of inputs, is high (Table 5.5.5, Table 28 in the appendix). 
This may be explained both by the decrease in the cost of inputs, among them 
raw materials and wages, and by the high productivity of the workforce. Anyway, 
as the average wage per head and the rate of the cost of raw materials on the total 
sales remains quite stable, it can be deduced that the highly specialized workforce 
concentrated in the area creates sufficient new value to cover the costs of the 
inputs. In particular, if we exclude the trend of the last period between 2009 and 
2010, the value added per head is growing in Ichinomiya, and more than doubled 
(from 2714. 5 to 5727.6 thousand yen, Table 28 in the appendix) between 1988 and 
2009. 
 
Table 5.55 VARIATION IN THE COST OF INPUTS IN ICHINOMIYA TEXTILE INDUSTRY 
(1988–2010) 
?
???????
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????????
??????
???????
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????? ??????? ?????????? ?????? ??????????? ??????????? ?????????? ?????? ????
????? ?????? ?????????? ?????? ?????????? ??????????? ?????????? ?????? ????
????? ?????? ?????????? ?????? ?????????? ??????????? ?????????? ?????? ????
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????? ?????? ?????????? ?????? ?????????? ?????????? ?????????? ?????? ????
????? ?????? ?????????? ?????? ?????????? ?????????? ?????????? ?????? ????
Source: author’s own elaboration from Ichinomiya City Industrial Statistics 
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Figure 5.5.7 GROSS VALUE ADDED PER HEAD IN THE TEXTILE SECTOR IN BISHU AND 
ICHINOMIYA (1988–2010) 
 
Source: author’s own elaboration from Ichinomiya City Industrial Statistics 
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   5.6 Presentation of the Textile District of Prato 
 
Prato is located nearly 20 km from 
Florence, the capital of the central region of 
Tuscany. The area of the district of Prato 
includes twelve municipalities, respectively 
belonging to the provinces of Prato (Prato, 
Cantagallo, Carmignano, Montemurolo, 
Poggio a Caiano, Vaiano, Vernio), Pistoia 
(Agliana, Montale, Quarrata) and Florence 
(Cadenzano and Campi Bisenzio) with an 
area of 700 square km and a population of 
300,000. 
Italian SMEs grew up inheriting the 
traditional craftsmanship of the medieval 
merchants’ guild and this is the reason why 
still nowadays the number of companies with 
less than ten employees account for the 95% 
of the total number of Italian firms. 
Soon after the economic depression 
following the First Oil Shock (1973) – but in 
Prato even before that – SMEs in the T&A sector started to concentrate in 
north-east and central Italy (the so-called Third Italy, in distinction from the 
heavy industry-based region in the north-west). These companies, by deepening 
their network and dividing the burden of manufacturing operations, gained 
profits and originated the flexible and well-connected organization of production 
known as industrial districts. This industrial model based on flexible, 
high-variety, low-volume manufacturing and specialization and distribution of 
work among SMEs, received nationwide attention and led to a reconsideration of 
the role of SMEs in Europe. 
Today textile industrial districts centred on SMEs, concentrated in Prato, 
Como and Bologna, are still a meaningful reality and contribute significantly to 
the improvement of Italy’s industrial competitive power. Suffice it to say that the 
textile-fashion sector accounts for the highest number of workers (one-third) of 
the total workforce employed in industrial districts (Italian Press Statistics, Il 
Sole 24 Ore). 
Prato is one of the biggest Italian industrial districts and one of the most 
important world centers in the production of woollen yarn and fabrics for the 
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clothing industry, the furnishing industry, the knitwear and apparel industry and 
for industrial use. Nowadays, among all the districts of the textile sector, it is the 
one with the highest number of firms, employees and export sales (Italian Press 
Statistics, Il Sole 24 Ore). 
 
 
5.7 The Middle Ages (XII–XV C.) And Annexion By Florence 
(XIV–XIX C.)  
 
The Prato district began to specialize in carded wool fabrics from the twelfth 
century, because the abundance of water and a good geographic position 
facilitated the operation of many fulling mills along the river Bisenzio. It was 
thanks to the building of a dam on the Bisenzio river, which allowed the formation 
of canals to feed industrial plants, which the textile activity developed in the area 
in the next two centuries. 
At the time textile manufacturing was regulated by the Wool Merchants’ Guild, 
among whom it is worth noting the famous merchant-entrepreneur Francesco di 
Marco Datini, who opened his warehouses in Tuscany and France and improved 
local production by importing English, Provençal and Flemish woolens. It is of 
great interest to notice that, even at the time, there was a subdivision of the 
various processing stages: women living in the countryside were in charge of the 
activities to transform the fiber into yarn, weaving operations were completed in 
workhouses within the city walls and the dyeing, the fulling and the washing of 
the fabric were carried out in the fulling mills along the Bisenzio; the fabric was 
then brought to the merchant-entrepreneur’s workshop to be inspected and sold. 
In 1351 Prato was annexed by Florence and the manufacturing of “broad and 
fine woolen cloths” was forbidden. However the textile production was somehow 
kept alive and definitely flourished in the nineteenth century. 
  
 
5.8 From The Nineteenth Century To The First Half Of The 
Twentieth Century: Regenerated Wool 
 
The transition from the handmade craftsmanship to the modern industrial 
productive system based on the use of new machinery was realized in the second 
half of the nineteenth century.  
In the nineteenth century Giovan Battista Mazzoni devised a machine, called a 
calender, which modified the look of the fabric and added sheen. 
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Regenerated wool manufacturing started in Prato around 1850 and it became 
the basic fiber for a low-cost carded fabric. The collecting, sorting and processing 
of rags were done in Prato and this made the city the center of regenerated wool 
production (in 1911, 600 people were employed in this activity). 
A protectionist change in economic policy in 1887 increased the price of worsted 
wool and thus favored regenerated wool products manufactured by Prato wool 
mills. At the same time a group of local wool manufacturers started producing 
shawls and plaids in regenerated wool for the foreign market and, in particular, 
for the British colonies. The sole exception was Kossler, Mayer and Co., known as 
the “Fabbricone”, established in 1888, which, with 1,000 workers and 700 power 
looms, produced exclusively worsted wool fabrics by purchasing the yarn outside 
of Prato. 
During the first half of the twentieth century, Prato’s woolen mills specialized 
in the production of fabrics for women’s apparel and developed a particular ability 
in yarn drawing and weaving: the production of a great variety of items with a 
high fashion content in a short time is still today one of the main characteristics of 
the district. 
The production of the area was characterized by a high degree of specialization 
and a growing flexibility of labor. In fact, following the preparation of the raw 
materials, the spinning was carried out in plants, while the weaving was done 
from home by “family businesses”; the finishing was realized by small weaving 
and fulling mills and the sole dyeing mill, Campolmi. 
Immediately after World War One there was an increase in the number of 
firms, especially of full-cycle wool manufacturers which produced mostly high 
quantities of products for export (plaids, shawls, scarves, flannels). The other 
firms, instead, produced low quality fabrics for the home market. The approach of 
World War Two and autarchy created trouble for the integrated businesses that 
could not find virgin wool, while the others went on using regenerated wool. 
 
 
5.9 The postwar period and the economic boom (1950–1981) 
 
Since the end of World War Two, Prato’s manufacturing industry has affirmed 
itself in international markets through the production of wool textiles destined for 
outdoor clothing, mainly for women. From the post-war years on, the production 
of carded wool from regenerated wool improved as far as weight, look and 
durability of the product were concerned, thanks to the introduction of synthetic 
fibers blended with wool, and in order to respond to a market more and more 
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sensitive to the idea of “fashion”. 
Between 1950 and 1981, the district experienced a veritable economic boom. 
Prato grew to become Europe’s most important textiles and fashion center, and 
the most advanced example — or prototype — of that particular form of 
organization of production that is the industrial district. Prato, which over the 
years reached its fame in the international market for the production of 
regenerated carded wool, started the production of carded fabric made of new wool 
but reinterpreted thanks to new finishing chemical processes.21 
The district was by then concerned also in the production of combed wool for 
the knitwear industry and new products like stretch fabrics, disposable fabrics, 
linen, cotton and silk fabrics, and fabrics with engineering fibers. 
In the 1970s, when Italy’s GDP slowed its growth and European wool sector 
was contracting, in Prato the wool industry became even stronger: as the census 
of 1971 and 1981 demonstrate, textile firms increased by a third and employment 
by almost a quarter (Toccafondi, 2009).   
At the same time, the new fashion trend, influenced by the student protest 
movements (1968 in Europe, Japan and the USA), of more informal and 
unstructured clothing, led the way to the spread of casual and knitwear garments 
in the world. Then in the 1970s along with the traditional fabrics, there was a 
boom for fancy yarns for knitwear, which was produced by the local textile firms 
in collaboration with fashion designers innovatively and creatively blending 
woolen yarns and natural and synthetic fibre.  
Since 1974, when the Multifiber Agreement came into force to regulate the 
trade in textile and clothing products, there have been important stages in a 
process of progressive liberalization and intensification of commercial trade. 
At the 1979 First Prato Expo Fair dedicated to the Spring/Summer season, the 
biggest textile companies of the district were by now able to offer to fashion 
makers a prestigious line of production that was not strictly tied to wool but 
included linen, cotton, viscose and more precious wooden fabrics, such as cashmir 
and mohair (Toccafondi). 
As the international supply of lower-cost semi-raw materials increased, Prato 
producers begun to buy high-quality semi-raw materials from abroad and to finish 
them off at home (finishing activities); by doing so, higher-quality materials were 
produced at more competitive costs. This, anyway, caused a reduction in the rate 
                                            
21 The idea of a chemical modification in carded wool fabric which adds wearability and washability is a successful one and 
widely used in the district’s industry. Chemical treatments confer the fabric a permanent finish, make it water- and dirt 
repellent (through fluorine treatments) and eliminate unpleasant smells. Resin treatments give fabrics the so-called “technical 
handle” aimed at durability and easy care.  
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of carded wool fabric in the exports of materials made in the district (more than 
30% in 1990 but 25% in 2005). 
 
 
5.10 The 1980s And The Rise Of Clothing Firms 
 
From the mid 1980s, for the first time since the end of the war, employment 
and the added value of Prato’s textiles industry began to contract. The total 
workforce employed in the textile sector decreased from 60,000 to 45,000 (-25%) 
and the total number of firms from 16,000 to 10,000 (-35%). Changes in lifestyle 
and innovations in the use of different fabrics (cotton, linen and polyester) caught 
Prato’s producers by surprise. Even though textile workers were still in the 
majority with respect to industrial workers, their number diminished between the 
two censuses. And there was also a contraction in the number of individuals going 
into business on their own, which has been a fundamental characteristic of the 
Prato area since World War Two (Toccafondi, 2005). 
It was in this context that in the district the first nucleus of clothing firms came 
to appear. Clothing firms did not share the same route and the same market with 
textile firms. The former did not arise as an added stage to the mere supply of 
fabric of the latter but manufactured in a very short span of time (on average, 15 
days) the collections that made-in-Italy designers would propose for the following 
year in Milan or Paris (hence the term “fast fashion” or “pronto moda”); as for the 
market, while the Prato textile industry was focused on the top of the line range, 
the clothing industry focused on the middle of the line range22.  
Interaction between the textile and clothing firms is infrequent: they each 
gravitate around a system of specialized services for fashion industries, but the 
provisioning of the clothing industry reaches beyond the Prato industrial district. 
Although Prato’s garment industry had grown to represent 25% of the value 
added of the local economy, the downsized textile industry still remains the 
driving force of the district.  
To cope with the crisis, textile firms have started to look for different and more 
dynamic markets than the carded wool market. This led to a change in the 
composition of the local offer, which nowadays covers combed wool, cotton, viscose, 
                                            
22 As Toccafondi says: in the Prato area there was just one case of a textile industry that invested in a clothing company with its own chain 
of single-brand boutiques, Sash (Toccafondi, 2005:77). 
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linen and silk fabrics. At the same time, the district’s manufacturing operations 
have widened: most of the woolen mills now have business relations with 
extra-district subcontractors, which, on the other side, have started to buy yarns 
and fabrics from external firms. 
In addition, since the 1990s the rationalization of the manufacturing 
operations and of the product development phase has been in process. Production 
and distribution operations have been modified and shortened to fit with the 
demand for a compression of productive cycles and the time between product 
order and delivery claimed by garment firms. Nevertheless, especially after the 
1997 Asian crisis, imports of economical textiles and clothes from Asian countries 
– in situ and from abroad – is gaining ground year by year. 
 
 
5.11 The International Context And Prato After Globalization 
 
In the 1990s, the process of trade liberalization initiated in the aftermath of 
World War Two expanded and accelerated, both in terms of goods (especially parts 
and components), and in terms of capital and people. This is also a result of the 
transition from centrally planned economies to market economies in Eastern 
Europe, whose countries until 1989 were part of the Soviet system. 
In particular, with regard to textiles, in 1994 the Multifiber Agreement was 
abolished: this treaty entered into force in 1974 to protect, at least in part through 
the imposition of import quotas, textile and clothing producers from competition 
from European developing countries with low-cost labor. The Multifiber 
Agreement was followed by another agreement on January 1, 2005, that fixed the 
complete liberalization of trade in T&A products, after a process of progressive 
liberalization lasting ten years. 
From the demand side, and thus disposable income, it should be noted that the 
nineties, at least in Europe (the main market for Italian exports) were years of 
low growth: the average gross domestic product increased just by 2.1% per annum 
across the whole EU in the period between 1993 and 2002 (Ciocca, 2004). 
Nevertheless, Italian exports remained high even after the return of the lira to 
the European Monetary System in 1996, as required by the Maastricht Treaty for 
joining the Euro Area since 2002. The Italian balance of payments was 
particularly positive in the areas of personal and household goods (textiles, 
clothing, leather, footwear, jewelry, eyewear, furniture, etc.) and light machinery 
(especially machine tools), aggregates of products that are now known as “made in 
Italy”, because of persistent surpluses in Italy’s balance of trade generated by 
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them (Becattini and Dei Ottati, 2006). 
The number of total employees in the census of 2001, compared with 1991, 
increased nationally by 7.8%, and 10% in Italian industrial districts. As in other 
developed countries, manufacturing employment decreased (-6.1% on average 
between 1991 and 2001), although with different trends according to the sector; 
workers in the service sector increased and growth was particularly strong in real 
estate and professional services (+90.5%) (Dei Ottati and Grassini, 2006). Among 
the changes in the Italian context that are relevant to both the economic and 
social point of view, it is worth noting the general aging of the population 
(between 1991 and 2001 the proportion of residents of 65 years or more increased 
from 15.3% to 18.7%) and the massive inflow of non-EU immigrants, which are 
partly interconnected phenomena (Caritas Report, 2006). 
Regarding the context of Prato, with the crisis of carded wool in the 1980s, the 
textile companies implemented a progressive differentiation of the products and a 
reorganization of production. Thus, the woolen mills in Prato that traditionally 
produced fabrics of carded wool of medium-low quality increased their quality or 
the fashion content. Others changed the type of fiber used (no longer just wool, 
but cotton, silk, viscose), or even the type of customer (not only textiles for 
clothing, but also textiles for furniture, or products such as fake leather, fake fur, 
technical textiles). The change of the products offered has also led to a 
reorganization of production, giving rise to both a general growth of relations 
which are external to the district (in particular for the purchase of new 
semi-finished products for Prato, as are those of fibers other than wool), and to a 
selection of the internal ones. This reorganization had the effect of favoring the 
formation of “business teams” and small groups, led by "final firms", while, in the 
meantime, keeping generally non-exclusive subcontracting relationships, in line 
with the characteristics of the district. In practice, any final company, in addition 
to its team of “phase firms” with whom the relationships tend to be kept stable, 
occasionally also uses other subcontractors23. Similarly, each “phase firm”, in 
addition to the final firms with which it has regular contact, has relationships of 
exchange with other clients. 
The differentiation and requalification of products, together with the internal 
reorganization of the system, allowed the textile industry to recover its 
competitiveness from the beginning of the nineties, in a context where, on one 
hand, the demand for woolen products was greatly reduced and, on the other hand, 
it was no longer possible to compete with the newly industrialized countries in the 
                                            
23 The final firms specialize in the designing and marketing of the products that are usually done by a phase firm (or third 
party) that specializes in one or a few stages of the production process of the district's main industry. 
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production of standardized goods or low quality products. In fact, between 1991 
and 1996, the value of the textile production in Prato increased by 46.5%, 
reaching almost 8,000 billion lire in 1996; in the same period the total value of 
exports of fabrics, yarns and knitwear increased by 61% (Balestri, 1998). 
In the district, after a certain decline in terms of units and workers, registered 
between the eighties and nineties, the employment in the textile sector remained 
substantially stable up to 1996 (Tables 5.11.1 and 5.11.2). At the same time, the 
strategy of textile differentiation extended: the activities related to the production 
of articles of regenerated wool continued to decrease markedly (those involved in 
spinning and weaving were reduced by 27% and 29% between 1991 and of 1996), 
while those relating to the production of combed wool, other fibers and other 
textile articles increased. 
In line with the national trends and following the growing trend of the eighties, 
the textile exports of Prato showed an increasing trend in the second half of the 
nineties.  
Despite these good overall results, during the nineties, many micro and small 
businesses, especially woolen weaving and spinning firms, continued to close24 
and the shrinking of the textile system proceeded, just partially offset by the 
emergence of firms specialized in the manufacture of worsted wool fabrics and of 
other different textile fibers (Table 5.11.1). 
The differentiation of textile products, along with difficulty of generational 
change in the phase firms, had favored the purchase (and partly the 
subcontracting) of semi-finished goods outside the district, especially in Italy and 
abroad; choice preferred over the direct investment or subcontracting in other 
regions of Italy or abroad25. This is evident in the increase of the Prato textile 
imports during the nineties (Fig. 5.11.1, Table 19 in the appendix), in particular 
imports of yarn of the province of Prato between 1991 and 1995 grew by 96%. 
In addition, the purchase of semi-finished goods outside the district in the 
nineties included components not typical of Prato and was necessary both to 
introduce innovative products and services, and to extend the range of items 
offered (Bigarelli, 2001). 
 
 
 
                                            
24 Companies specializing in spinning operations in the district of Prato between the 1991 and 2001 census decreased by 789 
units and those of carded wool spinning of 971 units; likewise, the activities of weaving in 2001 were 1,669 units less than in 
1991, but the reduction of those specializing in weaving of carded wool was 2,313 (Dei Ottati, 2009). 
25 In late 2003, the number of foreign textile companies participated by Tuscan companies was just 24 and these companies 
were mostly located in Eastern Europe and registered a total employment of approximately 1,000 employees (Reprint, ICE). 
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Table 5.11.1 COMPOSITION OF THE TEXTILE INDUSTRY IN PRATO - NUMBER OF FIRMS  
(1981–2011) 
	  1981 
 
1991 1996* 2001 2006* 2011** 
SPINNING MILLS	  2,643 
 
2,879 2,333 2,090 1,490 755 
YARN WEAVING  5,188 
 
3,744 2,838 2,075 1,411 1,136 
DYEING AND FINISHING FACTORIES 582 
 
906 829 907 885 542 
OTHERS TEXTILE MANUFACTURERS 830 
 
292 397 499 399 580 
KNITWEAR 2,003 
 
1,590 792 946 625 514 
OUTERWEAR 514 
 
1,219 1,390 1,961 2,729 3,895 
TOTAL 11,760 
 
10,630 9,079 8,478 7,539 7,422 
Note: * Data from the Chamber of Commerce of Prato; ** Estimate data from the Chamber of Commerce of Prato 
Source: ISTAT, Census of Industry and Service 
 
Table 5.11.2 COMPOSITION OF THE TEXTILE INDUSTRY IN PRATO – NUMBER OF WORKERS 
(1981–2011) 
 
1981 
1991 1996* 2001 2006* 2011** 
SPINNING MILLS	  15,119 
 
13,451 12,968 12,388 8,423 4,268 
YARN WEAVING 20,287 
 
13,558 12,641 9,325 7,354 5,921 
DYEING AND FINISHING FACTORIES 6,063 
 
9,495 9,622 10,763 8,719 5,340 
OTHERS TEXTILE MANUFATURERS 2,482 
 
1,922 2,859 3,703 2,528 3,675 
KNITWEAR 5,082 
 
6,974 6,141 4,768 2,714 2,232 
OUTWEAR 1,484 
 
4,822 6,165 6,967 8,702 12,420 
TOTAL 50,517 
 
50,222 50,396 47,914 38,439 33,855 
Note: * Data from the Chamber of Commerce of Prato; ** Estimate data from the Chamber of Commerce of Prato 
Source: ISTAT, Census of Industry and Service 
 
The tendency to increase the immaterial content of products and services 
offered, along with that of the shortening the production cycle in the district, also 
in order to reduce delivery times, is reflected in the local development of the 
finishing activities (Tables 5.11.1 and 5.11.2).  
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Figure 5.11.1 IMPORTS AND EXPORTS IN THE TEXTILE DISTRICTS OF PRATO (1995–2010) 
 
Source: author’s elaboration on ISTAT, Trading Statistics 
 
Indeed, while between 1991 and 2001 the employees in weaving and spinning26 
reduced by 31.2% and 7.9%, respectively, the employment in the various processes 
of finishing in Prato grew by about 13% (Table 5.11.2), reflecting the strategic 
direction that the textile finishing phase had taken, in order to impart a 
distinctive aesthetic quality and fashion sense to Prato textile products. 
The external environment, especially the international context in which the 
majority of textile production in Prato is collocated, suddenly changed at the 
beginning of the new millennium. 
On the one hand, the economic development of Asia, especially China, became 
quicker, reducing the market share of developed countries, on the other hand, the 
latter, and in particular European countries – with which most of the Italian 
international trade is conducted – have entered into a period of recession that 
                                            
26 The publication of the 2011 Census is scheduled for the 24 September 2012. 
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may be the longest since the Second World War, which was followed, after a brief 
revival in 2006-2007, by the current international financial crisis. Furthermore, 
as for Italy, and the district of Prato in particular, the decline in foreign sales was 
accentuated by the simultaneous devaluation of the dollar against the euro, so 
that increasing the dollar prices of Prato’s goods has reduced competitiveness. 
If we also consider that the consumption of textiles and clothing in developed 
countries has started to decrease in relative terms, so that the respective shares of 
exports on world trade fell between 2001 and 2005 from 2.9% to 2.3% for textiles 
and from 3% to 2.5% for clothing, it should be not surprising that Italy has 
reduced its global market share of textile products (Dei Ottati, 2009).  
In this context, the textile system of Prato underwent a tremendous pressure 
both on the demand side, with the reduction of growth in income and changes in 
consumer choices in developed countries, and on the supply side, because of the 
“flood” of textile products from newly industrialized countries and especially 
China. The combined effects of these changes soon emerged: Prato textile exports 
have fallen dramatically (-33% from 2001 to 2007) and, despite a setback in 2004, 
have continued until today (Fig. 5.11.1). With the decline in exports and also of 
sales, the general profitability of companies reduced, and this, in turn, has 
brought a new reduction in investment, employment and number of companies in 
the main industry of the district of Prato. 
In the new millennium there is a return of the textile crisis which leads to 
further reductions in the number of businesses and employees in the spinning of 
textile fibers and weaving, as has already taken place during the nineties, but this 
time the employment registers a reduction also in the activities of finishing and in 
the other textile industries (Table 5.11.2). The activities of clothing and clothing 
finishing, which represent the bulk of the clothing industry in Prato, continued to 
record a significant increase in the number of employees and more than 
proportional growth in the number of the local units, which therefore further 
reduces their average size (Tab. 5.11.1). 
About twenty years after the commencement of downsizing, the textile system 
remains the economic heart of the district, not only for the number of employees 
and the produced value added, but also for the identity and the specific industrial 
culture still present in Prato. The demographic balance of the textile firms (the 
balance between the births and deaths of the new firms) has been, in these last 
years, consistently passive in the face of the growth of the service sector27. 
Consequently, the proportion of local textile firms in the total economic activity 
                                            
27 The change in the economic composition of the district will be examined in chapter 6. 
 109 
fell from 27.1% in 1991 (with 36.6% of total employees) to 11.7% in 2006 (with the 
21.2% of employees). These levels are still strongly characteristic – given that, on 
a national basis, local employees of textile companies accounted, in 2006, for 5.1% 
of the total but in a relatively short period of time the economic structure of Prato 
has been strongly modified. This is also due to the simultaneous growth of 
clothing, which, in the same period, has almost doubled its weight in terms of 
units and employment (from 3.5% to 6.6% of the overall local units and from 3.9% 
to 6.2% of the workforce, according to official statistics, which, however, 
underestimates the employment of ethnic Chinese businesses (Fig. 5.11.1 and 
5.11.2). 
Throughout the nineties and especially after 2001 the two sectors in Prato 
registered opposing trends. In particular, the number of firms and workers 
decreased in textiles and increased in clothing. Therefore, the prolonged reduction 
in size of the textile system and in particular the shrinking of the local 
subcontracting market seem to have weakened the formation of economies of 
production that are external to individual firms but internal to the system, 
negatively interfering with the regeneration processes of the manufacturing 
expertise, of entrepreneurial propensities, and with the rules of behavior that 
constitute the main source of external economies of the district. Indeed, first, the 
reduction of the number of firms and workers (along with their ageing) reduces 
the renewal of knowledge and its spreading within the textile system, so also 
decreasing the diffused creativity. Secondly, the escalation of price competition in 
local markets among the phase firms, leading to the replacement of the implied 
norm of behavior typical of the district to “take into account the needs of survival 
and success of the other” (Brusco, 2007) with “every man for himself”, typical of a 
situation of competition with no rules, makes it more difficult to integrate the 
division of labor among enterprises in the district through cooperative 
relationships besides competition. Finally, the prevalence of cessation of business 
over birth of new enterprises in most of the specializations of the textile system 
emphasizes the difficulties of generational change of both entrepreneurs and 
workers, particularly in “phase business”. In a situation like this, it is not 
surprising that the relatively bigger companies (albeit of small or medium size) 
show an increased capacity for survival, since they can reproduce their own 
internal economies within the productive plant or within the “team”. 
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6. The Transition of the MID of Bishu and Prato under 
Globalization 
 
 
6.1 Field Analysis In Prato: Results 
 
In conducting this research28, the author interviewed employees of five firms in 
the Prato MID. Of the five firms, one is a spinning mill (FS) and four are textile 
makers or converters (Table 6.1.1). 
 
Table 6.1.1 PRATO: LIST OF FIRMS INTERVIEWED 
• FS S.r.l., Vaiano (yarn spinning) 
• P S.r.l., Prato (textile converter) 
• FB S.p.a., Prato (textile converter) 
• C S.p.a, Prato (textile converter) 
• LP S.p.a., Prato (yarn spinning) 
 
Among the textile making firms, LP is the one with the tightest form of 
integration with the group companies: in fact, R&D activities, design of patterns, 
production, market and distribution of products are exclusively conducted among 
group companies distributed in the district and in other parts of Italy. FB, C and 
P firms are also vertically-integrated textile makers but the group companies are 
semi-integrated or independent, meaning they are allowed to take orders from 
external companies. Anyway, the organizational structure is partly new and 
many mills have internalized the functions previously assigned to outsourcers.  
All the firms started business as producers of carded wool (regenerated wool) 
and are still involved in the production of carded wool for knitwear and fabrics but, 
at the same time, at the end of the 1990s they opened up to production of other 
materials to increase their competitiveness; combed wool, cotton, linoleum and 
synthetic fibers. 
The size of the firms ranges between 8 and 140 workers and their respective 
turnover also ranges widely, from 60,000 € (FS) to 30 million € (LP). China and 
Australia are the main raw material suppliers for wool, but South Africa and 
South America for wool and Romania for cotton are also mentioned. 
The portfolio of clients is huge and foreign-oriented: it runs from big Italian 
                                            
28 Details of the interviews are given in Appendix 2. 
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brand names to foreign luxury brands in Europe (Germany, France, Spain, 
United Kingdom) or in the USA and Australia as final clients, and national 
(basically in-district textile converters) and international textile makers (China, 
Japan and Korea through trading companies). 
All the companies consider the high quality, specialization, high fashion content 
and variety of their production and the punctuality in the delivery of 
commissioned orders as their strong points. In addition, apart from firm P, which 
specializes in the production of fabrics with classical patterns, all the textile 
companies underline their efforts in technology, research and innovation of 
product as key to their business strategy. Besides, all the firms have developed a 
global network of customers based on long-term relationships with foreign firms 
supported by intra-firm or external sales representatives and, to some extent, by 
the company-set foreign representative offices. 
Among the current problems the firms are experiencing, the high cost of 
resources (energy, water, labor), the high fiscal pressure and the rise in the price 
of raw materials are perceived as common problems (of exogenous nature) that 
affect the competitiveness of local production. Again, climatic change (global 
warming) and the rise of synthetic fibers as substituted products have penalized 
the production of wool. 
The competitive pressure of Chinese apparel makers, which, according to the 
local producers, with their flaws in final goods and standard dyeing, is 
detrimental to the image of high-quality textile processing of the district, 
combined with the international crisis in consumption has paved the way to 
unfair competition. The price-driven competition typical of globalization pushes 
the manufacturers toward aggressive competition for short-term profits: 
“indiscriminate” sale of machinery to competitors (flight of machinery and leasing 
of mills that have gone out of business to Chinese enterprises) and dumping 
practices, are mentioned as some of the effects of globalization that have 
undermined the long-term interests of the district.  
According to some of the interviewees, the well-to-do second and third 
generations of textile makers lack the necessary experience to run their parents’ 
business and do not share the district’s “industrial atmosphere”. This is 
considered to be one of the factors responsible for the absence of a coordinated 
industrial policy for the district SMEs. 
According to firm FS, to escape the contraction of global consumption and the 
increased cost of production, a small number of textile makers commissioned a 
small amount of spinning operations for (worsted wool) basic processed goods to 
Eastern European firms (under the control of Italian management) and this led to 
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the shrinkage of the processing backbone of the Prato district (from 300 spinning 
mills to 80). Other firms, like LP, in order to combine Italian quality and 
creativity with the advantages of producing in China (no customs barriers, cheap 
costs of production), set up a textile factory in China in partnership with two 
Chinese companies specializing in the production of fabrics for the Chinese and 
Asian markets and for foreign textile companies operating in China. Firm C 
experienced a six or seven-year long delocalization experience in Eastern Europe 
(Bulgaria, Romania) with local partners who set up equipment and materials 
abroad to produce standard items. Firm P moved a part of its production to South 
Africa with a local partner company in 2000. This choice affected the labor force of 
the district: a large number of workers were made redundant to respond to the 
pushes toward rationalization of the local firms. 
What is important to note is that all the above experiences ended in failure. 
When LP was bought and re-launched by a local fashion marketing company in 
2010, the purchase of the Chinese company was abandoned. LP staff cited 
troubles with the Chinese associates and inadequacy and unprofitability of local 
manufacturing. A new strategy was to produce in Italy and penetrate the Chinese 
market, instead of producing in China for the European market. As for firms B 
and P, the experience of relocation abroad ended because of the lack of experience 
and know-how of local workers, the distance and the problems in management. In 
the end, the presence of skilled workers, the advanced system of information 
sharing and the long experience in textile production of the Prato district are 
undeniable advantages that seem to make any delocalization abroad unprofitable. 
In the short term, Prato’s strengths (know-how in regenerated wool, flexibility 
and speed, respect for due delivery time) will endure, even though the competition 
with China may push towards price reduction and lowering of quality of the 
district production.  
At the same time, as interviewees from firm FS claim, the number of Chinese 
clients from the local ethnic apparel district may increase (even though they 
prefer to import fabrics from the motherland) but the local producers must have 
the “moral duty” of subordinating business to the respect of law, labor regulations 
and contributory duties (joint liability). On the same line, firm P staff firmly state 
that to protect the local comparative advantage the “identity of the district”, not 
short-term profits, should be strengthened. 
Again, given the reduction of customs fees for intermediary goods, direct 
exports to China are a profitable opportunity for local manufacturers. Among 
others, LP is actively involved in the increase of exports of completely 
made-in-Italy yarns, believing that to beat price-centered Chinese 
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competitiveness and penetrate Chinese markets the quality and creativity of 
Italian textile manufacture is what can make the difference. 
Another trend that may be observed in the district is the formation of 
vertically-integrated groups led by a medium-sized (or large) firm, with greater 
financial, innovative and marketing competences, as in the case of firm LP, which 
was taken over by a company specializing in apparel marketing29. When a district 
experiences the breakdown of the positive synergy between the economic and 
institutional spheres, the district’s medium-sized and large firms often have 
better chances to regain competitiveness. By replacing the eroded district’s 
external economies they develop internally within the group or network, due to 
their innovation capacity, their management competence, their marketing 
strategies and, more generally, to advantages derived from their internal growth. 
Although the presence of medium-sized innovative firms is a key factor in the 
adjustment, if the hierarchical reorganization of local relations should evolve to a 
point where a large portion of economic power and strategic functions is 
concentrated in just one firm, then even if small and medium-sized enterprises 
survive, the resulting type of local system would no longer look like a MID 
because, within it, the circulation of information and knowledge is constrained by 
the hierarchical character of its relations. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                            
29 The case of FB and P firms is different because in both the cases the original mill was divided into smaller enterprises 
taken over by the most skilled workers in the company partially controlled by the “mother company” in charge, respectively, 
of design, production and sales. Refer to the data from the interviews in Appendix 2 for more details. 
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6.2 Field Analysis In Bishū: Results 
 
In Bishū, four textile makers and a dyeing company were interviewed. Three of 
the four textile makers are micro-firms with ten employees or fewer, while the 
dyeing company, thanks to several acquisitions of local small dyeing firms, is a big 
firm with 400 employees. All the textile makers outsource production but manage 
the design and the sales of fabrics in-house (Table 6.2.1). These companies have a 
planning function, bringing samples to apparel wholesale businesses located in 
consumer places, such as Tokyo, taking orders, and organizing production. 
 
Table 6.2.1 BISHU: LIST OF FIRMS INTERVIEWED 
• K  S.p.a. Gifu (textile converter) 
• IKW S.r.l., Hajima  (textile converter) 
• HT S.r.l., Ichinomiya (textile converter) 
• HSW S.r.l., Ichinomiya (textile converter) 
• S S.r.l., Ichinomiya (textile processing) 
 
Apart from firms K and IKW, whose production extends to synthetic fibers and 
natural materials other than wool, the other two makers concentrate 
approximately two thirds of their production on carded wool. 
The turnover seems not to be proportionate to the size: firms IKW, HT and 
HSW have the same dimension in terms of number of workers but HSW’s 
turnover is double that of the other two. 
All the textile companies buy raw materials through general trading companies 
and local textile trade companies (in one case Chinese trading companies) and the 
origins of the raw materials range from Australia for raw wool and China for wool 
and yarn produced by local spinning mills or Japanese joint ventures and 
purchased by Japanese trading companies. 
In contrast with the pre-globalization period, the companies nowadays seem to 
outsource the production of standard-level fabric not just to in-district companies 
but also to out-district companies, above all Chinese (but also Vietnamese and 
Indonesian) local firms or sub-affiliates. Also the orders for dyeing come from local 
converters, wholesalers, and trading companies, and apart from standard items, 
finishing of goods with high-security standards or composed of with mixed 
materials is realized in-district. 
The final market is still the national market in the form of Japanese apparel 
makers and trading companies or specialized wholesalers. Products are basically 
sold in national department stores. Of the firms interviewed, HT is the only one to 
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sell its products to Asian countries (China and Korea).  
For the dyeing company S, 70% of the orders are planned and come from T&A 
makers of the district and wholesalers (formerly almost 100%). The remaining 
orders come from other Japanese districts (Hokuriku, Wakayama, Hamamatsu). 
Recently, although not directly, orders from Chinese makers, European (Italian) 
and American makers through Japanese trade companies and apparel makers are 
growing. 
Orders (design, project and amount of final good/fabric) came from trading 
companies, which have the role of hedge fund (capital and risk-takers), cushion 
(claims administration) and distributors. Direct orders from apparel makers are 
the minority. 
With the Open Door Policy (1978) and entry to the WTO (2002), both in line 
with the policy of globalization, and the endaka (appreciation of the yen) effect 
after the Plaza Accord (1985), on the other hand, Japanese textile companies 
began to set up affiliates in China to take advantage of the cheaper prices of both 
workforce and land. Then, while preserving reverse imports for those products 
where Chinese counterparts were still immature, Japanese companies started to 
delegate production to local suppliers to further save costs. In contrast with 
Japanese affiliates, Chinese suppliers were available to take on all the production 
stages (from material/thread to the final product/cloth) and were willing to buy 
technologies to improve their productive standards. This phenomenon gradually 
led the way to the increase of procurement of goods from China and the 
consequent hollowing-out of the district’s productive backbone. 
All the firms, independently of their type of business, agree on the contraction 
of the district and the hollowing out. Since China is a coherent and economical 
maker, the production of yarn and fabrics is gradually shifting to China; the firms 
in the Bishū district are too small (the lots are too small and so is the investment 
capital) to invest in new equipment and to relocate the production. 
Chinese local firms or sub-affiliates specialize in the production of basic articles 
in bigger volume (e.g., coats, jackets), while Japan is the site of new projects (no 
foreign collaboration) and manufacturing of luxury items. For this reason, the 
district’s production has shifted to highly detailed and luxury goods. 
Furthermore, the strength of the district is in the high tech processing and 
finishing operations that cannot be realized abroad.  
Textile firms seem to depend passively on the orders of trading companies and 
not to be able to elaborate an original and proactive business strategy; of the four 
textile makers studied, just two of the firms invest in the development of new 
products and innovative materials (KT and HT firms) or use the internet as a tool 
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to reach new markets and enlarge their sales (HT firm). S dyeing company, 
instead, invests approximately 30% of its profits in a joint R&D project with raw 
materials producers for new fabrics and products and is involved in the active 
sales promotion of new products to trading companies and other clients. 
Another problem, as raised by firm S, is the ageing of personnel (average age 60 
years): actually, no new intake was realized in the last ten years in the company 
(apart from the personnel taken over from the acquisition of companies in the 
district). This may be related not only to the contraction of business but also to a 
more general process of ageing of the local society and the indifference of the new 
generations (smaller in number year by year) to working in the local small and 
medium-sized enterprises and in the textile sector, thus causing a serious 
problem of succession. 
Because of the contraction of the national demand, trading companies and 
wholesalers, as intermediary between textile and apparel makers, and 
department stores are all experiencing s consistent reduction in business. 
In 2007 the Japanese Ministry of Labor published a report on the “Relative 
Poverty Rate” of the country, denouncing a reduction of the rich layer, a reduction 
of wages of the middle layer, and an increase in the rate of poverty, up to 15.7%, 
which means that for every six or seven people one is in a state of poverty. This 
rate makes Japan the country among the thirty countries of the OECD with the 
fourth highest poverty rate. 
As an interviewee firm K states, while the adult Japanese consumer still 
invests money in more conspicuous brand-named accessories, for clothes the 
demand is oriented towards cheap articles, which require minimal standards of 
quality. The typical consumer today lives in a “car society” and in an age where, 
compared to the bubble era, the availability of money is limited. For this reason 
consumer choice is driven by convenience and realized by TV or Internet shopping. 
Furthermore, because of the massive penetration of Chinese products and their 
upgrading in quality and variety, wearing “made in China” has become natural 
and obvious among consumers. No matter the style or the genre, there is a 
growing tendency to believe that whatever people may wear, it should be Chinese 
product. 
For this reason, some interviewees from the Bishū firms claim the need to 
cultivate new markets abroad, besides the national market, tightening the link 
with apparel makers. To achieve this, the Japanese productive system, in which 
the project is drawn from the top (wholesalers, apparel makers) and then realized 
by the bottom (textile makers) should be revised. 
Again, in order to survive, the Bishū district SMEs should not just invest in 
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R&D to develop innovative materials but also bring up a class of skilled designers 
who can work on the final product, that is, shape their creations from a set of 
given fabrics (reverse production). 
The hurdle that affects the achievement of these results is the lack of skilled 
designers both in Japan and China. Even though convenient as a “shopping mall” 
and “reproduction” (imitation) base of brand-named goods, neither does Shanghai 
seem to have the necessary creativity and skills to cover this lack. 
Another strategy will be to consider China not just as a manufacturing center 
but as a market where the district’s specialist SMEs, with advanced technologies 
and highly specialized workforce, should export high quality and luxury goods. 
The district SMEs should maintain a varied production (not just carded wool and 
natural fibers but also synthetic fibers) and activate themselves to expand the 
market for Japanese textiles all over the world. 
S dyeing firm claims that the key for the district’s recovery is for the firms to 
specialize in a distinctive phase of production (adding value and price of the 
commodity) and to preserve the division of labor among local firms (raw materials 
producers, converters, dyeing and finishing operations firms) because if the 
district dies, every firm will die with it. (In the production of cotton and jersey 
items the level of specialization is already high, in woolen fabric the duplication of 
functions is still present.) Actually, firm S is practically trying to arrest the 
hollowing out of the district with the acquisition (Iwanaka, May 2010) or 
succession in business (Seiyakin, Tsuyakin, June 2010) of other dyeing and 
finishing companies of the district. 
According to the more pessimistic comments of interviewees from firm HSW, 
although a general rationalization of the sector (reduction of the number of firms, 
specialization in single operations) is to be desired, the era of SMEs is over; in 
Japan the textile sector will disappear and the Japanese apparel makers that 
have enough strength will relocate to China, the center of materials procurement. 
The future is in the hands of Chinese makers, with whose overall power and 
flexible workforce Japanese SMEs cannot compete. In future, SMEs in the textile 
sector may disappear to be replaced by the less specialized large textile makers 
(like Torey), which have the resources to cover all the stages of production – from 
the material (thread) to the final product (cloth) – or the overall textile industry 
may be replaced by apparel companies which work directly on textiles and fabrics 
imported from abroad. This will cause the transformation of the district from a 
manufacturing center to a distribution center. 
The interviewees pointed out that Chinese firms have no interest in relocating 
to Japan, the same as Prato, because the costs of production are high and there is 
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no advantage in production in the neighboring Japan (moreover, even in their 
motherland they are willing to shift to other sectors in place of textiles): they 
prefer, rather, to hire Japanese human resources and to acquire know-how from 
Japan. 
At the same time, while many textile converters chose to relocate their 
production abroad and T&A companies chose to increase the imports of yarn and 
woven textiles from China and other Asian countries, considering the problems in 
the adaptation, transport and maintenance of the equipment, and the different 
environmental conditions, the firms in charge of dyeing and finishing operations 
settled in the Bishū district for the moment show no intention of relocating 
production abroad (i.e. to China). 
 
 
6.3 Changes In The Manufacturing Chain Of Carded Wool After 
Globalization In Bishū And Prato 
 
At the end of the 1960s a new demand for differentiated products in the 
international industrialized markets forced the end of factory-based capitalist 
production and challenged the success in the 1950s and 1960s of large, 
multi-divisional vertically integrated firms with their substantial internal 
investment in R&D, mass production and mass marketing. This led to the 
world-wide success of Toyotism and the “return” of a neo-artisan model of 
production and the customized production of goods and services, tied with 
historical and cultural sources of locally-embedded production activities like those 
in MIDs in Italy and Japan. However, in rapidly changing and globalized markets, 
external forces – for instance, international competitors or even subcontractors 
and client firms – challenge, more assertively because more closely than before, 
the established sets of well-accepted knowledge, practices and beliefs. 
As a consequence of the Open Door Policy (1978) and the entry to the WTO 
(2002) and the “endaka” (revaluation of the yen) effect after the Plaza Accord 
(1985) on the other hand, Japanese textile companies started to set up affiliates in 
China to take advantage of the cheaper price of both workforce and land. Then, 
while preserving reverse imports for those productions where Chinese 
counterparts were still immature, Japanese companies started to delegate 
production to the newly born local textile suppliers to further save costs. In 
contrast with their Japanese affiliates, Chinese suppliers were available to take 
on all the production stages (from material/thread to the final product/cloth) and 
were willing to buy technologies to improve their production standards. This 
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phenomenon gradually led the way to the increase of procurement of goods from 
China and the consequential hollowing out of Bishū district’s productive backbone. 
According to recent Prefectural statistics, the number of new businesses and the 
amount of exports in the district is just one quarter that of the peak period.  
The abovementioned survey of a group of independent but interrelated 
companies involved, at different stages, in the production of carded wool, the 
representative goods of both districts, shows that nowadays Bishū has basically 
become a center for fabric dyeing and finishing activities, or the manufacturing 
base of luxury goods for the national or international market (Fig. 6.3.1).  
 
Figure 6.3.1 BISHU: MANUFACTURING STRUCTURE FOR CARDED WOOL 
(POST-GLOBALIZATION) 
 
Source: author`s own elaboration on 2009–2011 local survey 
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Project design and product sales are still the responsibility of trade companies 
or apparel makers, but direct relations between converter firms and local or 
foreign apparel makers, or converters and foreign yarn procurers have increased. 
Now that yarn-making operations or basic fabrics purchase are commissioned to 
Chinese companies or Japanese sub-affiliates in China, the converter has turned 
into the general coordinator of in-district and out-district manufacturing 
processes. 
The district looks more internationalized: the converter purchases foreign yarn 
directly from foreign makers, and dyeing and finishing firms take orders also from 
foreign textile makers or out-district makers. Final goods which, apart from 
luxury goods, are generally “manufactured” in China and “finished” in Japan, are 
sent to apparel makers and sold on to the Japanese market or to Asian 
department stores. 
To sum up, to meet the situation the district is trying to: (a) shift to 
high-value-added products; (b) develop new products and expand into new fields 
(i.e. production of high-tech synthetic fibers and clothes); (c) develop new channels 
in the national and international market; (d) strengthen the 
high-variety-low-volume manufacturing; (e) gather information for sales 
promotion beyond trading companies’ channels; (f) promote technical and 
technological development and inter-firms joint R&D activities; (g) boost 
rationalization (i.e. merger of firms) and labor saving; (h) to promote the 
employment of good designers and enhance product branding (creation of the 
district’s brand “Joint Bishū” in 2008). 
In Prato, especially since the Asian crisis in 1997 and the abolition of MFA on 
textile quotas between Europe and China in 2005, not only imports of 
Chinese-made yarns, fabrics and finished products, but also the local settlement 
of Chinese companies, first in the outwear and slowly also in the textile sector, are 
gaining ground and have been growing year by year.  
Unlike Bishū, Prato district is still a locally embedded compact manufacturing 
center but the productive units and the volume of production have markedly 
reduced; in fact, according to Prato Industrial Union, between 2000 and 2009, 
textiles and related companies in the industrial district fell by almost a half. 
A small part of the manufacturing operations (weaving) for standard items are 
in a very few cases executed abroad, but more often the attempt to relocate the 
manufacturing phase abroad (Eastern Europe) has been a failure because of 
inexperienced workforce or the lack of proper managerial skills. At the same time, 
the district manufacturing operations have widened: most of the woolen mills now 
have business relations with extra-district subcontractors, who, on the other hand, 
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have started to buy yarns and fabrics from external firms. The final user of carded 
wool goods is still mainly the international market (big foreign retailers) or local 
big brands (Fig. 6.3.2). 
However, the most relevant change in the Prato district is without any doubt 
the appearance of locally-settled Chinese companies in low/middle quality apparel 
making and, more recently, related fabric-finishing operations.  
After the entry of China to the WTO in 2002 and the abolition of the textile 
quotas between Europe and China in 2005, Chinese-made textiles and Chinese 
workers flowed into Prato, aiming at the lower segments of the labor market, left 
vacant by the local population because of the exacerbation of the generational 
succession problem,. 
Chinese firms started as sub-contracting suppliers to the original nucleus of 
knitwear firms and a few clothing companies present in the area since the 1970s. 
Many small artisan firms, whose owners were mainly aged weavers with no 
successor willing to take up their work, rented their workspaces to Chinese 
immigrants, who started to work as textile sub-contractors. There are also local 
clothing and knitwear firms whose local employees were fired and whose 
production was outsourced to workshops employing ethnic Chinese workers. 
Between 2000 and 2005 it is estimated that the volume of textile business in the 
district fell by 15.7% and that the profit margins on sales by firms were reduced 
by at least three percentage points. 
On the contrary, Chinese clothing firms show an extreme vitality in number of 
businesses, turnover and value added. Thanks to the “guanxi” system (ethnic 
connections), these firms, by obtaining credit from their own ethnic community 
instead of local banks, manage to start up their own businesses without 
guarantees in a foreign country. 
According to the 2007 Census of the Italian Chamber of Commerce, Chinese 
companies set up in Italy number 9,439 and nearly a third of them are located in 
Prato. In particular, in 2007, at the Chamber of Commerce of Prato the number of 
clothing firms in Chinese ownership was 2,291 representing a 53% increase in 
about five years. At the same time, according to the Prato Industrial Union, 
between 2000 and 2009, textiles and garments-related companies in the 
industrial district fell by 41.7% (about 2,760 companies) and in relation to this the 
workforce employed in the sector decreased by 43.4% (about 10,975 persons). 
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Figure 6.3.2 PRATO: MANUFACTURING STRUCTURE FOR CARDED WOOL 
(POST-GLOBALIZATION) 
 
 
Source: author`s own elaboration on 2009–2011 local survey 
 
Because of the different market segments they address, there is little 
information about the relationship between the Chinese ethnic clothing firms and 
the local Pratese textile firms. In fact, local textile producers, in order to face the 
price-based competition of the newly industrialized countries, have pursued 
strategies of product upgrading and collaboration with the few high-branded 
Italian clothing firms, while, in the case of the Chinese clothing producers, 
instead, the relationships with local textile makers are for the most part indirect, 
because they deal with Italian intermediaries that acquire stocks of unsold fabric 
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from the market. 
The persistence of illegal behavior, like the use of clandestine labor, the 
consistent transfers of wealth from the immigrants to their communities in the 
form of remittances, and tax evasion issues, do not help the reciprocal interaction 
and collaboration between the two communities. 
With the rise of globalization, in short, the Italian firms, in both the apparel 
and the textile sectors, find themselves face-to-face with a dual competitive 
challenge: an international one resulting from the production in China and other 
new industrialized countries of economical textiles. and a local one caused by the 
Chinese firm next door. In particular, within the clothing sector can be observed 
the co-presence of two different sub-systems: pre-existing internationally 
well-known Italian clothing firms with their own brands and chains of stores and 
a myriad of clothing firms without labels, most of which are run by Chinese 
immigrants who employ Chinese labor and capital and more often import raw or 
intermediate products from China and other newly industrialized countries. 
 
 
6.4 Changes In The Industrial And Economic Composition Of The 
District Of Prato 
 
Analysis of the data of the Chamber of Commerce of Prato, between 2006 and 
2011, on the number of firms and workers engaged in textile operations, allows us 
to assess the distribution of textile operations in the district (Tables 20 and 21 in 
the appendix). 
As Tables 6.4.1 and 6.4.2 reveal, businesses related to wool production 
(spinning, weaving, finishing and dyeing operations) still account for 33% of the 
total in-district textile operations and employ approximately half (46%) of the 
total textile workers of the district, although the reduction in terms of units and 
workers for each operation has noticeably decreased. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 124 
Figure 6.4.1 COMPOSITION OF THE TEXTILE INDUSTRY IN PRATO: 
NUMBER OF FIRMS 
 
Source: Chamber of Commerce of Prato (*estimates) 
 
 
Figure 6.4.2 COMPOSITION OF THE TEXTILE INDUSTRY IN PRATO:  
NUMBER OF WORKERS 
 
Source: Chamber of Commerce of Prato (*estimates) 
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Among others, the shrinking of the spinning and weaving operations is striking: 
in just five years the number of firms and workers of the spinning mills decrease 
to a half, while the reduction observed for the yarn twisting manufacturers 
reached approximately 20%30.  
The entry of China into the WTO in 2001 and the abolition of the MFA in 2005 
have caused the substitution of a large part of local textile products with 
importation of yarns, fabrics and finished products made in China. This caused an 
excess of supply for the Prato textile producers, many of which were forced to close 
down their enterprises, causing an overall reduction in employment, production, 
turnover and value adding in the textile industry.  
However, this reduction in spinning and weaving operations seems to have been 
compensated by the rapid and outstanding growth of apparel companies and other 
textile makers. In particular, the number of firms making outerwear increased by 
43% and workers in this sector by 45% in the examined period31.  
The growth of other textile makers seems to connected to the process of 
diversification of production begun in the district since the second half of the 
1990s32, while the rise of clothing operations of the district is mainly related to the 
rise of Chinese firms and the businesses conducted in the Chinese ethnic district. 
Unlike Pratese textile makers, in fact, Chinese clothing firms show an extreme 
vitality in number of businesses and turnover.	   
The number of firms and workers employed in the clothing sector has 
outstripped other textile operations, taken individually. In fact, more than half 
(52%) of the textile business is represented by clothing manufacturing and more 
than a third (37%) of the textile workers of the district are involved in making 
clothing.  
Apart from Chinese clothing firms, a small number of Pratese firms that 
ventured into clothing activities (among them Sasch, Patrizia Pepe, Osvaldo Bruni, 
Franco Pepe, Montezemolo Sartoria del Corso, Sonia Fortuna) have managed to 
sustain strong competitive pressure by increasing the quality of production and 
their business size and investing in distribution and branding33. Yet, they refused 
to transfer production elsewhere to keep their comparative advantage. As 
                                            
30 The numbers of enterprises and workers involved in spinning operations decreased, respectively, from 1,490 to 755 and 
from 8,423 to 4,268. Weaving operations decreased from 1,411 to 1,136 units and their workers from 7,354 to 5,921. 
31 The number of outerwear firms increased from 2,729 in 2006 to 3,895 in 2011 and the number of workers grew 
proportionally from 8,702 to 12,420. 
32 In the 1980s changes in lifestyles and innovations in the use of different fabrics (cotton, linen and polyester), in a period in 
which a large part of Prato’s offer was fabrics of carded wool used in the production of winter clothing (coats, suits, jackets), 
caught many businesses unprepared. Since then, and through the 1990s, the search for markets more dynamic than that for 
carded wool, in decline, changed the composition of the local supply, which now includes large proportions of articles in 
worsted wool, cotton, viscose, linen and silk.  
33 The distinguished brands of Italian fashion still represent a guarantee of quality in the selection of materials, care of 
production, respect for the environment, attention to the workers’ welfare and sensitivity to the health of the consumer. 
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Toccafondi states: “It was unattractive to transfer production elsewhere: 
producing innovative articles of high quality in a few days needed skilled workers 
operating in close contact with each other” (Toccafondi, 2005:75). 
The operations of dyeing and finishing underwent a decrease that seems 
proportional to the decline of the local spinning and weaving operations: between 
2006 and 2011 both the units and the workers employed in dyeing and finishing 
operations reduced by approximately 40% (in 2006 there are 885 units and 8,719 
workers but in 2011 these figures were reduced to 542 units and 5,340 workers). 
Anyway, the dyeing and finishing stage is, after the apparel sector, the business 
which absorbs most of the district’s workforce and, considering the small number 
of firms, this might mean that a process of rationalization with the merging of 
small units in bigger one is currently in progress. 
The comparison between the census data of 1991 and 2001 and the data 
published by ISTAT/ASIA34 in 2008 allows us to analyze the evolution and 
composition of the economy of Prato during the 1990s. In the ten years between 
1991 and 2011, among the manufacturing activities – which in 2001 accounted for 
more than 50% of total employees in the district – a significant growth was 
recorded by two typical supporting industries of textiles; the manufacture of 
textile machinery (DK) and the manufacture of chemicals products and synthetic 
fibers (DG). In that decade they increased their staff by 18% and 52% respectively 
(Fig. 6.4.5, Tables 22 and 23 in the appendix). 
As regards the sector of business services (Fig. 6.4.4 and 6.4.6, Tables 24 and 25 
in the appendix), a relevant growth has been registered in the real estate 
activities – whose growth seems to be more linked to the development and urban 
population of Prato than to the transformation of its productive system – and 
computer services. In 2001, according to the census data, there were 3.6 workers 
in services for every 100 workers in manufacturing in the province of Prato. Also 
the development of professional activities was also high: among these, in addition 
to traditional legal services and tax, in particular the activities of technical 
studies, including consultancy business and also those related to textile design 
and fashion in general grew (classified as other business services). In other 
sectors, the more substantial expansion occurred in the transport and storage 
activity which between 1991 and 2001 had a 55% increase in employees. There 
was also growth in the sector of hotels and restaurants, and construction, with 
growth of numbers of employees by 37% and 26% respectively. 
                                            
34 The ASIA database on local units of ISTAT responds to the dual need to represent in territorial terms the evolution of the 
country's annual economic structure and to adapt the Italian production of statistics on economic units to the Eurostat 
regulations.  
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The analysis of data from ASIA on the number of local units for the period 
2001–2007 shows a sharp gap between manufacturing industry and services in 
terms of economic growth (Fig. 6.4.3 and 6.4.4). 
 
Figure 6.4.3 COMPOSITION OF THE MANUFACTURING ACTIVITIES OF THE 
DISTRICT OF PRATO: NUMBER OF FIRMS 
 
Source: ISTAT and ASIA Statistics 
 
The shift of the economic center of gravity of the area from manufacture to 
services might be a phenomenon linked to the “escape” from the textile industry 
in crisis, but it could also depend, at least in part, on the growth of demand for 
specialized services to support the industrial production, which has been 
reorganized into forms more suitable to the new economic and social context: 
logistics, marketing, recruitment and provision of personnel, R&D, information 
technology and professional services to businesses in general. 
This is because both the companies that have continued to produce fabrics and 
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carded yarns of high quality and the companies that have diversified and 
expanded the range of fabrics and yarns, in order to be competitive in the new 
context of globalization, need specialist services to give their products a specific 
intangible content of innovation and quality that would elevate them above mere 
price competition. 
Even for the activities in the service sector as a whole, the structural dynamics 
of the 2001–2006 period are placed in substantial continuity with those observed 
during the years 1991–2001. It is actually thanks to their growth (and that of 
constructions) that the local economy was able to absorb the sharp decline in 
employment in the manufacturing sector, achieving a slight increase in local jobs 
(+1.7%, Fig. 6.4.4).  
 
Fig. 6.4.4 COMPOSITION OF THE SERVICE ACTIVITIES OF THE DISTRICT OF 
PRATO: NUMBER OF FIRMS 
 
Source: ISTAT and ASIA Statistics 
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Figure 6.4.5 COMPOSITION OF THE MANUFACTURING ACTIVITIES OF THE 
DISTRICT OF PRATO: NUMBER OF WORKERS 
 
Source: ISTAT and ASIA Statistics 
 
Going into detail, it can be noted, in the transport sector, that there is a 
significant increase of the activity of goods cargo and storage (+28.2% of 
employees between 2004 and 2006), probably connected with the processes of 
indirect internationalization (import of semi-finished and intermediate goods) of 
the textile and apparel industry. Also the growth of renting activities appears 
significant, since the bulk of the local units classified in group 71.3 (“renting of 
other machinery and equipment”, +43.1% of employees in three years, Table 6.4.6) 
are probably active in the field of industrial machinery. The growth of leasing of 
real property that in the decade 1991–2001 had increased the number of 
employees by ten times, instead, slows down and, finally, there is concern about 
the decline in the number of workers in information technology and R&D 
activities, which in the decade 1991–2001 had recorded a significant increase (Fig. 
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6.4.6). 
There are links between the textile activities in decline and the expansion of the 
tertiary activities, the decline in employment in information activities and R&D, 
and also the contraction of the final stages of the textile cycle, which is the stage 
with greater value added and intensity of skills and capital assets, as well as the 
contraction of the engineering machinery sector. However, these suggest that the 
local growth of the services sector has more to do with the urban sprawl of Prato 
and its hinterland than with a transformation of its industrial apparatus, 
characterized by a continuous search for innovation, quality and intangible 
content of products. 
 
Figure 6.4.6 COMPOSITION OF THE SERVICE ACTIVITIES OF THE DISTRICT OF 
PRATO: NUMBER OF WORKERS 
 
ISTAT and ASIA Statistics 
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6.5 Changes In The Industrial And Economic Composition Of The 
District Of Bishū (Ichinomiya) 
 
In the “New Textile Vision” of July 2003, the Japanese government proposed a 
concrete and intensive structural reform of the textile sector that invests in the 
upstream (spinning yarn), middle-stream (weaving firms, knitwear, dyeing and 
finishing) and the downstream (apparel makers and wholesalers). 
As for the upstream firms the production of general-purpose materials in China 
is expanding. More and more textile companies are relocating their production 
base to Asia to respond to the increase of the global competition. This is evident in 
the reduction in the number of spinning mills and weaving companies and their 
workers. In the period from 2006 to 2010, in fact, the number of spinning mills 
and weaving companies reduced by 30% and their number of workers by 5% (Fig. 
6.5.1 and 6.5.2). 
 
Figure 6.5.1 COMPOSITION OF TEXTILE INDUSTRY IN ICHINOMIYA: 
NUMBER OF FIRMS 
 
Source: The Industries of Ichinomiya, Ichinomiya City Council Statistics 
 
Other upstream firms have, instead, chosen to engage in the production of 
high-functionality fibers and industrial textiles (i.e. carbon fiber, membrane for 
water treatment). For this reason, the national consumption of textiles in this 
sector grew from 37% in 1991 to 45% in 1998. The consumption of clothing fabrics, 
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instead, decreased from 30.5% in 1991 to 27.6% in 1998 (Association of Japanese 
Textiles Chemical, Consumption of Textiles and Items for Use). 
 
Figure 6.5.2 COMPOSITION OF TEXTILE INDUSTRY IN ICHINOMIYA: 
NUMBER OF WORKERS 
 
Source: The Industries of Ichinomiya, Ichinomiya City Council Statistics 
 
In reality, in Ichinomiya, the “other textile producers” also showed a reduction, 
although it is small if compared to that experienced by the spinning and weaving 
companies of the district (between 2006 to 2010 there was a reduction of a single 
company, Table 29 and 31 in the appendix). 
Although, until the 1990s the production of textiles for apparel, for industrial 
use and for furniture covered one third each, at present, while the production of 
textiles for furniture still covers one third of the total share, the production of 
fibers for industrial use has extended to almost half of the total. 
More and more textile producers have abandoned the production of fiber and 
fabrics for clothing and, thus, the proportion of consumption of the domestic goods 
of the sector decreases35. 
According to the WTO, the income of the world population until 2005 increased 
to US$ 510 billion per year and the 60% of the growth has been charged to the 
clothing industry. Also, according to the CIRFS (European Man-Made Fibres 
                                            
35 These figures relate to the fibers used in the production of secondary goods that are produced in the country and do not 
take into account imports of textile products, and should not be understood as estimates of total sector consumption. 
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Association), 60% of the consumption of textile fibers in the EU in 2001 was 
represented by clothing goods and by 2010 there was a further increase of 5.3%. In 
particular, the high purchasing power group of consumers in the BRIC countries 
is expanding rapidly. It is foreseen that in 2050, the number of people with the 
same income as the average Japanese consumer will reach about 700 million (a 
tenth of the total world population). Therefore, in parallel with the emergence of 
new foreign markets, it is expected that in future foreign markets for textiles and 
clothing will expand. 
Therefore, while in Japan the textiles for clothing are reducing their share of 
the textile sector, the use of clothing fibers not only plays an important role 
worldwide but also seems to continue to grow. For the downstream firms (apparel 
companies), more than half of the imports of final products comes from China.  
The most important change in the industrial structure of the district, besides 
the overall contraction of the industrial textile industry, is certainly the rise of 
clothing companies. Although these activities did not exist in 2006, in 2010 there 
were 33 units of “outerwear manufacturers” employing 411 workers. 
The middle stream (textile converter firms, dyeing and finishing firms) is the 
section of the textile industry where the largest number of micro, small and 
medium enterprises concentrate. In Ichinomiya, wool textile companies 
(converters) are still the main firms (80% of total textile firms), although also in 
this case, they registered a one-third reduction in the number of firms and 23% in 
the number of workers between 2006 and in 2010. 
Considering, however, the different stages of production, the activities of dyeing 
and finishing emerge as the most developed both for the number of firms (95 in 
2010, about one third of the total textile activities) and for the number of 
employees (2,064 workers 36% of the local textile workforce in 2010). However, 
this sector also experienced a contraction of about a quarter in the four years 
considered (from 131 to 95 units, from 2721 workers to 2064 between 2006 and 
2010)36. 
So, as a result of a price-oriented choice that did not consider the long-term 
interests of the district, spinning and weaving mills became a residual entity in 
the district, since the production of yarn and fabrics is commissioned year by year 
to Chinese firms. On the other hand, the activities that require more technical 
skills and know-how, such as those of dyeing and finishing, are, nowadays, the 
main activities of the sector. And this explains why the reduction of the total 
number of firms and textile workers in the district does not correspond with a 
                                            
36 See Tables 29 and 31 in the appendix at the end of this dissertation. 
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proportional decrease in the value added. 
The comparison between the industrial statistics of 2006 and 2010 and the 
services statistics of 2003 and 2008 of the Ichinomiya Civil Council allows us to 
analyze the evolution and composition of the economy of Ichinomiya during the 
1990s.  
In the four years between 2006 and 2010, among the manufacturing activities – 
which in 2003 accounted for 80% of the total economic activities and 95% of the 
total employees in the district – we can notice a significant reduction of all the 
main activities but the food industry, whose employees increased by 22% (despite 
the reduction of one unit) (Fig. 6.5.3 and Fig. 6.5.4, Tables 33 and 34 in the 
appendix).  
 
Figure 6.5.3 COMPOSITION OF THE MANUFACTURING ACTIVITIES OF THE DISTRICT 
OF ICHINOMIYA: NUMBER OF WORKERS 
 
Source: The Industries of Ichinomiya, Ichinomiya City Council Statistics 
 
If the textile industry experienced a reduction of approximately 8% of both the 
number of firms and of employees, the industry that suffered the greatest 
reduction was the industrial machinery manufacturing industry, where the 
number of firms and employees decreased by 36% and 50% respectively. Also the 
other industries, like plastic and metal manufacturing, transport equipment and 
electrical, electronic and IT equipment and devices, suffered from a reduction of 
units and personnel (Fig. 6.5.3 and Fig. 6.5.4). 
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As regards the sector of business services, it registers an overall outstanding 
increase of all activities: in fact, if the number of firms increased by nine times 
(from 1,598 in 2003 to 16,587 in 2008), the number of workers indeed increased by 
twelve times (from 9,331 in 2003 to 127,089 in 2008)37. 
 
Figure 6.5.4 COMPOSITION OF THE MANUFACTURING ACTIVITIES OF THE DISTRICT 
OF ICHINOMIYA: NUMBER OF WORKERS 
 
Source: The Industries of Ichinomiya, Ichinomiya City Council Statistics 
 
In particular, a relevant growth has been registered in the construction, retail, 
restaurant and hotel, and welfare and medical activities, which, in general 
registered an increase of 6 to 6.5 times in the number of firms and an increase of 7 
to 8 times in the number of workers38. In the transport sector, the number of firms 
and of workers increased, respectively, from 24 units and 458 workers in 2003 to 
281 units and 7,981 workers in 2008, registering the biggest growth in the service 
sector (Fig. 6.5.5 and Fig. 6.5.6). 
The sudden growth in services seems to be linked to the development of 
Ichinomiya as a residential area and to the progressive ageing of the local 
population. In 2008, according to the local statistics, the ratio between the 
                                            
37 See Tables 35 and 37 in the appendix at the end of the dissertation. 
38 In the construction sector the number of firms (workers) grew from 203 (1,026) in 2003 (8,716) to 1,374 in 2008, in the 
retailing activities from 572 (3,546) in 2003 to 3,909 (29,022) in 2008, in the restaurant and hotel services from 311 (1,711) 
in 2003 to 2,262 (13,065) in 2008 and in the welfare and medical activities from 103 (11,254) in 2003 to 781 (10,219) in 
2008. 
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number of workers in manufacturing and services in Ichinomiya was 1:10. 
As Kobayashi (2005) states, Japanese industries have been able to maintain 
their international competitiveness partly because of the strength of the 
secondary and tertiary manufacturers (weaving firms, dyeing and finishing). 
Small Japanese makers without the technological strength are being driven to 
bankruptcy after losing out in the race to cut costs. An increasing number of 
major primary manufacturers (big apparel and textile makers) have replaced 
domestic secondary makers as suppliers of intermediate products to Chinese and 
Asian firms.  
Generally speaking, many major primary makers prefer to procure from 
overseas suppliers if there are few problems with quality, cost and delivery time 
and if their products are cheaper than domestically procured products. On the 
other side, secondary and tertiary makers are likely to be able to compete with 
Asian rivals if they succeed in improving the quality, technology and value added 
of their products and, eventually, reduce cost.  
 
Figure 6.5.5 COMPOSITION OF THE SERVICE ACTIVITIES OF THE DISTRICT OF 
ICHINOMIYA: NUMBER OF FIRMS 
 
 
Source: The Services of Ichinomiya, Ichinomiya City Council Statistics 
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Figure 6.5.6 COMPOSITION OF THE SERVICE ACTIVITIES OF THE DISTRICT OF 
ICHINOMIYA: NUMBER OF WORKERS 
 
Source: The Industries of Ichinomiya, Ichinomiya City Council Statistics 
 
There are opinions suggesting that secondary and tertiary makers should 
transfer operations to China and other Asian countries to survive. However 
caution is advised for relocation abroad of micro enterprises that lack know-how 
in management of overseas operations: as the Italian case demonstrates, 
innumerable small and medium enterprises have failed in overseas operations 
and returned to the motherland. 
As Kobayashi (2005) states:  
 
We must not simply believe that all Japanese companies that relocated to 
China found a “rose petal-covered” road to success. some were forced to 
withdraw after finding joint ventures partners unreliable, and others went 
bankrupt with accumulated losses after failing to collect their accounts 
receivable. There are also Japanese firms that decided to cease their 
operations because they found it impossible to make business plans under 
the constantly changing laws and regulations of the Chinese government. 
(Kobayashi, 2005:93) 
 
Therefore, rather that engaging in overseas operations, many small firms would 
be more likely to survive if they remain in Japan and try to upgrade the level of 
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their technologies by relying on the advantage of concentration of textile activities 
and experience of the district. 
As the government claims, it is advisable for them to push ahead with 
rationalization and explore the possibilities of joint development with the upper 
and down stream. However, many middle-stream firms are unable to give scope to 
their high technical potential because of the lack of ample funding. Generally, 
SMEs rely for funding on banks or credit unions, regional financial institutions 
that have relatively weak financial positions. As a result, SMEs are in a situation 
where they can be easily pushed into financial hardship by financial institutions’ 
reluctance to lend money or refusal to discount commercial bills. Thus, 
administrative agencies are under pressure to map out a path through which 
SMEs can exercise their management skills and technical capabilities by taking 
measures to ease SMEs’ financial weakness. 
For this reason, in 2008 the government began a program of support aimed at 
small and medium-sized textile enterprises that want to realize their own product 
design and undertake the activities of marketing. In addition, the METI also 
proposes the rationalization of the sector through the merger of companies and 
the formation of enterprise groups (even among firms of different sectors), headed 
by a leader. In METI’s provision such structure should enhance the industry and 
avoid the overlapping of functions, the loss of productive resources and 
unproductive internal competition39. In addition, the process of branding and the 
overseas expansion (exports) of the Japanese apparel companies proceeds slowly. 
Indeed, according to the 2010 METI Report “Future Tasks of the Textile and 
Apparel industry”, the proportion between exports and imports is 1:50.  
Furthermore, because of the economic depression, the influx of economical 
clothing and fabrics and the worsening of competition between apparel companies, 
the unit price of goods is decreasing. After the Lehman Brothers financial shock, 
also, and in connection with the apparel makers’ crisis, the turnover of retailers 
(above all department stores) has suddenly decreased.  
The value of the final product is, in particular, determined by the textile fibers, 
which express the value and creativity of the fashion content elaborated by the 
fashion designers. For this reason, so that the yarn producers can obtain 
international competitiveness and apparel makers can make their brands 
recognizable worldwide, the existence of manufacturers of fabrics in the middle 
stream that provide excellent textiles and actively promote their distinctive 
high-quality production to the fashion world is indispensable.  
                                            
39	 For details about governmental policies towards textile and apparel companies see ????? (METI)???????
???????????????????(Future Tasks of the Textile and Apparel Industry). 
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In this context, in accordance with the suggestions of the 1993 Report of the 
Textile Industries Council, “A Vision for New Textile Industry”, submitted to 
METI, the Youth Committee (substructure of Japan Worsted and Woolen 
Weavers Association) in cooperation with the Bishū Wool Textile Manufacturing 
Association, have launched two main projects: the Bishū Collection, started in 
1994 to raise creativity in product planning, and the Bishū Forum, to develop new 
ideas and active programs to solve critical problems of the textile industry. Again, 
from 2009 through collective exhibitions, called “Bishū Style”, held once a year in 
autumn in Tokyo by the Japan Worsted and Wool Weavers Association (which 
groups Bisai, Bihoku, Tsushima, Nagoya and Gifu aas local associations), and the 
Japan and Aichi Textile Industry Conference, the firms of the district have the 
chance to present the high quality and technique of their products (mainly, made 
of wool) to the fashion world, especially buyers40.  
In addition, in 2006 the Bishū Enterprise Committee of Japan (in collaboration 
with Ichinomiya Chamber of Commerce and Industry), supported by the Japan 
Worsted and Woolen Weavers Association, created JB (Joint Bishū) as the 
common label of the district41. The committee started from the premises that the 
textiles of the Bishū region, renowned not only in Japan but all over the world, 
come from the collaboration of original models and highly-perfected techniques of 
all the participants in all the creative stages (spinning, twisting, dying, weaving, 
finishing and final treatments), and that woolen materials, in particular, occupy a 
dominant position within the fashion industry, as materials of primary 
importance for outdoor garments, and this thanks also to the collaboration and 
ties created with garment manufacturers and retailers. On this background, the 
Committee expresses the desire to match the results obtained from the 
collaboration and the ties already created within Japan, with the idea of adapting 
to the progress of globalization by creating a distinctive regional brand.  
Lately, in May 2011, fifteen leading companies of Bishū started a common 
project to revitalize the district forces, titled “All Bishū” to promote through 
exhibitions (“Bishū materials exhibition”, hosted by the Ichinomiya Fashion 
Design Center) of locally-produced woolen (or wool blended) fancy yarns and high 
quality fabrics, held twice a year in Tokyo and organized around innovative trend 
concepts, the local high value added production, and escaping the competition on 
price which has been damaging the productive structure of the district since the 
era of globalization began42. 
                                            
40  Details on Japan Worsted and Woolen Weavers Association (JWWA) website at 
http://www.jwwa.net/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=19&Itemid=46 
41 For details refer to Joint Bishū site at http://www.joint-bishu.jp/index_jp.html 
42 For further information refer to “All Bishu” official site at http://www.textile-tree.com/blog/?page_id=2. 
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7. The Erosion Of The Local Cohesive Socio-Cultural 
Texture under Globalization As Cause Of The Crisis 
  
 
7.1 The Rise Of Clothing Firms And Ethnic Chinese Firms In Prato In 
The New Millenium 
 
While in the 1990s the textile district of Prato, although regaining 
competitiveness, continued the trends of change initiated in the previous decade, 
the real new phenomenon of the nineties was constituted by the growth of the 
clothing industry, mainly due to the proliferation of companies constituted by 
immigrants of Chinese origin. As seen in the previous chapter, in the nineties, the 
textile system, while remaining dominant, experienced a reduction especially in 
terms of local economic units, the clothing industry grew considerably. This was 
primarily a result of the Chinese immigration in Prato, who has given birth to, 
initially hundreds and, then, thousands, of clothing workshops (Table 7.1.1). 
 
Figure 7.1.1 TEXTILE AND CLOTHING FIRMS AND CHINESE FIRMS IN PRATO 
(2002–2011) 
 
Source: Prato Chamber of Commerce 
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Table 7.1.1 TEXTILE AND CLOTHING FIRMS AND CHINESE FIRMS IN PRATO (2002–2011) 
 
TOTAL  
TEXTILE 
FIRMS 
TOTAL 
CLOTHING 
FIRMS 
CHINESE  
TEXTILE 
FIRMS 
CHINESE  
CLOTHING 
FIRMS 
2002 7,276 2,529 56 1,230 
2003 6,813 2,589 133 1,293 
2004 6,682 2,398 159 1,436 
2005 6,206 2,597 168 1,693 
2006 5,828 3,080 204 2,140 
2007 4,290 3,105 224 2,477 
2008 4,094 3,396 175 2,854 
2009 3,862 3,734 213 3,229 
2010 3,143 4,476 253 3,446 
2011 3,027 4,438 269 3,489 
Source: Prato Chamber of Commerce 
 
This is a surprising phenomenon from various points of view. Firstly, the 
clothing industry in Prato has become a considerable reality in just a few years. If 
in 2002 clothing firms represented only a quarter of the total number of firms of 
the local textile and clothing sector, in 2009 their number overcame the number of 
the textile firms (Fig. 7.1.1). In particular, the number of Chinese firms in the 
districts increased by more than 10% per year until 2009 (Table 7.1.2 and Fig. 
7.1.2). Secondly, this growth does not stem from a strategy of lengthening of the 
manufacturing chain adopted by the local textile entrepreneurs. Thirdly, a 
gradually increasing share of the clothing business consists of workshops of 
Chinese immigrants. Indeed, in 2010 Chinese clothing firms accounted for the 
80% of the total clothing firms of the Prato district. 
The employment of Chinese migrants has partially been facilitated by 
institutional changes in Italy, among which the Italian-Chinese Treaty signed in 
1985, which permitted Chinese to set up enterprises and employ a co-ethnic 
workforce if they had regular resident permits (Carchedi and Ferri, 1998). In 
September 2005 there were 21,743 Chinese firms in Italy, with a growth index of 
21% over the period 2000–2005. These businesses are almost evenly distributed 
between trade/services and manufacturing (Spinner, 2006).  
Chinese workers began to flow to Italy during the exports boom in the 1960s. 
First they started bazaars, food shops and restaurants in the biggest cities, such 
as Rome and Milan, than moved to other Italian regions. According to the data of 
the National Prefecture based on permanent resident permits, Chinese 
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registrations grew from 38 in 1990 to 3,000 in the 1998 and 11,000 in 2006. After 
the entry of China to the WTO in 2002 and the abolition of the Textiles Path on 
textile quotas provided in the MFA between Europe and China in 2005, first 
Chinese-made textiles, and then Chinese workers flowed into Prato, aimed at 
covering the lower segments of the labor market, left empty by the local 
population. 
The following numbers may help to quantify the phenomenon of Chinese 
immigration and economic activity. According to the most recent data available, 
10.7% of the residents of the province of Prato are of foreign origin – the highest 
percentage among Italian provinces. In the city of Prato, 12% of the residents are 
of foreign origin, compared with a national average of 5.0% and 7.6% and 7.3% in 
Lombardy and in the Veneto region (the two Italian regions having the largest 
number of foreign residents).  
 
Figure 7.1.2 NUMBER OF CHINESE FIRMS IN PRATO (1998–2011) 
 
Source: Multicultural Affair Section, Council of Prato Municipality 
 
Table 7.1.2 NUMBER OF CHINESE FIRMS IN PRATO (1998–2011) 
?
CHINESE 
FIRMS 
INCREASE OF 
UNITS 
INCREMENTAL 
INCREASE 
1998 479 
  1999 862 383 +0.44 
2000 1158 296 +0.26 
2001 1288 130 +0.10 
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2002 1339 51 +0.04 
2003 1501 162 +0.11 
2004 1684 183 +0.11 
2005 1975 291 +0.15 
2006 2474 499 +0.20 
2007 2877 403 +0.14 
2008 3222 345 +0.11 
2009 3645 423 +0.12 
2010 3893 248 +0.06 
2011 3954 61 +0.02 
Multicultural Affair Section, Council of Prato Municipality 
 
According to the 2007 Census of the Italian Chamber of Commerce, nearly a 
third of the manufacturing companies set up by Chinese immigrants are located 
in Prato. In particular, in March 2007, at the Chamber of Commerce of Prato the 
number of firms registered as having Chinese ownership was approximately 3,000, 
representing a 50% increase in less than four years.  At the same time, according 
to the Prato Industrial Union, between 2000 and 2009, textiles companies in the 
industrial district fell by 41,7% (about 2,760 companies) and in relation to this the 
workforce employed in the sector decreased by 43.4% (about 10,975 persons).  
The majority of individually owned Chinese manufacturing activities are 
concentrated in the textile and clothing sector (more than 30%) and concentrated 
in specific Italian regions, among which Tuscany is the region with the highest 
number of Chinese businesses and Chinese-led textile-garment manufacturing 
activities (Table 30). In Italy as a whole, Chinese individually owned businesses 
account for 8.8% of all firms active in the textile/clothing sector. 
 
Table 7.1.3 TYPES AND NUMBER OF CHINESE-LED 
BUSINESSES (2005) 
AGRICULTURE 27 0.1% 
MANUFACTURING ACTIVITIES 
(TEXTILE&CLOTHING) 
9,669 
(6,783) 
44% 
(31%) 
WHOLESALE AND RETAIL COMMERCE OF GOODS 10,114 46% 
HOTELS AND RESTAURANTS 1,290 6% 
REAL ESTATE AND IT 188 0.8% 
CONSTRUCTION AND TRANSPORTATION 298 1.3% 
TOTAL 21,743  
Source: Spinner (2006) 
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Table 7.1.4 CHINESE MANUFACTURING ACTIVITIES IN SELECTED ITALIAN 
REGIONS (2005) 
 
 
Toscana Lombardia E.Romagna Veneto Lazio  Campania 
Textile  
and clothing 
2,319 1,450 1,227 1,022 96 94 
Total Man.  
activities 
3,903 1,820 1,475 1,173 132 102 
Total Chinese 
businesses 
4,977 4,038 2,295 2,060 1,524 988 
Source: Spinner (2006) 
 
The first group of apparel companies formed in Prato in the 1980s, along with a 
substantial population of knitwear firms that had formed earlier (Toccafondi, 
1992). In the decade from the mid 1980s to the mid 1990s nearly all of the new 
migrants were employed within the ethnic economy in workshops that contracted 
with Italian final suppliers of garments, knitwear, leatherwear and handbags. 
Chinese ethnic workshops are generally employed in the intermediate 
standardized stages of production of clothing apparel, mainly in the central phase 
of the productive process as assemblers of garments and knitwear. 
Garment workshops operated by Chinese migrants in industrial districts are 
usually set up as individually owned or family-run businesses. The typical 
workshop’s human resources consist of the owner (a third of whom are women), 
the owner’s spouse and children, and eight to ten workers. The reason is that the 
family/owner tends to divide staff among several workshops. 
Indeed, it seems that it was precisely the demand for finishing operations in the 
clothing industry, a job usually entrusted to sub-contractors or to small 
enterprises working at home, by the knitwear companies of Prato that attracted 
the first flow of about 1,000 immigrants of Chinese origin in the early nineties. 
Arrivals then continued at a steady pace throughout the decade, during which 
there flourished in Prato an important community of Chinese immigrants and 
also a Chinese ethnic economy of international standing. 
At first, the arrival of immigrants and the establishment of their workshops 
remained almost unnoticed, probably because the Chinese – as in previous 
decades the flow of immigrants coming from southern Italy were going to fill 
working positions – in this case subcontracting roles  that otherwise would have 
been vacant, as a result of the changed attitude towards manual work by the 
Italian younger generations. The underestimation of the phenomenon may have 
been due in part to the fact that Chinese immigrants were not connected with the 
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textile industry, which, besides requiring more technical skills, was regarded by 
the people of Prato as part of their identity. 
Chinese immigrants rented the large warehouses of textile artisans, many of 
which were closed during the crisis of the eighties, or later due to the problem of 
generational succession. Also, the city council adopted a policy of accommodation: 
in 1994, it established the Research and Immigration Services Center in order to 
study Chinese immigrants and provide them with assistance, in collaboration 
with other local organizations (Caritas). 
Since the mid 1990s, apart from their workshops, the Chinese migrants in 
Prato have started to develop and reinvigorate the local textile industry through 
their innovative “pronto moda” business model of “ready-to-wear fast fashion” as 
an additional industrial sector alongside Prato’s traditional textile sector 
(Ceccagno, 2003). In Prato, in December 2006, there were 2,474 Chinese-operated 
firms and 2,140 of them were active in textile and garment production. Most of 
them operated as contractors (sewing, cutting and distribution of garments), but 
since 1996-1997 an increasing number are composed of final firms engaged in 
“pronto-moda” production. Unlike “programmed firms”, which define the fashion 
trends and establish their collections in advance of the sales season and plan their 
production in the basis of the orders received, the so-called “pronto modas” 
prepare collections and take orders from clients just a little before – or even after 
– the sales season, their lines imitating the successful models of the programmed 
firms.  
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Table 7.1.5 PRATO: CHINESE RESIDENTS AS SHARE OF TOTAL POPULATION 
(1990–2010) 
 
TOTAL 
POPULATION 
CHINESE 
RESIDENTS, No. 
CHINESE 
RESIDENTS, % 
1990 166,688 169 0.0% 
1991 167,209 1,009 0.6% 
1995 167,991 1,525 0.9% 
1996 168,892 1,761 1.0% 
1997 169,927 2,457 1.4% 
1998 171,135 3,162 1.8% 
1999 172,473 3,625 2.1% 
2000 174,513 4,354 2.5% 
2001 176,023 4,806 2.7% 
2002 177,643 5,335 3.0% 
2003 178,023 5,457 3.1% 
2004 180,674 6,813 3.8% 
2005 183,823 8,627 4.7% 
2006 185,660 10,077 5.4% 
2007 185,603 10,431 5.6% 
2008 185,091 9,927 5.4% 
2009 186,798 10,877 5.8% 
2010 188,011 11,882 6.3% 
Source: Statistics of Council of Prato Municipality 
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Chinese-operated firms maintain their competitive advantage thanks to a 
combination of low wages based on piecework, non-compliance with social security 
and tax laws, and working hours far longer than those allowed by national labor 
contracts. In addition, in Prato, the ample availability of workers in Chinese 
workshops and the organization of the industrial districts whereby textile 
producers, textile dyeing firms and accessory shops are concentrated in a 
relatively small place, has enabled Chinese entrepreneurs to establish themselves 
as final producers of knitwear and clothing, in the less value-added sector of 
pronto moda production. 
Both large and small pronto modas exist in Prato. Small ones usually consist of 
four workers: a couple in which the wife takes care of customer service and the 
husband of the design of the pattern, a designer who prepares the patterns and a 
cutter. The larger ones include up to ten people, including warehouse workers, 
ironers, designers, and, in some cases, one or two stylists (Italian or Chinese). 
Large pronto modas manufacture with the client’s brand and sell to buyers  – 
wholesalers, sales representatives or directly to retail outlets – who come to the 
district and place the orders, while small ones with low quality and no-branded 
production usually sell to buyers who buy what they find on display and then sell 
it in retail outlets or at open-air markets. 
Hence, since the early nineties, apparel companies in Prato are of two distinct 
types, although both of them mostly specialize in manufacturing women’s clothing. 
Some of the Prato clothing companies positioned themselves in medium-high 
market segments and have rapidly expanded, investing in collections and brand, 
so to be able to build their own image and, in some cases, also to manage the 
distribution of their products in Italy and abroad. A larger, and growing, number 
of micro-enterprises – usually of Chinese origin – instead, work in “fast fashion”, 
offering articles addressed mainly to lower market segments: their main strength 
consists of the speed and the price at which the garment is produced and 
distributed.  
In the apparel sector of Prato, as in textiles, manufacturing is based on the 
division of labor between the client firm (or final firm) and the sub-contractor (or 
phase-firms), even though the number of productive phases assigned to 
sub-contractors is smaller in apparel firms than textile firms. Sub-contracting 
operations are concentrated locally for the production of “fast fashion”, and 
outsourced to external companies for the few “programmed companies” that have 
a recognized brand and offer products of medium-high quality. As a result, the 
productive structure of the apparel industry in Prato is more fragmented than 
that of the textile sector and the increase of enterprises owned by Chinese 
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immigrants has further increased this fragmentation. However, except for the few 
Italian companies that produce clothing with famous brands, the exceptional 
development of the clothing industry in Prato is related to the expansion of “fast 
fashion” produced by enterprises of Chinese immigrants, not only employing 
Chinese workers, but also using economical fabrics, often imported from China 
itself. Thus, in general it is the few local businesses that offer quality clothing at 
high prices that use Prato textile manufacturers. 
Even in the new millennium, the clothing industry of Prato has continued to 
grow, mainly because of the growth of the Chinese ethnic economy. In fact the 
number of apparel companies registered at the Chamber of Commerce of Prato 
with a Chinese owner or members of Chinese origin increases from year to year, 
while the number of Italian firms decreases. The share of Chinese enterprises in 
the province of Prato rose from 49% in 2002 (1,230 firms owned by Chinese 
immigrants out of a total of 2,529 active in the apparel sector) to over 78% in 2010 
(3,489 active Chinese companies out of 4,438). The gradual expansion of the 
ethnic economy, of course, goes along with the continuous flow of Chinese 
immigrants: in 2010 those officially resident in the province of Prato exceed 
11,000 (Table 7.1.5). 
The majority of Chinese residents in Prato come from Zhejiang, a province to 
the south of Shanghai, and, in particular, from the city of Wenzhou, a 
manufacturing city among the most developed in China, whose economy is based 
on small family businesses that manufacture goods for the person and the house, 
like clothes, shoes, bags, toys, etc. (Wu, 2009). Mainly unskilled migrants, they 
have been recruited by word-of-mouth and via interpersonal networks of relatives 
and compatriots. This appears to be particularly true for the irregular Chinese 
migrants or clandestinos, who account for at least one quarter of all Chinese 
residents in Prato and who often work as forced labor in order to pay off their 
debts to the middlemen (snakeheads or “shetou”) who facilitate their entry into 
Italy (Ehlers, 2006). 
According to Dei Ottati, Chinese immigrants are characterized by a widespread 
desire for economic and social success through self-employment and this makes 
them well suited to the local productive system. Thanks to the division of labor 
between firms, this provides them with ample opportunity to start their own 
business and utilize with profit their manufacturing expertise and, above all, 
labor and financial resources readily available through their characteristic family 
and community relations. 
The rapid growth of the ethnic economy and the Chinese community in Prato is 
explained, then, on the one hand, with the driving force that lies behind the 
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demand for sub-contracting work by the knitwear industries, and the other hand, 
with the propensity of these immigrants to become self-employed entrepreneurs, 
willing to take advantage of their special family and community resources. Thus, 
in little more than a decade, the number of the enterprises of the Chinese 
immigrants in the province of Prato officially registered at the end of 2011, 
increased from a few hundred to approximately 4,000, including 3,489 firms in the 
apparel industry (Chamber of Commerce of Prato, Table 28). 
The development of ethnic Chinese enterprise in the district of Prato is not only 
a quantitative but also qualitative phenomenon. Indeed, in the late nineties, the 
Chinese workshops performed only sub-contracting activities in various stages of 
the finishing stage of clothing and knitwear manufacturing, on behalf of Italian 
final firms. However, especially since the new millennium, several Chinese 
companies  a few hundred  have turned from suppliers to final firms. The new 
Chinese prontisti, of course, make use of their compatriots not only as employees 
but also as sub-contractors, and sell their production, mainly of medium-low 
quality, to Italian wholesalers or vendors and now more and more to foreign 
buyers abroad, through the commercial center, directly run by them and located 
in Macrolotto43. 
Recently, through investment in the quality of fabrics – often Italian fabrics  
bought by Italian sales representatives, more accuracy in the quality of garments, 
and the introduction of a programmed calendar, some Chinese pronto modas have 
launched their own brands. That is the case of Koralline, launched in 2005 by a 
Chinese businessman who simultaneously continues to produce no-brand 
medium-to-low garments, and Giupel, a brand launched in 2004 by Xu Qiulin, a 
half Chinese and half Italian businessman. Xu Qiulin was the first immigrant to 
join Confindustria, the Italian Confederation of Industry in 2004. Giupel blends 
fabric and leather for the production of fashion products, manufactured partly in 
China and partly in Italy, although much of the raw materials and the final 
products are manufactured in China. 
Some Chinese entrepreneurs have also bought or established dyeing and 
finishing businesses for garments and knitwear, while another group has added 
or replaced knitwear manufacturing activities with wholesale activities or 
import-export business of textiles and clothing. This qualitative evolution of the 
ethnic Chinese economy in Prato is also attested by the strong increase in S.p.a 
firms (from 72 in 2002 to 188 in 2005), with a high incidence among new 
                                            
43 Macrolotto in Prato was the largest industrial estate built in Italy in the eighties on completely private initiative. This 
industrial area in the south of the district of Prato has an extent of about 150 hectares, where over 400 micro and small 
enterprises are located, which employ about 3,000 workers. 
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wholesale and trading companies (Caserta and Marsden, 2007). 
The changes in the competitive and institutional context with the economic 
growth of China and its WTO entry (2002), the end of the MFA (2005), the 
diffusion of the internationalization of production, the introduction of the euro 
and its appreciation against the US dollar are among the factors at the origin of a 
new crisis and the further shrinking of the Prato textile district: the value of 
exports fell by more than half between 2001 and2010; investment and 
employment reduced: the number of textile workers in employment fell from 
41,000 in 2001 to 18,700; many textile companies closed (their number was 
reduced by almost 3,000 units in the period 2002–2010).  
In this context, local government policy changed: the Research Center for 
Immigration was closed in 2006 and the previous tolerance towards irregularities 
found in Chinese enterprises was replaced by a policy of control and repression of 
any violation of laws and regulations. Especially after the political change in the 
leadership of the city in 2009, the controls on Chinese companies are becoming 
more frequent and urgent,  and they are given considerable prominence by the 
local and national media. 
 
 
7.2 The In-District Internationalization Of The District Of Prato  
 
In describing the internal organization of Chinese-operated pronto modas and 
their relationships with Italian suppliers and other Chinese contractors in Prato, 
Ceccagno (2003) states that the organization and patterns of production pursued 
by Chinese businesses in Prato resembles those pursued by Italian firms 
operating within industrial districts in the past. 
A distinctive feature of the Prato district, for example, has been the relative 
ease with which workers could shift to self-employment, once they acquired a 
certain amount of professional knowledge and social networks. Besides, 
entrepreneurs could easily substitute workers by taking advantage of the 
continual influx of Italian migrants, mainly from southern Italy. This also 
describes well the features of the Chinese ethnic district, where ethnic networks 
guaranteed the constant arrival of new migrants eager to move up the 
professional and social ladder in shorter and shorter time spans triggered intense 
competition among contractors. 
A further similarity between former Italian workers in the textile district of 
Prato and the Chinese immigrant workers is that monetary returns were more 
important than working conditions. Between 1950 and the late 1970s, the 
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possibility of setting up one’s own business induced the Italian workers to 
consider employed work as transitory and thus to accept hard working conditions 
for the time being. “From this perspective, detailed regulations of labor 
organization were not only disadvantageous to the entrepreneurs but it was also 
opposed by many workers” (Dei Ottati, 2003:510). Among Chinese businesses of 
today, both employers and workers are more interested in money than working 
conditions: in fact, long working hours and operating “off the books” is prevalent 
among Chinese businesses today as it was amongst Italian firms in the past. 
Prato is an industrial district specializing in the production of high quality 
fabrics mostly sold abroad, not only in Europe, but also in North America, Japan 
and China. According to Eurostat, in 2001 Italy was the top European producer of 
textiles, clothing and leather products and footwear, accounting for 29.32 and 
45.2% respectively of EU-25 total output (Fortis, 2004). While shares of these 
markets have been progressively lost to countries with lower labor costs. such as 
China, Korea, India, Pakistan, Mexico and Turkey (Bigarelli and Solinas, 2003), 
these sectors are still the strongholds of traditional Italian products. This is clear 
if we consider that the value added of the fashion and home-furnishing sectors 
amounts to 42.2 billion €, higher than that scored by the German automobile 
industry (Fortis, 2005). 
However, the spreading of Chinese-led pronto moda activities within the 
district has pushed a growing number of Italian textile producers to adapt to the 
new opportunity by producing medium-low fabrics, setting more limited prices 
and shrinking production time and delivery specifically for the pronto modas. 
According to the Confartigianato (the Italian association of small entrepreneurs), 
in 2004 a third of the locally produced textile fabric was purchased by Chinese 
pronto modas (Confartigianato, 2005). 
To adapt to the frantic rhythm of the Chinese pronto modas, Italian textile 
firms increase the flexibility of production: they eliminated the phase of quality 
control and accept to produce limited quantity of a specific fabric and also to 
change production from one day to the next. 
Even the district textile dyeing firms are in part adapting to the changes linked 
to the proliferation of the Chinese pronto modas. Small dyeing firms have first 
offered them exclusive dyeing of garments but, later, from early 2006, Chinese 
have started to buy all of the about 15 small dyeing firms of the district. This 
allows them to control over the fast and flexible process of garment production: 
they can make use of basic fabric imported from China and to adapt them to fast 
changing fashion preferences for one color or another. On account of the pronto 
modas, also large dyeing firms are adapting to the new context: they have, in fact, 
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introduced smaller sections dedicated to garment dyeing. 
Therefore, Chinese migrants are contributing to the transformation of the 
industrial district of Prato. While, as in the origins, the core production of the 
district is still textiles, in the last years, thanks to the presence of Chinese 
workshops and final firms producing garments, the local chain of production has 
expanded to include the last phase of manufacturing, so that that area of Prato 
can now be described as a “fashion district”; besides, in a drive toward becoming a 
pronto moda center in Europe, Chinese businesses are revitalizing the district 
and are pushing the local productive sector to modify and adapt to the need of the 
now booming pronto moda garment business. 
Notwithstanding the role played by Chinese businesses in revitalizing a 
traditional industrial district in crisis due to international competition under 
globalization, it is not clear whether the ready-made fashion business will 
continue to be economically viable over the next years and whether the current 
structure of the district will ensure the stability of the district social and economic 
forces. 
In this regard, a problem linked to the survival of the district and the risk of 
further decentralization is the improvement in the quality of garment production. 
The main problem is related to the high mobility of labor in the Chinese 
workshops: because of the lack of any employment security and of the individual 
drive toward economic success, if workers find an opportunity for higher pay or to 
star up their own business, they are free to quit without notice, even in the middle 
of production: the loss of highly skilled workers affect the quality of the final 
product and make the economic asset unstable. 
 
 
7.3 The Erosion Of The Socio-Economic Environment In Prato 
 
One consequence of the opposite directions of evolution of the Prato textile 
industry, on one side, and the ethnic economy of fast fashion, on the other side, 
has been to change the attitudes of Pratese towards these immigrants. When the 
Chinese first began to arrive in Prato, they were perceived as a resource for the 
local economy, but then, their great expansion began more and more to be 
perceived as a threat and sometimes even as a real social emergency (Rastrelli, 
2003). 
The persistence of illegal behavior, as in the use of clandestine labor, the 
consistent transfers of wealth from the immigrants to their homeland in the form 
of remittances, and tax evasion issues, do not help the reciprocal interaction and 
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collaboration between the two communities. In addition, despite the initiatives 
towards integration realized by the municipality (Office of Immigration and 
Citizenship Services, Council for Multiculturalism), the university (course of 
Culture, Economic and Development in Contemporary China, grants for Chinese 
students) and private business associations (Made in Prato project between 
Chinese and Italian-owned firms), the constitution of Prato as an autonomous 
province in 1992 has made it more difficult for the new institutions to manage the 
district’s new globalized situation. 
Recent studies (Colombi, 2002; Ceccagno, 2003) have identified the relative 
complementarities of the manufacturing activities managed by the Chinese with 
those of local Italians in the textile sector, however, over recent years, there have 
emerged clear signs of hostility towards Chinese enterprises.  
The fear of Chinese economic competition is exacerbated not only by 
socio-economic development in Prato but, more generally, by perceptions about 
the rise of China and its negative impact on Italy’s international competitiveness. 
The reverse argument, that Italian competitiveness in critical areas increasingly 
depends on Chinese entrepreneurship inside Italy, has not received as much 
attention. 
Among the Italians who are owners of enterprises or small firms is diffused the 
perception of a dual legality: one law for the Italian firms and a different one for 
migrant firms. According to the Director of the Department for Accident 
Prevention and Safety in the Workplace (ASL 4) the question of “unfair 
competition” emerged at the start of the decade, because the artisans were 
concerned with the very low costs of Chinese production. The consequent protests 
led to minimum working conditions enforced by the Financial Police, the 
Carabinieri and the Italian Social Security authority (ASL). 
Moreover, the concentration of the physical and cultural presence of the 
Chinese in the Macrolotto makes public intervention – already meagre – still 
more difficult, perpetuating the situation of laissez faire. 
The situation of ethnic-economic tension affects not only the private sphere but 
also the public one. In January 2007, the Prato councilor for the Multicultural 
Affairs Section imposed a ban on the Dragon Procession, a central part of Chinese 
New Year celebrations that in the past had been regularly held. The councilor 
stated that he was upset by the “deafness” of the Chinese community that was not 
collaborating with the Italian community on matters such as overseas Chinese 
integration with the local culture and respecting basic European, national and 
local regulations ranging from sanitary to fiscal matters. 
Yet, the Chinese community has also made positive contributions to the local 
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environment. 
For example, the overseas Chinese have contributed to the maintenance of real 
estate and rental values. According to the municipal records, the average price of 
real estate in Prato is 1,000 € per square meter and rental properties range from 
2.5 € to 5.8 € per square meter. The overseas Chinese have also filled a gap in 
Italy’s labor supply, especially because young Italians are no longer willing to 
work as sub-contractors for the textile mills. 
The debate about the overseas Chinese community in Prato has also drawn 
sharp attention to issues of governance throughout the civil, police and 
parliamentary institutions. If some Chinese firms have defrauded the Prato and 
Italian tax system they have done so with the assistance of some Italian 
accounting companies. The process of clamping down on negligence, inefficiency, 
fraud and corruption is beginning to bite: recently 50 million € worth of assets 
owned by Italian firms in Prato were frozen by Prato’s tax officers, following 
allegations of fraud. 
As Collina (2005) argues, the rules of society need to be evoked for all residents, 
not merely overseas minorities. Historically, however, this has been difficult for 
Italy that has a “traditional” blurred distinction between what constitutes legal 
and illegal behavior. Such legal ambiguities, however, have been broadly 
tolerated by bureaucrats and residents. Now suddenly, the arrival of the overseas 
Chinese and their rapid rise to fortune and success has focused attention on all 
the familiar issues of poor governance. Perhaps the overseas Chinese are acting 
as a catalyst for the modernization of Italian government – something that 
successive governments at all levels have been unable to fully realize during the 
last fifty years. 
This reversal in the perception of the Chinese by the local population does not 
seem to be due only to the size reached by the Chinese community settled in Prato, 
but rather by its socio-cultural separateness from the host community, to the 
point that the Chinese community is described as a “district within the district”. 
This is, in part, certainly due to significant language barriers, but the 
separateness of the Chinese ethnic economy from the rest of the district also 
depends on the fact that the different socio-cultural character of these immigrants 
sustains their economic success, thanks to the possibility to employ the labor and 
financial resources of the members of the family and of the community. For this 
reason, the separation tends to be reproduced over time. All this creates a 
contradiction between the economic development of the Chinese immigrants in 
Prato, on the one hand, and the intolerance of the local society towards them on 
the other. This is because the success of Chinese immigrants depends greatly on 
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exploitation of productive conditions considered unacceptable by the local 
population. In fact, with the proliferation of Chinese enterprises, a broader and 
broader manufacturing and living base of the local system becomes characterized 
by working and living conditions more similar to those of a developing country 
than to those of a developed country (violation of rules on tax, labor, housing, 
sanitation, environment, etc.). The resulting social tension can make it difficult 
not only to establish, but even to maintain, a social dialogue between the two 
populations. Therefore, a first challenge posed by the expansion of Chinese 
immigrants involves the maintenance of the “social cohesion” within the district. 
Thus, if, on the one hand, the economic performance of the industrial district 
and the ethnic economy both depend on the socio-cultural characteristics of the 
members who give life to these organization, the two forms have a different 
socio-cultural character. For example, regarding work relationships, while in the 
industrial district, these are based on the principle of equality between the parties 
and the respect of labor laws and work union agreements is a prerequisite for 
employment, in Chinese enterprises, relations within and between firms are 
governed by the principle of hierarchy and the respect for the law is generally 
weak in the culture of these immigrants (Rastrelli, 2003). 
A different challenge, but related to the previous one, concerns the possibility of 
economic integration between the historical textile system and the new clothing 
industry. The relations between the two industries located in the same area are 
also limited because they address different market segments. Indeed, Chinese 
immigrants have specialized in low-quality fast fashion because they can form an 
ethnic enclave in which they conduct businesses in working conditions different 
from those of Italian firms. 
In fact, the two parts of the districts are still weakly integrated, perhaps 
because of the impossibility in establishing relationships of mutual trust and 
loyalty between Chinese and Italian businesses in the manufacturing chain in a 
district where informal work relations have always developed among final firms 
and their limited number of contractors; as Fladrich (2009) notes, an important 
aspect of the tension in the host society is the lack of participation and integration 
of Chinese migrants into the mainstream labor market and the little respect 
Italians have in a social sense towards Chinese. 
Chinese workers in garment workshops are at the bottom of the social ladder of 
the Chinese community in Prato: they work long hours in poor working conditions, 
have little or no social networks, have little or no social life and are largely 
unfamiliar not only with Italian life in Prato, but with Chinese life as well. 
As Giovani and Savino (2001) comment, the Chinese in Prato, unlike other 
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ethnic groups, have a strong sense of community, have plenty of work and can 
create a new life for themselves without knowledge of Italian. Notwithstanding 
this, Chinese businesses are clearly integrated into the broader economy. They 
rely on Italian contracts and clients for their existence and it is this broader 
market that determines the condition of business. In this respect, the apparent 
independence of the Chinese community in a social sense does not interfere with 
its integration in an economic sense. 
Toccafondi (2009) argues that local institutions have attempted to facilitate 
positive interaction between the Chinese and Italian communities, but this has 
been hampered by the unfair competition from Chinese who operate outside the 
law. For Toccafondi, the prospects for better socioeconomic integration in the 
future lie with the second generation of Chinese who might be more prepared to 
integrate.  
Also among the Chinese contractors competition prevails over cooperation. As 
Ceccagno states: 
 
Although the Chinese in Italy are perceived from the outside as having a 
strong national identity and a tendency towards ethnic aloofness, actually 
they lack a cohesive collective identity in the economic sphere and seem to be 
unaware of their potential bargaining power. Indeed, it seems there are no 
embryonic sector-related price-fixing agreements among Chinese contractors. 
Contrary to what is often assumed – that the Chinese in Prato represent an 
homogenous group – the economic ties within the Prato Chinese community 
are increasingly fragmented and depend on the specific city and province 
from which the migrant comes in the PRC (Ceccagno, 2009: 51). 
 
On this regard, Dei Ottati argues that the development of the Chinese ethnic 
economy within the Prato industrial district is not sustainable over time because 
it undermines the socioeconomic characteristics that define the industrial district. 
For a long time, the existence of a cohesive socio-economic environment in the 
form of “the spread and strengthening of a particular individual and collective 
identity” (Dei Ottati, 2003) reinforced by local institutions has been one of the 
keys for the economic success of the district.  
Although Chinese migrants have been able to enter the cooperative 
relationships and informal contracting of the district, a marked separation and 
lack of socio-cultural homogeneity exists in the territory. Dei Ottati’s solution is 
for the local Italian and Chinese communities to come together to propose 
collective solutions in which the Chinese community becomes integrated into the 
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industrial district.  
The study of the industrial districts has demonstrated that, along with identity, 
trust is also necessary to reproduce the competitive benefits typical of this 
productive form. In fact, “the fabric of trust relations at the basis of economic 
relationships has guaranteed greater flexibility, entrepreneurship and creativity. 
A district where unfair practices on the part of the buyers occur on a regular basis 
and are not sanctioned, will tend to decline.” (Dei Ottati, 2004). 
Nevertheless, the current relationships between Italian final firms and Chinese 
contractors have not centered on trust: unfair practices among Italian firms have 
contributed to accelerating the shift of many Chinese contractors from Italian to 
Chinese outsources; on the other side, the sales of counterfeit products produced 
by Chinese firms and the Chinese disrespect of Italian laws in conducting their 
businesses are for local producers the source of an “asymmetrical competition”. 
According to Dei Ottati (2009a), the economic and social relationships between 
the Chinese and Italian communities, embedded into a cross-cultural and 
transnational framework, would nurture the traditional trust features of the 
industrial district and would allow them to utilize the advantages of the Chinese 
international networks and access to low-cost manufacturing; the hope is that the 
Chinese ethnic economy and traditional industrial district in Prato will merge to 
form a richer, fuller, entity. 
 
 
7.4 Prato: An Economic Success Built On Immigration 
 
One of the most characteristic features of the city of Prato is the diversity of its 
population. The post-war period has involved migration flows originating from 
increasingly distant locations. Between 1951 and 1971 the number of residents 
almost doubled, rising from 77,631 to 143,232 (+84%): although the growth rate 
slackened in the following twenty years, it has nevertheless continued 
uninterrupted up to the present. 
Over half of the present population of Prato (56.3%) has immigrated to the city 
since the 1950s. The large group of immigrants originates from the rural areas of 
central Italy, while the other two components consist of immigrants from other 
regions of Italy, predominantly the south, and globally, comprising the large 
Chinese community. The migratory flows to Prato correspond to the rise of the 
industrial district and the demand for labor in Prato. 
The first and most consistent immigration flow was regional, involving families 
originating primarily from the share-cropping areas of the Tuscan countryside. 
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This is a component that still accounts for 30% of the residents of Prato. This first 
phase of immigration was family based and came from locales that were 
geographically close; the province of Tuscany and central Italy. 
Subsequently, there was a boost in domestic migration and the first groups of 
immigrants from the southern regions arrived, in particular from Campania, 
Puglia and Sicily. This component of the population accounts for 12% of current 
residents, with peaks of over 15% in three districts in the inner suburban area, 
located to the west and northwest of the old city center. 
Then we come to foreign immigration which, in 2006, based on official figures, 
accounted for 12% of the population, including over 10,000 Chinese. In contrast to 
other migrant communities in Prato, the Chinese have quickly transformed 
themselves from factory workers into entrepreneurs with the result that much 
suspicion adheres to the process by which the Chinese have been increasing their 
economic status (Di Castro and Vicziany, 2007).  
According to the data of the Civil Council of Prato, at the beginning of 2006 the 
resident population of Prato was 184,380, of which 20,505 were migrants. In 
comparison with the demographic picture provided by the 2001 census, migrants 
have increased by approximately 142% (in 2001, 8,462 foreign residents were 
registered). Overall 64% of this increase in migrants can be attributed to an 
Asiatic component, 24% to a European component and 9% to an African 
component. Moreover, almost all the resident immigrants (96.85%) originate from 
countries defined by the Italian National Institute of Statistics (Istat) in 2005 as 
Countries with Strong Migratory Pressure (Csmp): Chinese collectively represent 
44.4% of immigrants in Prato, followed by Albanians (17.7%), Pakistanis (7.65%) 
and the Moroccan communities (5.84%), who combined represent approximately 
80% of the resident foreign population.  
In two districts of the city, the old city center and the bordering area comprising 
the industrial complex of Macrolotto, migrants – mostly Chinese – represent 20% 
of the official residents, with peaks of over 50% in compact clusters of census 
tracts. 
Migrants are integrated into the labor market, especially in the sectors where it 
is difficult to find local Italian workers, such as construction, textiles and care 
activities. In particular, the Chinese took over abandoned workshops and 
warehouses, they set to work in sectors closely connected with textiles but in 
which Prato had invested in a marginal manner, such as clothing and knitwear 
and, then, they began to purchase property and undertake subcontracting 
activities. In fact, the replacement of enterprises and communities of producers 
has not coincided with profound processes of relocation of local industries 
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(Bressan, 2009). 
The long tradition of immigration in Prato and the fact that, at least initially, 
Chinese immigrants filled positions  in this case subcontracting roles in a sector 
not completely connected with the textile industry, with which the local 
community identifies itself  left vacant by the absence of local workforce explains 
why the local government and the local residents were initially tolerant towards 
Chinese immigrants who, maybe, they expected to integrate over the years in the 
local economic apparatus, as had happened with the Italian regional immigration 
of the past years. 
 
 
7.5 Ageing And Hollowing-Out Of The Productive Backbone In Bishū 
(Ichinomiya) 
 
The hollowing out process that is affecting the district of Bishū, as evidenced by 
the general statistics of the district and the local statistics of the city of 
Ichinomiya, affects not only the textile sector but the entire manufacturing sector. 
Considering the situation of Ichinomiya as a model case, although in 1980 the 
manufacturing sector had 1,698 firms and 23,968 workers, in 2010 – beyond the 
various sectorial allocations – the number of firms and workers involved in 
manufacturing activities comes down to 920 units and 20,651 workers ((METI 
Industrial statistics). 
Obviously, the industry that appears to be affected the most is the textile 
industry: if in 1980 72% of the industrial activities was covered by the textile 
industry, in 2010 the percentage had dropped to 37%. Proportionally the number 
of the employees of the sector fell from 66% in 1980 to 27% in 2010 (METI 
Industrial statistics). 
The crisis in the textile industry is, certainly, connected to the worsening of the 
global competitive pressures from the nineties onwards, and especially the rise of 
Asian countries – primarily China – as a manufacturing center of textile and 
clothing products. Nevertheless, this crisis, in order to be fully understood and 
possibly overcome, must be analyzed within its socio-cultural context and in the 
light of the socio-cultural changes that the local reality is experiencing. 
The crisis of the district is, thus, linked to the crumbling of the socio-cultural 
structure of the district due to the effect of a series of “crossover” phenomena. 
These include the ageing of the local population, the problem of succession of 
generations, the emigration of population to urban and industrialized centers of 
the same prefecture or other prefectures and, last but not least, the rise of 
 160 
anti-cooperative and opportunistic behavior of economic agents in the district, all 
of which undermine the cultural and normative environment that supported the 
rise of the local economy. 
 
Figure 7.5.1 POPULATION OF ICHINOMIYA PER AGE GROUP (2010)    
 
????? ??????? ??????
?????? ???????? ??????
???? ???????? ??????
Source: Citizens’ Affair Division of Ichinomiya City 
 
According to the 2010 analysis of the local population provided by the 
Demographic Statistics of the Population of Ichinomiya edited by the Citizens’ 
Affairs Division of Ichinomiya City Council, the working population (from 15 to 65 
years old) in 2010 amounted to 64% of total population (9703 inhabitants). What 
is striking, however, is that almost one third of the population is made up of the 
post-retirement age group, while the under-15 group, which should ensure the 
proper generational change of the local community, remains at 15% of the total 
population (see Appendix 2 for further details). The population seems to be 
concentrated mainly in the age group from 30 to 39 years old and has a decreasing 
trend towards the youngest age group. This means the new generations would not 
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be sufficient in number to cover the incremental ageing of the local population 
(Table 7.5.1). 
The ageing of the local population is connected to the phenomenon of 
outmigration of local residents to other urban and industrialized centers of the 
prefecture of Aichi or other prefectures. Analyzing the number of emigrants per 
age group from the Demographic Statistics of the Population of Ichinomiya, it can 
be noticed that people moving out from Ichinomiya were concentrated in the 
20–40 group age (62%), that is to say the “working engine” of the local industrial 
base (Table 7.5.2). 
 
Figure 7.5.2 NUMBER OF OUTMIGRANTS OF ICHINOMIYA PER AGE GROUP (2010, 
ICHINOMIYA) 
 
Source: Citizens’ Affair Division of Ichinomiya City 
 
As for the destination of outmigration, if we consider the ranking of the top 
twenty cities, half of the immigrant population of Ichinomiya moved within the 
district, that is moves to a city of the district (Nagoya, Inazawa, Konan, Hajima, 
Kakumigahara and Tsushima). The in-district outmigration amounts to about 
30%, while approximately 25% of the residents of Ichinomiya seems to prefer as 
destinations urban and industrial centers of the northern prefecture of Aichi, such 
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as Kasugai, Toyota, Toyohashi, Kitanagoya – manufacturing centers of transport 
equipment, electrical electronic, IT equipment and devices and metal articles, or 
cities of the neighboring Gifu prefecture, as Gifushi or, also, extra-prefectural 
large centers such as Tokyo, Yokohama or Osaka (Table 7.5.1). 
 
Table 7.5.1 MAIN DESTINATION OF OUTMIGRATION FROM ICHINOMIYA (2010) 
1.  NAGOYA 1,375 12. KIYOSU 141 
2.  INAZAWA 712 13. YOKOHAMA 119 
3.  TOKYO 433 14. OSAKA 107 
4.  GIFUSHI 382 15. AMASHI 106 
5.  KONAN 357 16. OKAZAKI 104 
6.  KASUGAI  217 17. TOYOTA 102 
7.  KITANAGOYA 185 18. OOGAKISHI 107 
8.  KOMAKI 169 19. TSUSHIMA 98 
9.  HAJIMA 168 20. TOYOHASHI 81 
10.  KAKUMIGAHARA 168 TOTAL 20 5,284 
11.  IWAKURA 153 TOTAL 9,703 
Source: Citizens’ Affair Division of Ichinomiya City 
 
 
Obviously, the migration flows are offset by immigration flows (intra- or 
extra-prefectural) but, anyway, the inflow seems inadequate to cover the problem 
of succession in the textile sector and the ageing of the local population. 
The result is evident when analyzing the natural balance (balance between 
birth rate and death rate) and the social balance (emigration and immigration 
rates) of the city of Ichinomiya. In fact, although the difference between the birth 
and death rate and the immigration and emigration rate is still positive, the total 
amount looks inadequate to sustain the local economy. In particular, the 
difference between the birth and death rate calculated in 2010 amounts to just 0.7 
per 1000 residents and summed with the social balance (+115 people) reaches its 
historical minimum (Fig. 7.5.3). 
In this context, in the meantime, the problem of ageing of the working 
population in the textile sector worsens. 
If one compares the number of workers divided by age of the textile sector with 
the total manufacturing sector, it comes out that the age of textile workers is 
much higher than the average: approximately 55% of textile workers, in fact, are 
more than fifty years of age, while the percentage of young employees, in the age 
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range 2029 years, is 8 points lower than the average for manufacturing industry 
(Table 7.5.2). 
 
Fig. 7.5.3 TREND OF NATURAL AND SOCIAL BALANCE OF THE POPULATION OF 
ICHINOMIYA (REGISTERED AS RESIDENT, 2010) 
 
Source: Community Service Division of Ichinomiya City 
 
Table 7.5.2 PROPORTION OF TEXTILE AND MANUFACTURING WORKERS BY AGE 
GROUP (2010) 
AGE TEXTILE INDUSTRY ALL INDUSTRIES 
>60 24.0% 14.7% 
50-59 30.7% 22.9% 
40-49 18.7% 20.4% 
30-39 14.7% 22.3% 
20-29 10.7% 18.2% 
15-19 1.3% 1.5% 
Source: ????? (METI)?????????????????????????? 
(Future Tasks of the textile and apparel industry) 
 
 
As a consequence of the ageing of the population and the problem of succession, 
the percentage of young employees has been decreasing and the relative weight of 
old and middle-aged employees has been going up. Therefore, the succession of 
technology and skill from the skilled older generation to the unskilled younger 
generation is a critical problem to maintain the core competencies within the 
organization. 
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In particular in the textile district of Bishū, the ageing of the working 
population (in conjunction with the gentrification of the general population) is 
added to the reduction of domestic production and this aggravates the 
phenomenon of hollowing out. 
As Kobayashi (2005) proposes, reemployment training courses commissioned by 
the ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare are becoming essential at a time when 
industrial hollowing out is destroying the institution of lifetime employment and 
making reemployment a serious problem. If the future of Japan with its ageing 
population is taken into account, reemployment after retirement is not only a 
necessity but also an urgent problem in terms of passing on the skills and 
experiences accumulated through  long years of service in the industry to 
younger generations. This will also satisfy the need to preserve artisanship skills 
in Japan. 
 
 
7.6 The Erosion Of The Socio-Economic Environment In Bishū 
(Ichinomiya) 
 
Another important factor to consider in the process of hollowing out of the 
district is the change of the culture of the district by both the district population 
and the economic agents. 
On the one hand, the less numerous younger people locally are not interested in 
working in the small and medium-sized enterprises in the textile sector and this 
is because the textile sector is regarded as a sector in crisis, and, also, because 
working in small and medium-sized enterprises in a city of the province is 
considered not very appealing, both for the manual nature of the work and as a 
matter of status (prestige and fame of the firms). 
The shortage of successors for the problem of ageing of population, is, therefore, 
worsened by an existing difficulty of retaining the workforce, in light of the 
dangerous, dirty and tough nature of the work itself (3K work, ????????
?, in English “3D”, Dirty, Dangerous and Demeaning). 
The distinction between white collar (office workers) and blue collar (factory 
workers) began to spread in the common mentality during the period of rapid 
industrialization in the Meiji era. In particular, it was in the 1980s, when the 
living standards rose, that “blue collar” work, which had been the basis of the 
rapid economic growth of Japan, began to be negatively defined as “3K”. 
Demeaning, because it is a job that requires great physical and psychological 
effort, with long working hours, an irregular holiday system and a relatively low 
 165 
salary (in consideration of the content and duration of work compared with white 
collar work). Moreover, the content often consists of simple, repetitive tasks, for 
which it is difficult to maintain a high motivation. Dirty, not only because 
laborious and manual, but also because it is often performed in an environment of 
unpleasant climatic conditions and poor hygiene. Finally, dangerous because, 
according to the type of work, it is performed in contact with materials and 
equipment that, if not properly used, can cause injury or endanger life. 
For this reason, especially after the bursting of the bubble economy in the early 
nineties, there is a tendency to prefer clerical work that, even when the pay gap 
with the manual labor is minimal, has better conditions of hygiene and safety. 
The consequential problem of succession, which is crucial in such small companies, 
is a constant threat to the existence and preservation of their unique technical 
and craftsmanship skills. 
The gradual aging of the population of the district and the textile industry, and 
the problem of retaining the local workforce is associated with the tightness of the 
structure for educating and training human resources. 
In Japan, in fact, there is a lack of university departments engaged in the study 
of textile fibers. After the closure of the textile department at the Technical 
University of Kyoto (??	 ?	 ?	 ?	 维	 ??), the university of Shinshu became 
the only university to have a department for the study of textile fibers. All the 
above factors, therefore, seem to contribute to the drastic decline in the supply of 
human resources in the textile sector. 
As Kobayashi (2005:90) states: “free-mindness, creativity and thoughts are 
generated only from an environment favorable to research, backed with ample 
funding and tough competition”. Therefore, if we examine measures to cope with 
industrial hollowing out from the long-term perspective, priority should clearly be 
by the government to pumping state funds into the expansion of both the practical 
and basic research aspects of science and technology in textile manufacture. On 
the other hand, current and future chief executives of middle-stream firms should 
invest in the education of managers and the upgrading of management know-how 
through cooperation with universities and research institutes. 
With the escalation of global competition from the nineties, then, the culture of 
the MID of both Bishū and Prato changed. The culture of the district is 
multifaceted. It expresses itself in the entrepreneurial spirit and risk propensity 
of local people (like the introduction of foreign machinery from Germany, the 
starting up of wool businesses from silk and cotton to adapt to the new demand 
demonstrated in the past) to catch the potentiality of the local natural and social 
environment and to invest in it.  
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Another part of the culture of the district is also the supportive activity of local 
governmental research centers (Industrial Institute of Aichi Prefecture, 
University of Florence), industrial bodies (among the others Gifu Prefecture Wool 
Manufacturers Association, Prato Industrial Union) and the trust individual 
economic agents put in them (membership of Industrial Union, collaboration with 
academic research etc.). 
The district culture includes also the historical and geographical sense of 
identity (shared experience and beliefs). Local identity is the base of the 
intra-district cooperative attitude in competition, which expresses itself in the 
prevalence of spread long-term profits over individual short-term profits and the 
sharing of information and knowledge, which sustains and nurtures the economic 
activities of the districts.  
The high growth period of the sixties and seventies allowed the apparel 
industry to develop with an average growth rate of 10% (until the early eighties, 
the final market consumption exceeded 10 trillion yen) and this culture developed 
in a period when the Japanese demand was able to absorb the supply of textiles 
and clothing. 
In the nineties, with the sudden increase of international competition and the 
contraction of domestic demand, most of the Japanese textile industry chose to 
conduct competition based on price and to relocate their production abroad to take 
advantage of the lower price of labor, equipment and other resources. In 
particular, Japanese textile producers, rather than begin a process of increasing 
the added value and product differentiation, adopted an industrial strategy aimed 
at the reduction of production costs through streamlined management and 
relocation abroad of industrial activities. 
The choice made by textile converters, trading converters and apparel 
companies to import yarn and woven textiles from China and other Asian 
countries has had a disruptive impact on the small producers of yarn and fabric of 
the district, who have had to face a sharp reduction in orders, in an already 
difficult period of crisis exacerbated by the contraction of the domestic demand 
and the rise of foreign competition.  
The choice of relocating the production abroad is an example of opportunistic 
behavior, based on self-interest without considering the long-term interests of the 
district. So too is the outmigration of the younger generations, because their 
choice to leave the district in pursuit of “status” or a better economic return is a 
form of defective behavior that undermines the survival of the district. 
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7.7 The Importance Of Human And Social Capital  
 
The comparative advantages of the MID (i.e. the creation of external economies 
internal to the district) are not just a matter of availability of material production 
factors but, above all, of availability of immaterial factors, such as human and 
social capital. 
Marshallian IDs are not just agglomerations of industrial activity, but “nations 
within nations”. As Marshall himself states:  
 
If the local spirit of any place ran high: if those born in it would much rather 
stay there than migrate to another place: if most of the capital employed in 
the industries of the place were accumulated from those industries, and 
nearly all the income enjoyed in it were derived from own its resources: if all 
these conditions were satisfied, then the people of such a place would be a 
nation within a nation in a degree sufficient to render propositions, which 
relate to international trade, applicable to their case from an abstract point 
of view; ... (Marshall, 1919, pp. 13-14). 
 
The formation of a solid human and social capital at the district level is, 
therefore, one of the factors contributing to the network of relations between 
enterprises within a district, based on a self-organizational logic, thereby 
reinforcing the competitive capacity of IDs.  
Anyway, the internal equilibrium, far from the long-term one, is maintained 
due to the effect of dissipative processes, which may be influenced by the  
exogenous changes in the domestic and international economic and technological 
context developing in the background. 
The term “dissipative processes” – which originally comes from the natural 
sciences – is used to indicate self-organizational processes adopted by parts of the 
physical universe and living matter, guaranteed by energy exchanges between the 
said parts, or subsystems, and the outside environment. The nature of a 
subsystem within its environment is determined by the relationships that keep 
the parts of the subsystem together, and by the relationships that keep each 
system in contact with its environment (Mistri, 2006). 
In the MID, district enterprises are tied together not only by economic 
relationships, but also by individuals engaging in social and cultural relationships. 
As a result, people and enterprises have a shared heritage of values and 
know-how.  
These relationships often have their roots in the fact that the enterprises were 
 168 
originally family concerns, which have branched out also as a result of the 
ramification of the founding families of the original enterprises. New enterprises 
are born from the offspring of another enterprise and of social relations and this 
phenomenon is responsible, to some degree, for the territorial concentration of 
enterprises. 
Many of these people are or have been engaged in the particular sector 
featuring an ID, and that is why they possess the necessary professional expertise 
to conduct businesses. The shared work experience, reinforced by social ties, is the 
factor that promotes the sharing of cultural models. 
The stable group of operators, working side by side in the same area, share 
what Mistri defines as “communicative competence” (Mistri, 2006: 76), that is, the 
capacity to read each other’s messages, judge their real intentions in the meaning 
behind the words, and predict their behaviors. This is a founding element of the 
shared, often tacit understanding distinctive of the relations between people who 
live and work in an ID and it also serves as a catalyst of non-opportunistic 
behaviors. In fact, the competitive advantage of the district ensues when the 
economic behavior is inspired by loyalty and cooperative spirit suitable for 
reducing the transaction costs (Coriat and Gennif, 1998:54). 
In addition, by its very nature, the community market is strongly connected 
internally and sufficiently (though not entirely) isolated externally. This is 
because the district enterprises prefer to do business with other enterprises in the 
district, with which they share communication protocols and. a widespread 
know-how. 
Cooperative behavior is an element of competitive advantage in the ID: an ID 
cannot achieve self-determination, nor even come into being, unless cooperative 
behavior develops. Thus, this set of behavior patterns provides the backbone of 
the “social capital” that is a systemic element of the competitive force of the ID. 
The presence of a plurality of small enterprises within an area of limited extent 
drives the agents to maximize their commitment and to adopt a non-opportunistic 
type of behavior: in a series of transactions between enterprises on a 
multiple-period time horizon and with a certain number of customers, an 
enterprise will behave so as to maintain its good reputation because it attributes 
more value to its future earning than to its present earnings (Kreps, 1995). 
In short, the backbone of the district is based on the regeneration of the local 
human and social capital. The human capital depends on the nature of know-how 
incorporated in individual agents and on the nature of their behavior, whereas the 
social capital depends on the strength of the social links between the agents and 
on the nature of their behavior. 
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Anyway, the changes in lifestyles and culture, and the current processes of 
globalization, summed with the decision of local textile makers to adopt a 
price-oriented strategy and increase imports from outward contexts or, even, 
relocate production outside the district, have weakened the density of the 
socio-cultural and economic relations within the ID.  
Now, the problem of succession in business and the difficulty in retaining the 
local human resources within the district hamper the creation of new businesses 
and undermine the reproduction and preservation of the know-how, which is the 
factory which guarantees a long-term economic success of the district; at the same 
time, this problem also leads to deterioration of the social relations and cultural 
ties that form the comparative advantage of the district. 
On the other side, the choice to extend the relational branches to enterprises 
outside the district, to the detriment of the local producers, inverts the logic of the 
district because it attributes more value to present (often perishable) earnings 
than to future (often long-lasting) earnings. This opportunist behavior 
undermines the relative degree of social closure and the long-term trust placed in 
the relations between local agents, and, with this, the survival of the district in a 
globalized era. 
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8. Conclusions 
 
 
8.1 Common Factors In The Pre-Globalization Development Of Bishū 
And Prato 
 
This study proves that SMEs are not an obsolete or residual form of economic 
organization in developed countries but rather that they can carry out production 
independently from a subordinate subcontracting relation with a (a number of) 
big company (companies) and work, not only for local and regional outlet markets, 
but even for national and international markets. 
As shown by the successful growth in the post-war era of the industrial 
agglomeration of SMEs, known as a Marshallian industrial district (MID), in Italy 
and Japan	 in the second half of the twentieth century, SMEs, gathering into 
industrial districts that share an homogeneous culture and through a 
sophisticated system of division of labor, in light-manufacturing industry, indeed 
demonstrated the ability to drive local economic development and contribute to a 
sector’s or even a country’s overall economic growth.  
The flexibility of the model and the capability of firms to enter the market 
without competing on low labor costs showed the efficiency of SMEs in MIDs and 
the innovation capability embedded within this organizational model. This 
definitively broke up the old paradigm that presumed small firms should 
represent the weak part of dualistic economies. 
As, perhaps, the most popular theory that conceptualizes industrial 
agglomerations, the Industrial Cluster theory of Porter (1990), a very well 
established theory in Japan, focuses on external multinational companies (MNCs), 
which, attracted by the local competitive advantage, act as local anchors for new 
subcontracting companies, suppliers, skilled individuals and capital from 
different locations. The author believes that this theory is incomplete and is 
affected by a sort of “neoliberal bias”. In fact, in line with the neoliberal economic 
theories, which strongly promoted the internationalization of economic activities, 
it draws attention to MNCs and their global strategy and does not consider the 
way the production is locally organized or its interaction with the social 
environment. 
Becattini’s model of the MID, instead, is not a sheer concentration of 
manufacturing and service processes realized by (internal or external) firms, 
which are vertically formally linked, neither is the ID a geographical distribution 
of industries, but instead a complex social system, difficult to build using artificial 
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techniques, since it is the local society that provides the formation of a 
socio-cultural environment suitable to different forms of industrial organization. 
The development of the district is endogenous, based on the exploitation of local 
resources (entrepreneurs, capital, labor) and on the implicit respect of the “code of 
the district”, a combination of experience, beliefs, and behavioral aptitudes, 
guaranteed by local social, political and economic institutions. 
Given these premises, the present dissertation is organized around two main 
research questions. 
Firstly, is the MID theory, elaborated to describe post-Fordist economic 
development in some Italian regions in the central and northern-east part of the 
country, a pattern to describe local agglomerations that may be applied also to 
Japan, the keiretsu (vertically-integrated companies)-driven capitalistic East 
Asian economy par excellence? Given that MIDs are characterized by groups of 
collocated SMEs, competent producers and specialized workforce operating in 
light manufacturing sectors of the economy, the author chose as case studies the 
textile districts of Bishū (western Japan, Aichi and Gifu prefectures) and Prato 
(central Italy, region of Tuscany). These districts, the greatest woolen 
textile-producing areas in both countries, by reason of the high number of 
employed workers (according to both countries’ national statistics, more than 10% 
of the total workforce in the national textile sector is employed in the district), 
hold an important place in the national textile economy and can be regarded as 
representative industrial agglomerations of SMEs in both the countries.  
Using as reference Markusen’s classification of ID and statistics of METI on 
Industrial Production, statistics of the Japanese Small and Medium Enterprises 
Agency and Gifu and Aichi Prefectures, Italian census data and Prato Industrial 
Union statistics with hearings of local government officials, scholars and 
representatives of the local Industrial Unions and Associations, the dissertation 
shows that the districts of Prato and Bishū, albeit in different contexts and with a 
different spatial, cultural and economic background, before the advent of 
globalization, have developed with a number of common factors. 
To summarize, briefly, these factors can be identified in: 
- the economic structure based on local SMEs and on endogenous economic 
agents; 
- the local system of division of labor that concentrates on the production of 
intermediate goods of light manufacturing industry; 
- the developed local identity based on a cohesive cultural and social framework 
and nurtured by the cooperation between governmental institutions, academic 
institutions and business world and the innovative drive and entrepreneurship of 
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local businessmen; 
In both the districts, large enterprises are almost absent and the district firms 
are all micro, small and medium-sized independent companies (given national 
differences in the definition of small and medium enterprises). In Bishū, textile 
firms with fewer than 30 employees account for 92% of the total number of firms, 
the reason for which is likely that they absorb most of the district’s workforce; in 
Prato, firms with fewer than 50 employees are more than half of the total number 
of firms, and they absorb more than 80% of the local workforce.  
This implies that the development of the district is endogenous: in the district 
there is no foreign company that was attracted by the local competitive advantage 
to relocate production in the district and attract new companies, suppliers, skilled 
individuals and capital from different locations. The endogeneity of economic 
agents relates to territoriality of both entrepreneurs and firms; it does not relate 
exclusively to the production but the birth, growth, reorganization and 
transformation of the local businesses, until the cessation of the economic 
activities. 
A local system of division of labor implies that the production of goods in the 
district is realized through the subdivision of manufacturing operations per stage 
of production between the firms of the district. The main firm (oyabata in Bishū 
and impannatore in Prato) includes a mix of horizontal (competitive), vertical 
(input-output) and diagonal (related services and instruments) specialized 
activities, each of them carried out by a specialist small firm. After the completion 
of spinning operations, the textile chain can be mainly divided into the two main 
stages; yarn twisting and processing (dyeing and finishing) and fabric making 
(weaving) and processing (dyeing and finishing).  
At the center of each set of small companies is an independent master broker or 
converter that manages the relationships among the various firms. They are 
facilitators and problem solvers who carry information from one place along the 
value-added chain to wherever it will be most useful. They get involved in all 
aspects of the textile business: raw materials purchases, fabric design, production 
contracts, transportation, and sales. They look at the weaver’s samples for next 
year and if they think they will sell, take them to customers all over the world. If 
the market objects to the weaver’s price, the converter may help the weaver find 
ways to trim costs.  
They also negotiate with suppliers of raw materials and transportation services. 
In the examined districts, in particular, business activities before globalization 
concentrated in refers to the production of woolen yarn and fabrics, among which 
the representative type of wool was identified in the carded wool. 
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Cohesive cultural texture refers to a shared combination of implicit norms 
based on experience, beliefs and behavioral aptitudes. The respect of the implicit 
norms reduces the risk of opportunism, fosters a semi-conscious collaboration 
between the actors of the districts and promotes a relative stability of income 
prices, production costs and transaction costs. The population of small 
entrepreneurs, independent and employed workers all participate equally in the 
manufacturing process. 
The developed local identity, mainly, expresses itself in the cooperation between 
governmental institutions, academic institutions and the business world and in 
the innovative drive and entrepreneurship of local businessmen. 
In the district, in fact, there is a continuous flow and sharing of information 
between government, business and universities, all equally committed to the 
common project of local economic development. Although the development of the 
district is a spontaneous process, local government acts as a liaison with the 
central government and, at the same time, guarantees the order and the 
environmental conditions necessary for the performance of economic activities. At 
the same time, the university promotes research and the diffusion of key 
information for the reproduction and renewal of local knowledge, and, therefore, 
fosters the adaptation to the changes in the international district. In particular, 
the effort of local research centers (Industrial Institute of Aichi Prefecture, 
University of Florence) and industrial bodies (among others Gifu Prefecture Wool 
Manufacturers Association, Prato Industrial Union) are among the main 
elements that boosted the rise of textile activities in both the districts. 
Innovation and entrepreneurship of business people refers to the final aim, 
long-term strategy, skills, knowledge, experience, capacity of translating creative 
ideas in goods and realizing it by taking risks and investing in the district. Bishū 
was originally, dedicated to the production of silk and cotton mixed weaving 
textiles in the Meiji period. Woolen textile production started at the beginning of 
the twentieth century, thanks to the efforts of the three “fathers of wool”, 
Harakichi Kataoka, Saichiro Kikuda and Seitaro Sumi, who perceived the 
growing westernization of clothes, imported dyeing and processing machinery and 
the quadruple loom, and embarked themselves in the new business. In Prato in 
the thirteenth century the famous merchant-entrepreneur Francesco di Marco 
Datini opened his warehouses in Tuscany and France and improved local 
production by importing English, Provençal and Flemish woolens. In the 
nineteenth century; later on, Giovan Battista Mazzoni devised a machine, called a 
calender, which modified the look of the fabric and added sheen. 
The attitudes of individuals and younger generations to self-employment, a 
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system of training and economic mobility promote the formation and diffusion of 
organizational skills, creativity and pragmatism necessary for the preservation of 
a local identity and an industrial atmosphere from generation to generation. 
Having demonstrated that Bishū and Prato, in origin, belong to the category of 
MID, the second research question proceeds to investigate the way in which 
globalization has affected the local structure of the MID and this demonstrates 
the limitations of the original MID framework in describing current industrial 
agglomerations of SMEs affected by the exogenous forces of globalization.  
The author utilizes a survey of a group of ten independent but interrelated 
companies of Bishū and Prato, involved in the production of the same final good 
(carded wool, the representative manufacture in both districts), conducted 
between 2009 and 2011 with the collaboration of Prato Industrial Union and Gifu 
Prefecture Wool Manufacturers Association. The study analyzed the type of 
company and content of business (type product/service), the company profile (year 
of establishment, number of workers, history and features) and economic 
performance data, the position in the textile value chain (role in the productive 
network), the composition of clients and outsourcing partners (past and present), 
the business strategy (past and present), the current problems in the light of the 
rise of globalization and future tasks and forecast. The author thus tries to depict 
the structure of the manufacturing chain of the same representative good carded 
wool) in two districts and its changes under globalization. 
 
 
8.2 Differences Between The Two Districts Before Globalization 
 
In the manufacturing chain of carded wool, in the Japanese district of Bishū 
and the Italian district of Prato, the fabric production operations are both based 
on a production process that consists of multiple stages, of which the main 
operations involved yarn twisting and processing (dyeing and finishing) and fabric 
making (weaving) and processing (dyeing and finishing), and on the competence of 
highly-specialized small and micro enterprises. The division of labor in the 
production of textile fibers is an important comparative advantage because it can 
provide a wider range of materials and a wide range of products. 
Nevertheless, despite this and the previous described similarities between the 
two districts, they also present a series of differences that basically concern the 
marketing and distribution process and the targeted market. 
First of all, one of the differences of the two districts can be observed in the 
active role of trading companies in the marketing and distribution process in 
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Japan. 
In the Meiji era the role of trading companies was to procure foreign currency 
by the exports of national mining resources, textile materials and food and to use 
it to import technologies and commodities from the more developed Western 
countries. Then, in the fifties, they also managed the procurement of raw 
materials from foreign procurement sites and promoted the expansion of exports 
and new markets through “barter transaction” (trade with foreign trading 
companies). In the sixties they also executed the role of fund procurement and 
credit enhancement. During the period of rapid economic growth, Japanese 
makers started to develop their own marketing and distribution channels but 
they still lacked the experience and business expertise in trading and lacked a 
large international network. For this reason, above all, small makers of 
intermediate products depended on the support of trading companies to conduct 
transactions in foreign languages, the introduction of foreign technologies, 
machines and equipment and the provision of information on national and 
international market trends. 
The role of trading companies remains fundamental for Japanese small and 
medium-sized companies nowadays. In particular, trading companies specializing 
in the textile sector serve as intermediaries between apparel manufacturers and 
textile producers. They procure raw materials from the optimal source and often 
involve themselves directly in the production process and in the development of 
innovative materials.  
In addition, Japanese textile trading companies with their subsidiaries, branch 
offices and representative offices located abroad, and thanks to the exploitation of 
foreign business connections and the knowledge of foreign distribution channels, 
also conduct market surveys and product planning operations, orient processing 
operations (including the establishment of joint ventures abroad) and manage 
distribution of intermediate and final products in the most suitable and profitable 
domestic or international location. 
On the other side, in Italy, the absence of big financial conglomerates and the 
relative fragmentation of markets and customers (manufacturing companies, 
retailers and domestic and foreign large distributors) prevented the formation of 
big trading companies. Hence commercial transactions and investments by 
manufacturers have been conducted on an individual base (by the firm itself) or 
with the support of private trading agents. Regarding distribution, a larger share 
of the Italian market belongs to traditional and independent retailers, while in 
the rest of Europe large enterprises and specialized distribution networks prevail 
in the textile and apparel industry. 
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The fragmentation of markets and of distribution system in Italy has been seen 
as the main reason manufacturers in this sector have a strong competitive 
position. This could have contributed to an improvement in the innovative 
capability of enterprises in the local systems and also standards of production and 
a focus on small market niches. 
Another relevant difference between the districts may be found in the fact that 
in Prato, unlike Bishū, the final user, apart from national fashion big makers, is 
mainly the international market. This difference may be explained by the 
different historical backgrounds of the two districts: the historical rivalry with the 
Wool Guild of the neighboring city of Florence (the major municipality of the area) 
in the so-called Eta’ dei Comuni (Communes Era, 1100-1250) pushed the 
merchant-entrepreneurs of Prato (a minor municipality) from the beginning to 
seek the “support” of the international market and in the past, up to the 1970s the 
openness and proximity of European markets provided great opportunities for it. 
Therefore, thanks to the “cross-border” entrepreneurial spirit of the first local 
merchants-entrepreneurs and also the proximity to an already industrialized 
context, as Europe was at the time, links with foreign economic realities were 
made in the past (France, Germany, England). 
In Japan, instead, the process of economic development, nationally driven and 
oriented from the government in Meiji era, allowed the district to focus its 
production on the domestic market, at the time large enough to absorb the whole 
production. This is particularly true for the textile and apparel sectors and in 
contrast with what happened in the electronic and automobile sectors. In fact, 
products such as fashion and beauty items did not have the margins or the 
market scale to rebuild the manufacturing infrastructure, create jobs or support a 
national economy that was eager to develop and get independent from the threat 
of Western imperialism, the way that electronics and automobiles did. Between 
1955 and 1970, the Japanese government promoted economic growth by setting in 
place the infrastructure needed for industrialization and by providing incentives 
for developing the industries it felt were best suited to compete on world markets. 
The government concentrated on higher-priced, high-margin, industrial products 
to export, and the textile sector did not correspond with this requirement. 
Therefore, the Japanese textile industry, targeting the domestic market, has 
not been able to develop an international strategy of marketing and 
diversification of production, despite the high developmental skills and 
manufacturing technologies. Neither did it feel the necessity to adopt a strong 
branding strategy to make this or that maker’s production identifiable and 
distinctive in the domestic or foreign market. This may explain the low 
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competitive power of Japanese textile industry and the difficulty the district of 
Bishū is experiencing in the new globalized era.  
 
 
8.3 Divergent Path Of Development In The Third Millennium: 
Erosion Of The Original Social And Cultural Backbone And 
Accentuation Of Differences 
 
Since the beginning of the third millennium the international context has been 
experiencing profound changes: the incorporation of the states of the former 
Soviet Union into the market economy, the introduction of the single European 
currency, the Asian currency crisis of 1997, and, more recently, the extraordinary 
growth of Asian countries, especially China. These radical changes, combined 
with the spread of information technology and the drop in transportation costs, 
have led to the emergence of a new model of industrial organization: the so-called 
“global value chain”. In the 1970s Fordism was superseded by lean production, 
now the latter model has increasingly been incorporated into the process of 
international fragmentation of production initiated by the MNCs whose main aim 
is to take advantage of the lower labor costs in those countries hosting the new 
process of industrialization. 
In this context, the MID model vulnerabilities inexorably came to the surface. 
The relentless changes in the technological, market and knowledge fields put in 
discussion the district systemic stability, based, in the original assumptions of the 
theory, on the specialization and complementarity between the small businesses 
of the district, the spatial concentration of manufacturing relations among 
physically and culturally close companies, the expansion of the market, the stable 
and unchanging market relations with the commercial distribution chain outside 
the district. This has attempted to the competitiveness of the entire production 
system, and, last but not least, eroded the generalized and widespread local 
system of rules and practices in the regulation of in-district business activities.  
In particular, in Bishū, the problems of ageing and generational succession in 
business, insufficient improvement in job expectations for younger generations 
(i.e. the increasing outmigration of young working people) and the decision of local 
textile makers to adopt a price-oriented strategy and increase imports from 
external contexts – or even relocate production outside the district – to react to 
the contraction of domestic demand and face the competition with emerging 
countries with low cost products, have weakened the density of the socio-cultural 
and economic relations within the ID. Furthermore, as the study of the business 
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composition of Ichinomiya reveals, following the international decentralization of 
production in search of lower costs, the district has undergone a process of 
progressive restructuring due to a shift from the production side to the 
service-commercial sector. These strategies have progressively interrupted the 
interrelations and linkages between the local companies and the diffusion of 
knowledge, breaking the local productive cycle, wasting local-specific resources, 
assets and competences and progressively stripping the area of its productive 
capacity. 
In the meantime, since the 1980s, Chinese immigrants have continuously 
flowed into Prato. Many small Pratese artisan firms, whose owners were mainly 
aged weavers with no successors willing to take up their work, without realizing 
the long-term consequences for the district of their actions, rented their 
workspaces to Chinese immigrants, who started to work as textile subcontractors 
(finishing operations – sewing) to the original nucleus of knitwear firms and a few 
clothing companies present in the area. Facilitated by institutional changes in 
Italy (among them the Italian-Chinese Treaty signed in 1985, which permitted 
Chinese to set up enterprises and employ a co-ethnic workforce if they had regular 
resident permits), in the mid-1990s, as well as their workshops, the Chinese 
migrants in Prato started to develop clothing firms making “fast fashion” as an 
additional industrial sector alongside Prato’s traditional textile sector. Chinese 
immigrants’ working and living conditions – tendency to remain isolated within 
members of the family and of the community, violation of rules on tax, labor, 
housing, sanitation, environment  summed with the language barrier, their 
upgrading from subcontractors to independent businessmen and the nature of 
their business (not the traditional textile manufacturing but clothing), are the 
cause of the Chinese ethnic economy’s separateness from the rest of the district. 
This phenomenon, alongside the opportunistic choice of some Italian textile 
producers to adapt to the new opportunity by lowering the quality of their fabrics 
or renting warehouses to Chinese businessmen, without subordinate it to the 
respect of the local law, challenges the “social and cultural cohesion” within the 
district. 
Notwithstanding the shortcomings of the MID theory, the present analysis of 
the transformations occurring in the manufacturing chain of carded wool in 
globalization and in the social framework of the districts, confirms the value of the 
geographical standpoint and the importance of the changes in local culture in 
understanding contemporary globalization, its successes and its failures and its 
specific forms of creative destruction. Globalization is not an ethereal and 
inexorable phenomenon that hits local systems of production breeding victims 
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(and winners). It is, actually, the product of the choice of single economic and 
social agents who renounce the form of “moral capitalism”, based on win-win 
relations, or the need to invest in their locality, to embrace the ideas of short-term 
and self-interested profit of the prevailing “brute capitalism”, based on the 
accumulation of profit to the detriment of other social and economic actors. 
In particular, the study and qualitative field research conducted show that, 
although in the twentieth century the districts have been evolving in line with the 
same pattern of development, in the third millennium, because of the erosion of 
their social and cultural backbone and the growing weight of some pre-existent 
differences in the organization of the textile sector, under the effect of 
globalization and in order to cope with it, they seem to be leaning towards two 
possible different paths of development.  
Bishū, characterized by strong innovative and technological power, and a high 
value added production but, because of a national-market orientation, weak on 
distinctive branding and design - also as a consequence of the shrinking of the 
national demand, the problems of gentrification and generational succession in 
business - is experiencing a hollowing-out phenomenon with massive relocation of 
industrial activities to the “neighboring” China. The “destructuring” of the district, 
the pursuit of a cost reduction strategy looking for delocalization of several phases 
of production, or looking for new suppliers abroad in poor countries with an 
unlimited supply of labor, determines the cutting out of phases of production (i.e. 
yarn spinning, twisting and weaving), reduction of use of labor and progressive 
disappearance of specific skills and competences. In this process the only 
operations not deterritorialized are those that involve the production of 
high-value or high-tech intermediate goods, including the production of luxury 
goods and dyeing and finishing operations. Considering the problems in the 
transfer and maintenance of equipment, the different environment conditions and 
the risk of the dispersion of technology, local processing firms show no intention of 
relocating their production abroad. On the other hand, Chinese makers have no 
advantage in relocating the production in Japan, where costs of production (tariffs 
on raw materials, price of water and of workforce) are higher but prefer, rather, to 
hire Japanese human resources and to acquire know-how from Japan. 
On the other hand, Prato, which, compared with Bishū, derives its 
competitiveness from the use of craft ability and product adaptability, rather than 
advanced technologies and the generation of new products, benefiting from 
internationally recognized strong design power, the creativity and quality of 
“made in Italy” fabrics and textiles (apart from clothing), seems to be less exposed 
to the pushes towards relocation abroad and is, instead, experiencing a 
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progressive shrinking phenomenon of its industrial apparatus (a reduction in 
numbers of local productive units and employees) and a re-internalization of 
phases of production with a progressive increase in size of local leader firms and, 
as a consequence, the introduction of a hierarchical organization and internal 
restructuring, which cause the use of exclusive specialized suppliers located 
within the district.  
Furthermore, the district is undergoing a sort of “in-district 
internationalization” of its productive operations due to the entry of foreign firms 
(Chinese companies) into the clothing sector and, more recently, into textile 
finishing operations. Historical rivalry and competition with the neighboring city 
of Florence in the production of textiles, in addition to the fragmentation of both 
the distributing sector and the market, and a “low-absorbing” small national 
market, pushed the merchant-entrepreneurs of Prato to develop a distinctive 
image and to look for new commercial outlets in the neighboring and open Europe. 
This provided the base of the international reputation of “made in Italy” apparel 
products and explains the orientation to exports of both the textile and apparel 
sectors. 
Taking advantage of the generational succession problem of the local clothing 
laboratories and the long tradition of immigration in the district before, and 
profiting from the insufficient attention and the scarce controls of the appointed 
authorities, Chinese immigrants started up Chinese-owned companies with (often 
irregular) Chinese-only-personnel. By operating directly in Italy, Chinese apparel 
makers can get the latest information about current trends, design, materials and 
so on that could not otherwise acquire in the homeland, and communicate them 
straight on to factories located in China. Yet, local textile firms seem to have 
rejected transferring production abroad to keep their comparative advantage: the 
presence in the district of many highly skilled micro-firms specialized in the 
individual stages of textile production remains the main comparative advantage 
of the area while the relocation of manufacturing operations to distant China is 
not profitable either in term of costs or for the image of high-quality and 
exclusivity of the local goods. 
The way the actors of the two mature MIDs have reacted to the changes of the 
international contexts, by so delineating the path of transition of the districts, is 
strictly connected to the difference in the organization of the textile industry and, 
in particular, the relations between the middle-stream makers and the upper and 
down stream actors of the textile value chain. 
The difference between the Japanese and the Italian textile industry is that the 
Japanese industry is organized on a rigid vertical system that has as its final 
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destination big apparel makers and as buyers textile and general trading 
companies, while the Italian system is based on the division of labor between 
independent producers that can flexibly adapt to market changes. In addition, 
while in Japan, the need for the big apparel makers to increase profit and market 
share is more likely to lead to competition based on price, the flexible network of 
the small independent Italian textile producers engages in competition based on 
differentiation and on the high value added of the production.  
So far, Japanese textile makers have been formally “independent” 
subcontractors of large upstream and downstream firms and have realized the 
commissioned processing activities under the command of large companies that 
dictate the price and quantity of orders and take care of the design and 
development of the collection. Currently, due to the strategy of streamlined 
management and relocation abroad of industrial activities adopted by the up 
stream and down stream customers, the expansion of imports and the related 
reduction of commissions from final makers (apparel companies) and the 
contraction of the unit price, textile manufacturers are in crisis. Therefore, to 
compete internationally, they need to become independent from this “on 
commission production system”, to assume the risks of production, planning and 
development and realize sales of their products by themselves. The fabric 
manufacturers have the highest technology to produce articles of high quality but, 
since they have always produced as commissioned by contractors, they lack the 
necessary skills for design and marketing.  
The path for the district recovery may be an organic rationalization of the 
manufacturing operations of the district: firms should avoid a dispersive and 
onerous duplication of functions and, instead, specialize in a distinctive phase of 
production in order to preserve the division of labor among local firms which is the 
absolute advantage of the district; at the same time, the Japanese productive 
system, which was conceived for the huge post-war national market, in which the 
project is drawn from the top (wholesalers, apparel makers and trading 
companies) and then realized at the bottom (textile makers) needs to be revised to 
adapt more flexibly to the demands of a globalized market: the converters of the 
districts need to cultivate new markets abroad, beside the national market, 
upgrading the originality of local products, diversifying production, and 
tightening the direct link and joint-cooperation network with apparel makers. 
As for the district of Prato, it finds itself face-to-face with a dual competitive 
challenge: an international one resulting from the production in China and other 
new industrialized countries of textiles at favorable price differentials, and a local 
one caused by the firm next door. The socio-cultural differences and the lack of 
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mutual trust between Chinese ethnic firms and Pratese textile firms are the 
source of both the social divide that hampers the possibility of socio-cultural 
integration of these immigrants, and also of the fracture that prevents economic 
integration between the historical textile system and the new apparel industry.  
As the local Industrial Union states44:  
 
Chinese workers rarely sought employment in Italian-owned companies. 
Instead, they established a large network of small or very small firms where 
they manufactured knitwear and high-street fashion garments. The firms 
had a short average lifespan and employed Chinese personnel only, except 
for a very few better-structured companies that also employed Italian 
executives. Over the years, the Chinese-owned companies showed a tendency 
towards “ethnic vertical integration”, buying subcontracting firms for 
garment processing and dyeing, supply firms in general (e.g. clothing 
accessories) or firms providing services to their businesses (consulting, IT, 
etc.) and community (commerce, personal services, etc.). Hence, a sort of 
“parallel district” developed that established it in the facilities vacated by 
the textile firms that were leaving the business.  
 
All this just when the two industries, adequately qualified and supplemented 
by new activities, could be the cornerstone of a new trajectory of local 
development. 
 
 
8.4 Possible Scenarios in the Next Future 
 
Given the previous analysis, will the MID have the capacity to react to the 
destabilizing power of globalization and what is to stop a MID from devolving into 
anarchy and hollowing-out or the local small businesses becoming subject to 
vertically integrated leader-firms?   
The message of this dissertation is that, notwithstanding the inevitable 
reorganization of the districts due to the impact of global forces, medium-sized 
district firms seem to have the means necessary for good performance in face of 
the internationalization challenge: SMEs historically and geographically deep 
                                            
44  Unione Industriale Pratese (UIP), Evolution of the Prato Textile District. 
http://www.ui.prato.it/unionedigitale/v2/english/presentazione%20distretto%20inglese.pdf  
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rooted in the local context, by reason of their flexible organizational apparatus, 
concentration of specialized know-how and high quality and value of their 
production, seem be the best solution (compared with single small firms or 
vertically-integrated firms) to react to the destabilizing power of globalization and 
drive the recovery of the local economy and the textile sector in advanced 
economies. In addition, they may help the IDs where they operate by breaking the 
ice, building bridges, and favoring the collective learning needed for smaller firms.  
However, the risks of de-anchoring, with the local firms separating their 
destiny from their IDs, are not to be underestimated. Public policy should support 
private internationalization strategies favoring cluster-to-cluster cooperative 
relations embedded in the local forces, based on a shared set of trans-local public 
goods, and aimed at co-realizing and/or co-selling sets of differentiated product 
lines for various markets. 
But structural factors are not enough. In fact, the difficulty Bishū and Prato 
show in recovering from the economic decline both the districts are experiencing 
seems to demonstrate that, most importantly, “culture is what matters”: a 
historical and geographical sense of identity, trust towards local economic agents 
and institutions, experience and “business as a collective mission” are the base of 
the cooperative attitude which sustains and nurtures the economic activities of 
the districts and express itself in informal trust relationships, the prevalence of 
long-term profits over the maximization of individual short-term profits and the 
cooperative sharing of information and knowledge.  
In addition, the cultural specificities of the geographical context the districts 
are located influence the way they react to the pressure of the exogenous forces 
under globalization; and this is also true for districts that, like Bishu and Prato, 
presented a similar pattern of development before globalization. 
In particular, with the beginning of the new millennium and the increasing of 
global competitive pressure, the competition in local markets is often conducted 
against the rules. The continuation of this situation, as well as having accelerated 
the contraction of textile businesses, seems also to have changed the attitudes, 
preferences and behavior that had characterized the local population and 
sustained the development in previous decades. This determines not only a crisis 
of confidence in the recovery of the textile industry, which, until recent times, 
offered ample opportunity for economic and social mobility, discouraging young 
people from acquiring skills and starting new businesses, but the same confidence 
in the “market game” fails, because competition is becoming more and more an 
unfair price war. All this paralyzes entrepreneurial and creative energies, 
dissipating valuable entrepreneurial skill, in a period when entrepreneurship, 
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imagination and high skills are particularly needed to enable Prato to adapt to 
the new context of globalization. 
In this context, the hope is that local actors (representatives of the different 
local economic, social and political categories), rather than leaving the change 
entirely to the unleashing of the unbridled competition of the processes of 
globalization, would once again find the necessary capacity and cohesion to govern 
and guide consciously the ongoing changes towards a shared goal of local 
re-development. Public and collective investments are needed, and they should be 
made in infrastructure so as to produce or reproduce high craft skills and R&D 
competencies able to liaise with traditional sources of local creativity, and 
management competencies able to drive internationalization processes (possibly 
with the help of new firms specializing in knowledge services). 
Again, for a MID to exist, its partners must adopt and adhere to a set of ground 
rules that generates trustworthy transactions. The sense of partnership must 
become an enforceable reality, despite the many uncertainties and opportunities 
for playing games. Therefore, successful MID must be able to punish partners for 
acts of opportunism and gaming (i.e. withholding new orders or even terminating 
a partnership in cases of manufacturing in violation of local laws or in a context 
unfair competition) and continue investing in the locality.  
In this regard, as Dei Ottati (2009) states, it is desirable to resolve the 
misunderstanding arising from the theory of the product life cycle of Vernon 
(1966), whereby the textile and clothing industries, born in the early phase of 
industrialization, are conceived to have reached by this time the stage of maturity. 
This interpretation does not consider that, currently, and especially among the 
middle and upper consumers, the value of products of fashion is almost entirely 
determined by intangible factors, such as taste, style, symbolism and evocative 
content. Thus, a distinctive feature of the fashion industry (similar to high-tech 
sectors) is a continuous innovation of products, including their immaterial content. 
Therefore, the textile and fashion industries are fully part of the new economy of 
goods and services with high-intensity of culture and innovation and a 
co-managed economic development of the small textile local realities in this field 
is still a possible and profitable economic strategy. 
 
 
8.5 Contributions Of The Present Research and its Limitations 
 
This research analyzes the transformations in the productive structure and the 
social context of industrial agglomerations of SMEs, defined as MIDs, in Japan 
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and Italy, the only industrialized countries where the textile sector is still of 
particular importance among manufacturing activities and which still register 
nowadays the largest number of SMEs and industrial districts of SMEs. 
The author has chosen as case studies the textile districts of Bishū in Japan and 
Prato in Italy for three reasons: the first is the concentration of local human 
capital employed in textile operations, the second is the almost total presence of 
micro enterprises and the third is the existence of a sophisticated system of 
division of labor based on horizontal cooperative relationships between local 
independent enterprises engaged in the execution of subsequent productive stages 
in the manufacturing chain of intermediate products. 
The fact that both districts produce woolen yarns and fabrics and that carded 
wool constitutes the representative type of production for both the districts is a 
secondary reason for the selection of these districts as case studies, although it 
proves to be an important factor for the purpose of a more truthful comparison. 
In short, the purpose of the author is not to analyze the changes and 
transformations taking place in the production of woolen textiles, which are 
known to be presently a niche within textile production, but to analyze how the 
production structure and socio-cultural districts of SMEs classified as MID has 
responded to the global competitive pressures that increased in the 1990s, 
following the change of the international context and China’s extraordinary 
economic growth. 
Obviously, although this research has made fruitful contributions to enlarge the 
applicability of the model to Japan, this does not preclude the existence in the two 
countries of other MIDs, different from Bishū and Prato, and, eventually engaged 
in other productions in the light manufacturing field45 or the existence of MIDs in 
other industrialized countries or developing countries46. 
Secondly, since socio-economic questioning cannot be understood independently 
of space and time, the analysis is, basically, conducted from the point of view of 
economic geography. Since Krugman (1991, 1995), economic geography has been 
re-established as a respectable topic for mainstream economists. 
Economic geography studies  
                                            
45 See, for example, the case of the industrial district of Arita in porcelain production in southwestern Japan (Yamamoto, 
2007, 2011) 
46 In Mediterranean countries it is possible to discover a high presence of local systems of SMEs, like the leather district of 
Ubrique, the district of Porrino specializing in granite processing and Castellon de la Plana specializing in tile production in 
Spain, the shoe-making district of Felgueiras and the furniture districts of Parades and Pacos Ferreira in Portugal, Thiers in 
France specializing in cutlery, Kastoria in Greece specializing in fur production. On the contrary, in Northern Europe there 
are nowadays few examples of Ids. Among them are the wool districts of Bradford and Halifax (Yorkshire, England), and 
cutlery production in Sheffield (also Yorkshire), the Solingen district in Germany, Gnosijo in Sweden, Jaren, Horten and 
Arendal in Norway (Garofoli, 2009). As for developing countries, there is jewellery cluster in Bangkok, tile cluster in Santa 
Catarina in Brazil, the knitwear cluster of Ludhiana, North India, and the garment cluster of Dongdaemon in South Korea 
(Posthuma, 2009). 
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the variation in the location and spatial distribution of economic activities 
(…) to understand how internal (local) and external (global) economic 
processes together cause economic activities and standards of living to vary 
from place to place (…). The theories and tools of discipline have implications 
for government policy and practical applications for business firms, 
non-governmental organizations and consumers. (Hayter and Patchell, 
2007:XI). 
 
In this regard, MID theory’s shortcoming, compared to the neoclassical 
perspective cannot be denied: it restores locality and society in the economic 
analysis by analyzing every economic process in the place it is performed, and 
focuses on the inseparable interaction between economic activities and 
socio-cultural and historical relations to explain the district competitiveness 
before the rise of globalization.  
Despite this, isolating the local system from the external environment, this 
theory means to understand the relationship of the district with the environment 
as unchanging - or more precisely, to assume the invariance of the system with 
respect to exogenous forces and, by doing this, it underestimates the impact of 
exogenous forces on the local economic and social structure. This is why the 
author has found that, in the light of the rise of globalization, MID theory in itself 
should be overcome through the scientific comparative case studies, as 
experimentally done in this dissertation, from the economic-geographical 
perspective. 
However, although it should be noted that the discipline of this dissertation is 
neither business strategy nor sociology or related fields of study, the author 
believes that anthropological and sociological studies may pave the way to other 
interesting perspectives about the transformation that happened in the cultural 
framework of local agglomerations of industries in the globalized era. In reality, a 
better understanding of territorial dynamics necessitates stronger links between 
disciplines, for example, economics and geography, but also sociology and 
anthropology. 
Some scholars have argued that the changes SMEs-based industrial districts 
are experiencing represent no more than different stages of the same process of 
adaptation to globalization. For example, in this dissertation, the phenomenon of 
Chinese immigration and the creation of an ethnic district in the apparel sector in 
the district of Prato might in future affect the district of Bishū or, inversely, the 
massive hollowing-out of the productive backbone – in particular, yarn spinning 
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and weaving operations – that Bishū is going through might, in future, when the 
Chinese workforce moves to more profitable areas outside Prato, affect the district 
of Prato. 
As we have seen, the so-called Marshallian industrial district (MID) is an 
ideal-typical model of a “locality of industry” exhibiting a steady path of 
development. The structure is characterized by a certain degree of local 
dominance by an industrial cluster (local specialization), a decisive role of locally 
embedded centers of strategy and decision-making in the definition of local 
private and public investments in technical, human and social capital 
(endogeneity), a structured plurality of autonomous centers of business 
decision-making (de-centralization) (Bellandi, 2007). 
This research demonstrates that, outside ideal-typical conditions, local 
development may be more generic, less endogenous, more centralized, and the 
district processes may be less robust and articulated. Variety is useful and even 
necessary in face of various types of external market conditions, technology, 
institutional infrastructure, and cultural tradition, and against possible 
discontinuities in local and external conditions. As emphasized by Pyke and 
Sengenberger (1992), “it could be said that just as with large firms, no two 
industrial districts are exactly alike”, and this is particularly true in the current 
globalize era.  
Furthermore, as Ernst, Guerrieri, Iammarino and Pietrobelli state (2011), 
“industrial districts are not cast in iron, but they evolve over time”. In fact, 
“globalization changes both the concept of proximity and the scope of competition” 
and in SMEs districts the cultural and social systems that sustain the economic 
structure of the districts are reshaped by the external forces of globalization. 
Therefore, the typical “uniformity” (in the light of some structural and cultural 
differences) in the growth process of MID systems, has come to an end.  
Given this background, the empirical analysis, based on a work field analysis 
carried out from 2009 to 2012 in Bishū and Prato wool districts, reveals that new 
diversified patterns of growth are in the course of being realized in the districts 
because the reaction to the competitive challenge of globalization may differ 
greatly even among MIDs specializing in the same industrial sector and following, 
in origin, a same pattern if development. No common and unidirectional 
development pattern proves valid anymore, and different avenues have been 
followed to face the new competitive challenges posed by the globalization of 
production, market and technology.  
Moreover, the scope and variety of inter-firm organization is continuously 
expanding, in relation to the increasing internationalization of economic and 
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innovative activities. In this context, a necessary prerequisite for competitive 
survival is the capacity to foster and govern the co-evolution of local and global 
linkages and networks, to develop new interactive modes of knowledge creation 
and to promptly and proactively adjust strategy and organization without being 
unlashed by the market forces.  
In brief, the crucial factors explaining the evolution of the MIDs’ industrial 
organization are, according to the author, not only the capacity to adapt to the 
(external) inducements derived from technology and technological change” (Ernst, 
Guerrieri, Iammarino and Pietrobelli, 2001:135) but also the capacity to keep the 
district culture cohesive (= directed to a common purpose) and give a “unitary” 
response to the disruptive force of globalization, innovating traditional culture 
and ways of production or/ and creating a new culture or new way of production. 
With this analysis of industrial districts of SMEs, the author wants to stress 
that a proper analysis of the spatial agglomeration of economic activities must be 
shifted from an analysis of traditional purely economic factors to an analysis of 
the mechanism of knowledge diffusion and accumulation established in industrial 
agglomerations of related industries; where learning dynamics and knowledge 
exchanges are historically, geographically and socially embedded in a distinct 
environment of interaction among different subjects, sharing common attitudes 
towards a particular type of learning. In this sense, attempts to construct a 
neo-Marshallian agglomeration theory would be a positive development, as long 
as we remain conscious of the contextual socio-historical and cultural differences 
and the possible different paths of development among differentiated areas.  
 
 
8.6 Future Research 
 
During the 1990s, surprisingly a sort of reincarnation of regionalism started 
and many academics and researchers ignited debates, as well as publishing 
numbers of empirical research works, on the importance of regional industrial 
agglomeration and local networking. Among them, the most popular was Porter’s 
“industrial cluster” thesis, which is based on his own “diamond theory” of 
competitiveness.  
Since then networks as an economic policy concern have become increasingly 
fashionable with policies to stimulate and strengthen networking among firms 
frequently perceived as desirable by the actors and agencies invested in 
facilitating local economic development. 
Many governments and organizations throughout the world adopted that idea 
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to deploy new policies to stimulate their own regional economies and to 
strengthen global competitiveness, depending on industrial cluster policy and, 
also in Japan, governmental ministries, local governments and public 
organizations are enthusiastically trying to apply it to seek regional innovation 
systems, the promotion of local business networking and new industrial 
development47. 
Could IDs, which are far from being simple localizations of industries, be 
helped to emerge and replicate? Or, as the author believes and demonstrates with 
this dissertation on Bishū and Prato districts, is the presence of favorable 
socio-cultural and territorial conditions a necessary basis for any plausible 
strategy of local development? And what about the future of mature IDs of locally 
embedded SMEs? 
Globalization, in association with inner changes in the social structure of the 
local agglomerations, has created an explosive mix of forces that create new 
opportunities and challenges for the development and upgrading of SME-based 
IDs: they facilitate international diffusion of knowledge (penetration of Chinese 
immigrants in Italy, delocalization of Japanese firms in China), increasing the 
variety of international knowledge linkages. 
In contrast to the assumptions of the convergence theory, however, 
globalization does not lead to the wonderland of a “borderless world” (Ohmae, 
1990) where not just capital but also knowledge and other resources move freely 
around the globe, acting as a powerful force of equalization. This is because 
knowledge and immigration do not easily migrate across borders: they do not 
automatically follow, once production moves. This implies that even while 
globalization extends its reach beyond trade and finance, giving rise to an 
extensive relocation of production, this may not help to reduce the huge 
international gaps and differences in knowledge and innovation.  
Some stages of the value chain are internationally dispersed, while others 
remain concentrated; therefore, agglomeration economies continue to matter, as 
well as the path-dependent nature of the cluster evolution. What needs to be 
explained, however, is how they have changed under the impact of globalization.  
We need, therefore, an explicit analysis of the impact of globalization on 
                                            
47 In Japan, METI FY 2002’s key measure was “formation of industrial clusters” to create new local industries and 
employment, and ¥29.4 billion was allocated to industrial cluster development measures (later increased to ¥52.2 billion). 
Targeted industries are mainly biotechnology, ICT, electronics, neo manufacturing, new energy, ecology and recycling which 
reflect individual region’s own backgrounds, scientific R&D activities and COE quality or existing industrial agglomerations. 
MEXT, Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology, also launched its own “knowledge cluster creation 
scheme”, in 2003. The scheme is based on national universities, institutes and MEXT’s science promotion measures, and 
partnership between universities and industry is emphasized. Ten regions have been selected (Mitsui, 2003). 
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agglomeration economies and on international knowledge diffusion. Just as 
cross-border linkage proliferates so that no country can exist any longer in 
isolation, also industrial districts are rapidly becoming internationalized, and 
increasingly depend on international linkages to import key inputs and export 
outputs; this implies that international linkages are no longer secondary, optional 
to domestic linkages. Instead, industrial networks in different countries (or in the 
same country) supplement each other and may experience mutual 
interpenetration. 
Furthermore, as De Propris (2008) notes, geographical proximity is not the only 
way to perceive proximity in the current globalized era. There are, in fact, 
alternative forms of proximity, for example “mental proximity” (Sacchetti and 
Sugden, 2005) that permits network relationships between production systems in 
localities that are geographically separate. Such networks would enable local 
networks of smaller firms, which have been competitive in the past in part on the 
base of their trust-based relationships, to maintain that competitiveness in a 
globalized world. In this context, a dilemma between protectionism and 
deindustrialization in contemporary IDs might be collaboration and governance in 
international trans-local and cluster-to-cluster relations (Bellandi, 2008) and this 
approach opens an interesting scenario for future research in the field of 
industrial districts. 
In conclusion, although it cannot be denied that local reserves of socio-cultural 
and territorial factors (cognitive proximity, trust, diffused entrepreneurship) 
come under strain along transition paths within mature IDs (Dei Ottati, 2003), 
this strain, and the weakening of ID structural features, may be temporary, and 
may not impede the (re-)gaining of a satisfactory path of local development. What 
is still unclear is how the alternatives arise within transitional paths.  
In any event, global production networks cannot be left to market forces alone; 
much depends on the nature of supporting institutions and policies. And 
supporting the restructuring process of an industrial cluster requires not only 
fundamental changes in the objectives and policy instruments, but also a deep 
understanding of the global competitive dynamics. Thus a critical challenge in a 
globalizing world is to develop a set of supporting institutions and policies that 
can foster the formation of local capability and innovation. That effort needs to be 
based on a sound understanding of how disruptive technological change and 
liberalization have changed the parameters of global competition, and hence the 
strategic options for developing SME-based local systems. 
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Appendix 1. Fieldwork Table 
 
Firms Side 
Interview Track 
u Type of company and content of business (type product/service) 
u Company profile (year of establishment, number of workers, history and 
features) and economic performance data 
u Position in the textile value chain (role in the productive network) 
u Composition of clients and outsourcing partners (past and present) 
u Business strategy (past and present) 
u Current problems in the light of the rise of globalization (economic data 
comparison) 
u China’s influence and potential involvement in the productive network 
u Future tasks and challenges 
 
Subjects 
BISHU PRATO 
K  S.p.a. Gifu (textile converter) 
IKW S.r.l., Hajima  (textile converter) 
HT S.r.l. , Ichinomiya (textile converter) 
HSW S.r.l., Ichinomiya (textile 
converter) 
S S.r.l., Ichinomiya (textile processing) 
S S.r.l. , Vaiano (yarn spinning) 
P S.r.l. , Prato (yarn spinning) 
FB S.p.a., Prato (textile converter) 
C S.p.a, Prato (textile converter) 
LP S.p.a, Prato (yarn spinning) 
 
 
Government And Business Side 
Interview Content 
u According to Markusen’s classification, which category of ID may be more appropriate to 
describe the Bishū/Prato textile district? 
u What is the representative production of Bishū/Prato? 
u In which way do you think the manufacturing structure of the district’s representative 
production changed with the rise of globalization? 
 
Subjects 
Gifu Prefecture, Industry Promotion Division  
Gifu Prefecture Wool Manufacturers Association  
Prato Industrial Union, Studies Area  
University of Florence, Department of Economics, Industrial Districts and Political Economic 
 192 
Appendix 2. Firms Interviewed And Data From Interviews 
  
 
PRATO 1 - LP  
COMPANY NAME Linapiu’ (LP) 
TYPE OF COMPANY 
 
vertically-integrated spinning mill and textile maker (weaving 
fabrics and knitwear) 
YEAR OF ESTABLISHMENT 
 
1975 
* taken over by A.Moda with the name of Lineapiu’ Italia in 2010 
NUMBER OF WORKERS 
 
140 (98 redundant workers of old Lineapiu’ waiting to be 
reintegrated) 
TURNOVER 30 million € (60% abroad) 
MATERIAL SUPPLIERS Australia 
OUTSOURCING PARTNERS group-companies (2005–2010 Chinese joint venture) 
CLIENTS Italy, France, Germany, USA, Japan, China 
BUSINESS STRATEGY - providing high quality colored woolen yarns with an exotic or an 
avant-garde edge for luxury brand stylists all over the world 
(Armani, Chanel, Hermés, Scervino, Alaya, Dior, Marras); from 
2010 introduction of a new line of economical but high-quality 
cotton and linen yarns (Filclass) 
- investment in technology, research and innovation: 1987 
introduction of viscose yarn, 1990 anti-electromagnetic pollution 
carbonate yarn, 2000 hollow feather mohair yarn, for the 
Spring/Summer 2013 season special yarn made with pearl powder. 
This material is mainly employed in the beauty industry but when 
it is added to fibers during the spinning process, pearl particles 
distribute themselves in the fibers and on their surface. Knits 
made with these yarns can help taking care of the skin, 
maintaining its elasticity and even reduce serum lipid peroxide 
levels. 
- global network providing quick service and local assistance: 
productive units located also outside the district (8), 
representative offices abroad (New York, Tokyo, Shanghai, Hong 
Kong, Moscow, Monaco di Bavaria, Brussels, Paris, Istanbul) for 
directly managing local marketing of the products. 
- 2005–2010 combining Italian quality and creativity with the 
advantages of producing in China (no customs barriers, cheap 
costs of production): set-up a textile factory in China (Top Line 
Yarns Manufacturing Company Ltd, first Italian spinning mills) in 
society with two Chinese companies (Fenix production and retail of 
knitwear to the Asian market – Anteprima brand – and Consinee, 
cashmere producer) specializing in production of fabrics for the 
Chinese and Asian market and for foreign textile companies 
settled in China. 
- 2010: After a serious period of crisis, Lineapiu’ was bought and 
relaunched by A. Bastagli (A. Moda, company specialized in 
apparel marketing) and renamed Lineapiù Italia. It closed the last 
financial year with quite positive results (increase of 25% of 
previous year turnover) and is also considering the reintegration of 
some Lineapiù workers currently on redundancy payment. The 
purchase of the Chinese company was abandoned due to troubles 
with the Chinese associates and inadequacy and unprofitability of 
local manufacturing. The new strategy is to produce in Italy and 
penetrate the Chinese market, instead of producing in China for 
the European market. 
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CURRENT PROBLEMS AND 
REMARKS 
- increase of cost of raw materials 
- overgrowth and overexpansion during the economic boom and 
Chinese competition made difficult to face the gradual decrease of 
turnover during the crisis (2001–2010) 
- gradual reintegration of workers (of 100 workers on redundancy 
a half has been reintegrated) 
FORECAST AND FUTURE TRENDS concentrate on expansion in Asia and in particular in China: 
- strenghten the position of the representative office of Shanghai 
- increase the exports of completely made-in-Italy yarns 
- try to beat the Chinese market not on price but on quality 
NOTES “We have to become innovation specialists if we want to save the 
Made in Italy label from the competition of emergent countries 
who lack expertise and a feeling for new ideas” (Mr Coppini, 
company president) 
 
 
 
PRATO 2 - FS 
COMPANY NAME Filatura di Spicciano (FS) 
TYPE OF COMPANY 
 
yarn spinning mill (weaving materials and knitwear, regenerated 
and mix carded wool) 
YEAR OF ESTABLISHMENT 1973 
NUMBER OF WORKERS 8 (17 at peak time) 
TURNOVER 600,000 € (a third of the amount in successful time) 
MATERIAL SUPPLIERS Australia, South Africa, Romania 
OUTSOURCING PARTNERS in-districts textile converters (80%) , (20%) foreign apparel 
makers, other textile districts (Biella, North Italy, vertical cluster 
specialized in worsted wool productions) 
CLIENTS - final clients: big apparel companies: Zara, Marks&Spencer 
(UK), Joe Bananas (Australia); 
- commissions from textile companies in Romania which provide 
yarn to be processed for wool tops;  
- in-district commissions from textile makers (around 80%) 
BUSINESS STRATEGY - large range, high quality and highly specialized production, in 
short delivery times and small lots, for diverse national and 
foreign (80%) customers;  
- investment in high-tech machinery (from Germany) 
CURRENT PROBLEMS AND 
REMARKS 
- high cost of labor in the district compared to China ($100 vs 
2500 €),though the efficiency of Italian skilled workers is higher; 
recently, the sector is threatened also by the high cost of energy, 
water and the rise in the price of raw materials.  Resources for 
quality control also raise the final price. For this reason, a small 
amount of spinning operations for (worsted wool) basic processed 
goods is outsourced on commission in Poland, Bulgaria, Romania 
(coats, curtains) and Slovenia under the control of Italian 
management (ex. Galli, wool maker controlled by Benetton). This 
led to the shrinking of the processing backbone of the districts 
(from 300 spinning mills to 80). 
- Chinese apparel makers (with their flaws in final goods, 
standard dyeing) harm the image of high-quality textile 
processing of the district. 
- the international crisis in consumption (flat market) pushes 
toward aggressive competition for short-term profits: 
i.e .“indiscriminate” sale of machinery to competitors (flight of 
machinery and leasing of mills that went bankrupt to Chinese 
businessmen), dumping. 
- generational succession problem 
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- rise of substitute products (synthetic textiles) 
- climatic changes (global warming) 
 
FORECAST AND FUTURE 
TRENDS 
- in the short term, Prato’s strength (know-how in regenerated 
wool, flexibility and speed, respect for delivery times) will endure 
even though the competition with China may push towards price 
reduction (and lowering of quality). 
- the number of Chinese clients may increase (even though they 
prefer to import fabrics from the motherland) but the local 
producers must have the “moral duty” of subordinating business 
to the respect of law, labor regulations and contributory duties 
(joint liability). 
- with the reduction of custom fees for intermediary goods, direct 
exports toward China may be a profitable opportunity. 
- the problem of generational succession threatens the survival of 
the local know-how. 
NOTES consultancy for the wool district of Sabadell (Spain) and for 
Chinese companies in Zhuhai, Hong Kong (9 million items/year), 
Macao (through the distributor Novitex) for the production of 
knitting yarn. Problems: lack of accuracy and efficiency, delay in 
delivery and problems in maintenance of machinery and in 
finding machinery parts and components (specialized textile 
machinery makers in Prato), no district structure and absence of 
industrial atmosphere. 
 
 
 
 PRATO 3 - FB 
COMPANY NAME Fratelli Balli (FB) 
TYPE OF COMPANY 
 
vertically-integrated textile converter (production of carded wool 
and purchase on commission of worsted wool items +20% nylon 
items) 
YEAR OF ESTABLISHMENT 
 
1948 
*in 1967 the integrated textile mills were divided into four  
organizations (with over 15 workers); the equipment was 
partially sold to key-employees who were granted the possibility 
of realizing independent management (new personnel) but not 
outside sales. Dyeing operations and part of weaving operations 
are still centralized. 
NUMBER OF WORKERS 90 (130 at peak time) 
TURNOVER 18 million € (24 million € at peak time) 
MATERIAL SUPPLIERS Australia (75%), China (25%, cashmere, agora) 
OUTSOURCING PARTNERS “semi-integrated” companies in the district 
CLIENTS 75% foreign apparel makers (Germany – Hugo Boss, Spain, 
Portugal, Turkey); 25% national high brand names (Max Mara, 
Armani) set in China or in Italy. 
BUSINESS STRATEGY - accurate production and punctuality in delivery. 
- production flexibility realized through the break-up into small 
companies with cooperative relations. Innovation through the 
acquisition of Rafanelli S.p.a. (1998), a local firm known for a 
wide range of innovative products. 
- foreign sales managed by internal personnel (cutting down of 
transition costs). 
- production of high-quality “classic” textiles (not innovative or 
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diversified). 
CURRENT PROBLEMS AND 
REMARKS 
- 6-7 years delocalization experience in Eastern Europe 
(Bulgaria, Romania) with local partners who set up equipment 
and materials abroad to produce standard items. The experience 
ended because of the lack of experience of local workers. 
- globalization paved the way to unfair competition (price-driven 
competition). 
- change in fashion and climatic conditions affect the economic 
stability of the district. 
 
 
FORECAST AND FUTURE 
TRENDS 
- reduction in the number of plants and diversification in 
production may save the district (e.g. England in the 1950s).  
- the presence of skilled workers, an advanced system of 
information-sharing and the long experience in textile production 
of the district are undeniable advantages which make any 
delocalization abroad unprofitable. 
NOTES reduction of personnel has been realized through retirement 
without new personnel replacement. 
 
 
 
PRATO 4 - C 
COMPANY NAME Cangioli 
TYPE OF COMPANY 
 
vertically-integrated textile converter involved in the production 
of carded (25%) and worsted wool items, synthetic fibers and 
cotton textiles 
YEAR OF ESTABLISHMENT 1859  
*3 independent firms which also process outside orders 
NUMBER OF WORKERS around 100 
TURNOVER 25 millions € (+5% in 2010) 
MATERIAL SUPPLIERS Australia and South America (wool), China (angora, cashmere) 
OUTSOURCING PARTNERS “independent” group companies 
CLIENTS 55% foreign apparel makers: 90% EU clients (Germany, Spain, 
France, England), 10% USA, Japan and South Korea through 
trading companies (Takisada, Takio). Italian apparel companies 
BUSINESS STRATEGY - since 2000s, to react to the crisis of demand and the rise on the 
market of substituted materials, production was diversified 
(wool- autumn-winter collection, synthetic fibers, cotton, 
linoleum– spring-summer collection) 
- creative and innovative production (orthogonally weaved 
textiles) with high fashion content (team of four designers who 
decide total look) at competitive price 
- 2–5% of the budjet is invested in R&D. 
- rapid delivery (6–8 weeks from the delivery of materials) 
 
CURRENT PROBLEMS AND 
REMARKS 
- the high cost of labor and energy and the high fiscal pressure 
affect the competitiveness of local production. 
- absence of coordinated industrial policy for the district SMEs 
- experience of delocalization to South Africa with a local 
company (Pecci) in 2000: failure due to lack of know-how, 
distance and problems in management. 
- foreign sales depend strongly on the value of currency 
FORECAST AND FUTURE 
TRENDS 
_ 
NOTES _ 
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PRATO 5 - P 
COMPANY NAME Pecci (P) 
TYPE OF COMPANY 
 
vertically-integrated textile converter which produces carded and 
worsted woolen threads, cotton, linoleum threads and synthetic 
fibers 
YEAR OF ESTABLISHMENT 
 
1902 (1880 first spinning operations) 
*in 2002 the company was divided into three enterprises taken 
over by the most skilled workers in the company and partially 
controlled by the “mother company” in charge, respectively, of 
design, production and sales 
NUMBER OF WORKERS around 100 
TURNOVER 17–24 million € 
MATERIAL SUPPLIERS [wool] Australia, China 
OUTSOURCING PARTNERS “partially-independent” group companies 
CLIENTS 40% foreign apparel companies (La Fayette-US, Hugo Boss etc.) 
and national brand names (like Max Mara) 
BUSINESS STRATEGY - innovative and sophisticated production of fancy yarns for 
knitwear through the use of the most advanced technology 
- diversification of materials from 2000s (not only wool but cotton, 
linoleum and synthetic fibers) 
- specialization of the productive apparatus to cut off costs and 
increase efficiency 
- wide network of sales representatives all over the world (East 
Asia included) 
CURRENT PROBLEMS AND 
REMARKS 
- the company underwent a radical rationalization in 2000s 
because of the crisis of the global demand (half of the personnel 
were made redundant) 
- the well-to-do second and third generation of textile makers lack 
the necessary experience to run their parents’ businesses and 
don’t share the district’s “industrial atmosphere” 
FORECAST AND FUTURE 
TRENDS 
the “identity of the district”, not short-term profits, should be 
strengthened 
NOTES _ 
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BISHU 1 - S 
COMPANY NAME Soto Finishing & Dyeing 
TYPE OF COMPANY 
 
dyeing and finishing operations firm 
 (four factories in Gifu and Aichi) 
YEAR OF ESTABLISHMENT 1923 
NUMBER OF WORKERS 680 (the overall group), 400 full-time workers 
TURNOVER 10,500 million yen (80% from dyeing) 
(past peak 12, 600 million yen) 
MATERIAL SUPPLIERS local converters, wholesalers, trading companies. 
OUTSOURCING PARTNERS China for standard items (delivery times are not always 
respected). 
Japan for high-value goods and goods with high-security 
standards with mixed materials. 
CLIENTS 70% of the orders are planned and come from textile and apparel 
makers of the district and wholesalers (formerly almost 100%), 
which press for shorter delivery times. The remainder come from 
other Japanese districts (Hokuriku, Wakayama, Hamamatsu). 
Recently, although not directly, orders from Chinese makers, 
European (Italian) and American makers through Japanese trade 
companies and apparel makers are growing (compressed and soft 
wool jersey which doesn’t look like wool) 
BUSINESS STRATEGY - The production was formerly wool-centered, now wool amounts to 
the 60% of the overall processed goods, or 80% from March to June 
in proximity of the autumn/winter collection launch. The 
remainder consists of cotton and compound goods (now cotton 
covers 60% of production). 
- Realization of goods with high finishing techniques (machines 
imported from Italy) and processes that may not be realized 
abroad, to attract foreign orders. 
- Not just manufacturing operations (seizo hanbai) for ordered 
goods, but also 30% of the profits invested in joint  R&D project 
with raw materials producers for new fabrics and products (e.g. 
jersey which doesn’t  wrinkle after ten washings, super-white 
cotton which doesn’t  stain). Active promotion (sells) of new 
products (teiangata) to shosha and clients. 
CURRENT PROBLEMS AND 
REMARKS 
- Because of the reduction in the volume of business, above all 
after the Lehman Brothers financial shock, ageing of personnel 
(average age of 60 years) and no new intake in the last 10 years 
(apart from the personnel taken over from the acquisition of 
companies in the district). 
- Attempt to arrest the hollowing-out of the district with the 
acquisition (Iwanaka, May 2010) or succession in business 
(Seiyakin, Tsuyakin, June 2010) of other dyeing and finishing 
companies of the district. 
- Considering the problems in the adaptation, moving and 
maintenance of the equipment, and the different environment 
conditions, no intention to relocate production abroad (to China) 
FORECAST AND FUTURE 
TRENDS 
- 
NOTES - 
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BISHU 2 - HSW 
COMPANY NAME Hinode Spinning and Weaving  
TYPE OF COMPANY 
 
textile maker (converter: design and sales, outsourcing of 
production) 
(85% ladies’ clothes and 15% men’s suits) 
YEAR OF ESTABLISHMENT 1916 
NUMBER OF WORKERS 10 employees 
TURNOVER 623.2 million yen 
(formerly 2000 million yen) 
MATERIAL SUPPLIERS Australian wool through local trading companies (Moririn 
Ichinomiya, Itochu Shoji Osaka, Mishin Osaka, Toyoshima 
Ichinomiya etc). 
carded wool 80% 
worsted wool 20% 
OUTSOURCING PARTNERS some years before, the production was almost district-centered 
(Bisen dyeing Ichinomiya, Soto, Fujikikai Aichi), but now the yarn 
is also procured from Japanese sub-affiliates in China and the 
fabric (final product) directly from Chinese companies. 
CLIENTS Japanese specialized wholesalers (Takihiyo Nagoya, Nihon woolen 
textile Osaka, Misshin Textile Osaka etc). 
BUSINESS STRATEGY - The strength of the district is in the high tech processing and 
finishing operations.  
- Economic relations with Chinese counterparts should be handled 
with a fair approach, without surrendering to stereotypes: this is 
the key for a successful economic penetration in China. 
CURRENT PROBLEMS AND 
REMARKS 
- The productive contraction of the firms in the district has 
advanced to the point it may be said there is no longer a district. 
China is a coherent maker (from the yard to the fabric/cloth) and 
the firms in the district are too small (the lots are too small and so 
is the investment capital) to invest in new equipment and relocate 
the production. 
FORECAST AND FUTURE 
TRENDS 
 
NOTES - 
 
 
 
BISHU 3 - HT 
COMPANY NAME Hayazen Textile  
TYPE OF COMPANY 
 
textile maker (converter: design and sales, outsourcing of 
production) 
ladies’ clothes 
YEAR OF ESTABLISHMENT 1946 
NUMBER OF WORKERS 11 (+2 contract) and 4 in China 
TURNOVER 340.5 million yen  
(3,000 million yen in 1997) 
MATERIAL SUPPLIERS Australia (30%, mohair, alpaca, Possam, Cubic types of wool ) and 
China (70%, cashmere, angora) through Japanese trading 
companies (Moririn Ichinomiya, Nagawa Sensho, Marutaka 
Nagoya, Toyoshima Ichinomiya) snd Chinese trading companies 
(Zhejiang Shenzhou Woolen  Textile). 
carded wool 75% 
worsted wool 25% 
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OUTSOURCING PARTNERS Chinese sites and joint ventures, Vietnamese sub-affiliates (R&D 
activities, problems in infrastructures and know-how), firms of the 
districts (Fujikikai CAD&CAM Aichi, Soto, Mitsubishi Weaving 
and Twisting Hajima etc.). 
CLIENTS National market (shosha: Daisho FT Ichinomiya, Fokado Nagoya, 
Takisada Nagoya, Okasan Tokyo etc.), China (angora, cashmere) 
and Korea (shosha: Pasteru, made by Japan – Japanese designed 
items produced in China). 
BUSINESS STRATEGY - Productive operations are located in China (five productive sites 
with Japanese supervisors around Shanghai, Sekkosho (Zhejiang), 
Kososho (Jiangsu) and a joint venture, established in 2004³, 
specializing in the production of basic articles in bigger lots – 
coats, jackets – commissioned by trade companies (Takisaya). 
Japan is the site of new projects (no foreign collaboration) and 
manufacturing of luxury items, like cashmere, commissioned by 
both trade companies and apparel makers. 
- Constant internal development of new products for the national 
luxury market (Vietnam – silk, Alaska and Canada – cubic).  
- Internet (Alibaba, Rakuten) as sale tool to reach new markets 
(Nigeria, America). 
CURRENT PROBLEMS AND 
REMARKS 
- Consistent reduction in business of the textile shosha (Moririn 
and Toyoshima) and local wholesalers (Takisada Nagoya, Ichida 
Kyoto, Yoshichu Kyoto, Takihyo Nagoya) as intermediary between 
textile and apparel makers. 
- Productive contraction of oyabata and hollowing out,  production 
is gradually shifting to China. Chinese firms have no interest in 
relocating to Japan, as in Prato because costs of production are 
high; even in their motherland they are willing to shift to other 
sectors in place of textiles. 
FORECAST AND FUTURE 
TRENDS 
- If in three years the TPP  (and a floating exchange system) 
among Japan, China and Korea were adopted, tariffs on Japanese 
goods at 15% of price would be reduced and Japanese goods would 
be more affordable for Chinese consumers. 
- Expand Japanese textiles all over the world (Russia as potential 
market) and export luxury goods to China, where Japanese design 
may be appreciated. 
- Possibility of cooperation with Italian textile makers is low 
because, notwithstanding the design power of Italian makers, they 
are known for not respecting delivery time (administration 
problems). 
NOTES - 
 
 
 
BISHU 4. IKW 
COMPANY NAME Iwata Ken Wool  
TYPE OF COMPANY 
 
converter: design and sales, outsourcing of production 
ladies’ clothes  
YEAR OF ESTABLISHMENT 1940 
NUMBER OF WORKERS 9 (50 employees 40 years ago) 
TURNOVER 307.5  million yen¹ 
(about 1, 500 million in the past, in deficit from 2009) 
MATERIAL SUPPLIERS wool from Australia, yarn from China (local spinning mills and 
joint ventures) and Japan, linoleum from Europe, mohair from 
Latin America through general trading companies (like Toyota 
Tsusho) and local textile trade companies (like Moririn in 
Ichinomiya  and Marusa in Gifu) 
OUTSOURCING PARTNERS district firms (Nagata, Maruichi, Soto) but also firms from Italy², 
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China and Indonesia (small lots) 
CLIENTS Japanese apparel makers and wholesalers/trading companies 
(Takisada Osaka, Takihiyo Nagoya, Dobua Tokyo, Daisho 
Ichinomiya etc.). Products are mainly sold in national department 
stores. 
Low export rate (China, Latin America, Italy). 
BUSINESS STRATEGY Orders (design, project and amount of final good/fabric) come from 
shosha, which have the role of hedge fund (capital and 
risk-taking), cushioning (claims administration) and distribution 
and final product are mainly meant to be sold locally. Direct orders 
from apparel makers are a minority.  
CURRENT PROBLEMS AND 
REMARKS 
- Contractions of the productive system 
- District production shifted to highly detailed and luxury goods 
- Difference between turnover and profits (current lower profit 
trend because of the rise in price of raw materials – tariffs on 
imported carded wool amount to 1.2, 1.5 – and production costs  
(high price of water) and income in Japan generates a higher unit 
price) 
FORECAST AND FUTURE 
TRENDS 
- Cultivate new markets abroad, besides the national market, and 
tighten the link with apparel makers 
- Boost the originality of the products and add value (usually 25% 
of production cost) 
- Maintain a varied production (not just carded wool and natural 
fibres (7,000 million yen profit) but also synthetic fibers (3,500 
million yen profit))  
NOTES - 
 
 
 
BISHU 5 - KW 
COMPANY NAME Kawabo  
TYPE OF COMPANY 
 
vertically- integrated textile and yarn maker 
(woolen and blended yarns, natural (paper fibers), synthetic and 
composite fabrics for ladies’ and men’s outerwear, knitwear and 
uniforms, laces, polyfunctional textile materials) 
yarn 15% 
knitwear fabrics 30% 
synthetic woven fabrics 65% 
YEAR OF ESTABLISHMENT 
 
1937 
*in 2003 the company was divided into an administrative and 
sales headquarters and a shopping center run by the group’s real 
estate company and in a textile firm and factory 
NUMBER OF WORKERS 97 
TURNOVER 4,342,494,000 yen 
MATERIAL SUPPLIERS local textile trading companies (Moririn) and general trading 
company (Itochu) 
OUTSOURCING PARTNERS group-companies (textile factory, sales headquarters etc.) 
CLIENTS Japanese textile makers (Toray, Yagi), group company, trading 
companies 
BUSINESS STRATEGY - wide-variety and small quantity lot 
- short production cycle and rapid delivery 
- outsourced production (China) 
- investment in innovative materials (1952, first producer of elastic 
woolen-nylon composite fibers in Japan, 1953 first producer of 
synthetic fibers, 1962 first producer of polyester fibers in the 
 201 
world) 
CURRENT PROBLEMS AND 
REMARKS 
- while adult consumers still invest in high brand-accessories, for 
clothes their demand is oriented towards cheap articles, with 
minimum standards of quality. 
- shopping is more and more realized by TV or internet shopping 
and not in department stores. 
- wearing “made in China” has become natural, obvious. 
- since the second half of 1980s Japanese textile companies began 
to set up affiliates in China to cut costs of production and to 
delegate production to local suppliers (from material/thread to the 
final product/cloth), leading to the increase of goods procurement 
from China and the consequence hollowing out of the district. 
FORECAST AND FUTURE 
TRENDS 
- In future, SMEs in the textile sector may disappear, to be 
replaced by the less specialized big textile makers, or the whole 
textile industry may be replaced by apparel companies that 
directly work on textiles and fabrics imported from abroad. 
- need to invest in R&D to develop innovative materials and to 
bring up a class of skilled designers who can work on the final 
product. 
NOTES - 
 
 202 
Appendix 3. Additional Data And Statistics 
 
 
List Of Tables In Appendix 3. 
 
1. NUMBER OF FIRMS AND EMPLOYEES IN THE TEXTILE AND APPAREL SECTORS IN 
JAPAN (1985–2010) 
2. VALUE ADDED (VA) AND PRODUCTION IN THE TEXTILE AND APPAREL SECTORS IN 
JAPAN (1985–2010) 
3. VALUE OF EXPORTS OF TEXTILE YARN AND THREAD, WOVEN FABRICS AND TEXTILE 
MATERIALS AND CLOTHING AND ACCESSORIES FROM JAPAN (1988–2011) 
4. VALUE OF IMPORTS OF TEXTILE YARN AND THREAD, WOVEN FABRICS AND TEXTILE 
MATERIALS AND CLOTHING AND ACCESSORIES INTO JAPAN (1988–2011) 
5. DISTRIBUTION OF EXPORTS OF TEXTILE YARN AND FABRICS FROM JAPAN (2011)  
6. DISTRIBUTION OF IMPORTS OF TEXTILE YARN AND FABRICS INTO JAPAN (2011) 
7. DISTRIBUTION OF EXPORTS OF CLOTHING FROM JAPAN  (2011, UNIT) 
8. DISTRIBUTION OF IMPORTS OF CLOTHING INTO JAPAN  (2011, UNIT) 
9. NUMBER OF FIRMS AND EMPLOYEES IN THE TEXTILE AND APPAREL SECTORS IN 
ITALY (1981–2011) 
10. VA AND PRODUCTION IN THE TEXTILE AND APPAREL SECTORS IN ITALY 
(1981–2011) 
11. VALUE OF IMPORTS OF THREAD, TEXTILE MATERIALS AND CLOTHING INTO ITALY 
(1997–2011)  
12. VALUE OF EXPORTS OF THREAD, TEXTILE MATERIALS AND CLOTHING AND 
ACCESSORIES FROM ITALY (1997–2011) 
13. DISTRIBUTION OF IMPORTS OF TEXTILE YARN INTO ITALY (2011) 
14. DISTRIBUTION OF EXPORTS OF TEXTILE YARN FROM ITALY (2011) 
15. DISTRIBUTION OF IMPORTS OF FABRICS INTO ITALY (2011) 
16. DISTRIBUTION OF EXPORTS OF FABRICS FROM ITALY (2011) 
17. DISTRIBUTION OF IMPORTS OF CLOTHING INTO ITALY (2011) 
18. DISTRIBUTION OF EXPORTS OF CLOTHING FROM ITALY (2011) 
19. IMPORTS AND EXPORTS OF CLOTHING INTO PRATO (1995–2010) 
20. COMPOSITION OF THE TEXTILE INDUSTRY IN PRATO – NUMBER OF FIRMS (2006; 
2011)  
21. COMPOSITION OF THE TEXTILE INDUSTRY IN PRATO – NUMBER OF WORKERS 
(2006; 2011) 
22. COMPOSITION OF THE MANUFACTURING ACTIVITIES OF THE DISTRICT OF PRATO – 
NUMBER OF FIRMS (1981–2007) 
 203 
23. COMPOSITION OF THE MANUFACTURING ACTIVITIES OF THE DISTRICT OF PRATO – 
NUMBER OF WORKERS (1981–2007) 
24. COMPOSITION OF THE SERVICE ACTIVITIES OF THE DISTRICT OF PRATO – 
NUMBER OF FIRMS (1981–2007) 
25. COMPOSITION OF THE SERVICE ACTIVITIES OF THE DISTRICT OF PRATO – 
NUMBER OF WORKERS (1981–2007) 
26. NUMBER OF FIRMS AND WORKERS IN THE TEXTILE SECTOR IN THE DISTRICT OF 
BISHU AND IN ICHINOMIYA – NUMBERS OF FIRMS AND WORKERS (1988–2010) 
27. TREND OF SALES AND GROSS VALUE ADDED IN THE TEXTILE SECTOR IN THE 
DISTRICT OF BISHU AND IN ICHINOMIYA – SALES AND GROSS VA (1988–2010) 
28. TREND OF GVA PER HEAD IN THE TEXTILE SECTOR IN THE DISTRICT OF BISHU 
AND IN ICHINOMIYA – GVA PER HEAD (1988–2010) 
29. COMPOSITION OF TEXTILE INDUSTRY IN ICHINOMIYA – NUMBER OF FIRMS AND 
WORKERS (2006) 
30. COMPOSITION OF TEXTILE INDUSTRY IN ICHINOMIYA – SALES, COST OF RAW 
MATERIALS, VA (2006) 
31. COMPOSITION OF TEXTILE INDUSTRY IN ICHINOMIYA – NUMBER OF FIRMS AND 
WORKERS (2006) 
32. COMPOSITION OF TEXTILE INDUSTRY IN ICHINOMIYA – SALES, COST OF RAW 
MATERIALS, VA (2006) 
33. COMPOSITION OF THE MANUFACTURING ACTIVITIES OF THE DISTRICT OF 
ICHINOMIYA – NUMBER OF FIRMS (2006; 2010) 
34. COMPOSITION OF THE MANUFACTURING ACTIVITIES OF THE DISTRICT OF 
ICHINOMIYA – NUMBER OF WORKERS (2006; 2010) 
35. COMPOSITION OF THE SERVICE ACTIVITIES OF THE DISTRICT OF ICHINOMIYA – 
NUMBER OF FIRMS (2003; 2008) 
36. COMPOSITION OF THE SERVICE ACTIVITIES OF THE DISTRICT OF ICHINOMIYA – 
NUMBER OF WORKERS (2003; 2008) 
37. COMPOSITION OF THE MANUFACTURING SECTOR OF ICHINOMIYA (1980) 
38.  COMPOSITION OF THE MANUFACTURING SECTOR OF ICHINOMIYA (2010) 
39. POPULATION OF ICHINOMIYA PER AGE GROUP (2010) 
40. NUMBER OF EMIGRANTS PER AGE GROUP (2010) 
41. TREND OF NATURAL AND SOCIAL BALANCE OF THE POPULATION OF ICHINOMIYA 
(REGISTERED AS RESIDENT, 2010) 
 
 
 
 
 204 
Appendix 3. Tables 
 
 
1. NUMBER OF FIRMS AND EMPLOYEES IN THE TEXTILE AND APPAREL SECTORS IN JAPAN 
(1985–2010)  
 
                                    FIRMS          EMPLOYEES 
 
TEXTILE APPAREL TEXTILE APPAREL 
1985 91,106 50,977 719,814 582,897 
1990 77,914 52,030 624,739 620,698 
1995 47,842 56,546 326,984 644,258 
2000 34,815 45,447 229,594 432,523 
2005 24,230 29,320 166,830 273,277 
2010 44,447* 352,945* 
Source: Establishment and Enterprise Census of Japan. 
 
 
 
 
2. VA AND PRODUCTION IN THE TEXTILE AND APPAREL SECTORS IN JAPAN (millions of yen) 
 PRODUCTION ADDED VALUE 
 TEXTILE APPAREL TEXTILE APPAREL 
1985 8,442,518 3,818,320 3,229,833 1,798,208 
1990 8,182,545 4,727,588 3,332,278 2,307,804 
1995 4,252,439 5,143,489 1,798,766 2,443,260 
2000 3,153,744 3,673,336 1,402,578 1,764,523 
2005 2,324,737 2,218,109 1,021,498 1,062,538 
2010 3,939,619* 1,524,138* 
Source: Establishment and Enterprise Census of Japan. 
Note: *from 2010 the statistical data of the textile industry and apparel industries have been unified. 
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3. VALUE OF EXPORTS OF TEXTILE YARN AND THREAD, WOVEN FABRICS AND TEXTILE 
MATERIALS AND CLOTHING AND ACCESSORIES FROM JAPAN (UNIT: 1000 YEN)  
 
TEXTILE YARN 
AND THREAD 
WOVEN FABRICS  
AND  
TEXTILE MATERIALS 
CLOTHING AND 
ACCESSORIES 
1988 700,577,064 558,833,920 75,353,248 
1990 838,763,038 676,659,688 81,664,643 
1995 665,116,239 563,260,758 49,134,153 
2000 746,798,681 630,069,007 56,931,670 
2005 748,573,594 640,623,006 54,297,482 
2010 610,032,847 509,372,580 46,175,992 
2011 630,512,226 523,657,246 47,065,684 
Source: Trade Statistics of Japan (MOF) 
 
4. VALUE OF IMPORTS OF TEXTILE YARN AND THREAD, WOVEN FABRICS AND TEXTILE 
MATERIALS AND CLOTHING AND ACCESORIES INTO JAPAN (UNIT: 1000 YEN)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Trade Statistics of Japan (MOF) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
TEXTILE YARN  
AND THREAD 
WOVEN FABRICS?  
AND 
TEXTILE MATERIALS 
CLOTHING  
AND  
ACCESSORIES 
1988 159,424,277 181,893,406 864,830,692 
1990 144,964,936 224,302,083 1,259,154,492 
1995 133,013,020 146,176,518 1,752,526,409 
2000 105,953,040 99,876,727 2,1153,76,557 
2005 113,650,115 104,182,313 2,469,476,654 
2010 97,975,631 76,363,299 2,328,311,267 
2011 130,593,274 99,030,999 2,597,568,990 
 206 
5. DISTRIBUTION OF EXPORTS OF TEXTILE YARN END FABRICS  
FROM JAPAN (2011, UNIT: 1000 YEN)  
CHINA 261,447,852 
SOUTH KOREA 28,094,386 
TAIWAN 17,607,677 
HK 46,430,224 
VIETNAM 55,726,815 
THAILAND 26,731,954 
INDONESIA 12,395,276 
UNITED ARAB REP.  13,668,430 
FRANCE 13,373,354 
GERMANY 12,284,607 
ITALY 11,566,025 
USA 38,707,723 
Source: Trade Statistics of Japan (MOF) 
 
 
 
 
6, DISTRIBUTION OF IMPORTS OF TEXTILE YARN END FABRICS  
INTO JAPAN (2011, UNIT: 1000 YEN) 
CHINA 35,256,648 
SOUTH KOREA 8,815,497 
TAIWAN 17,691,650 
PAKISTAN 6,326,398 
VIETNAM 2,614,036 
THAILAND 11,015,400 
INDONESIA 21,693,611 
MALAYSIA 2,936,661 
INDIA 9,644,012 
GERMANY 3,973,296 
ITALY 1,076,087 
USA 2,734,986 
HOLLAND 1,036,547 
CANADA 2,086,468 
Source: Trade Statistics of Japan (MOF) 
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7, DISTRIBUTION OF EXPORTS OF CLOTHING  
FROM JAPAN  (2011, UNIT: 1000 YEN) 
CHINA 1,760,243 
SOUTH KOREA 1,372,145 
TAIWAN 1,695,431 
HK 3,522,703 
VIETNAM 253,326 
USA 1,010,634 
SINGAPORE 149,531 
UK 428,031 
FRANCE 883,656 
GERMANY 314,963 
ITALY 435,485 
Source: Trade Statistics of Japan (MOF) 
 
 
 
 
8. DISTRIBUTION OF IMPORTS OF CLOTHING  
INTO JAPAN  (2011, UNIT: 1000 YEN) 
CHINA 894,195,873 
MYANMAR 27,031,992 
ITALY 31,231,101 
USA 6,330,041 
VIETNAM 84,832,369 
ROMANIA 6,138,344 
CAMBODIA 8,890,744 
INDONESIA 15,769,811 
INDIA 15,689,482 
BANGLADESH 15,451,200 
OTHER ASIAN COUNTRIES 15,555,846 
OTHER EU COUNTRIES 14,682,107 
Source: Trade Statistics of Japan (MOF) 
 
 
 
 
 208 
9, NUMBER OF FIRMS AND EMPLOYEES 
IN THE TEXTILE AND APPAREL SECTORS IN ITALY 
                 FIRMS WORKERS 
 
TEXTILE APPAREL TEXTILE APPAREL 
1981 72,289 65,846 539,239 413,556 
1991 43,598 57,405 410,706 415,99 
2001 29,564 43,780 311,010 298,619 
2011 53,086* 458,600* 
Source: ISTAT statistics 
 
 
 
10. VA AND PRODUCTION 
IN THE TEXTILE AND APPAREL SECTORS IN ITALY 
     
 
1981 1991 2001 2011 
ADDED VALUE** 7,531,844,475 1,958,375,255 2,248,433,678 201,550,114 
TOT AV 162,134,971 411,761,141 590,360,556 661,808,799 
AVxPER 7,905 23,709 36,882 43,949 
Source: ISTAT statistics 
Note:  *Since the 2011 Census has not yet been published, the figures of 2011 refers to the Eurostat data.  
 **The total Added Value has been calculated from the figures of value added per person multiplied for the 
number of workers of the sector. 
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11. VALUE OF IMPORTS OF THREAD, TEXTILE MATERIALS  
AND CLOTHING IN ITALY (1,000 euros)  
 
THREAD TEXTILES CLOTHES 
1997 1,802,061 1,834,115 4,575,952 
1998 1,707,679 1,948,663 5,146,001 
1999 1,564,403 1,774,213 5,454,775 
2000 2022198 2,019,763 6,441,889 
2001 2,045,180 2,220,728 7,274,656 
2002 1,851,807 2,029,449 7,815,240 
2003 1,723,307 1,858,900 8,150,049 
2004 1,631,946 1,889,222 8,798,709 
2005 1,517,564 1,866,243 9,579,485 
2006 1,756,793 1,995,294 9,247,957 
2007 17,50,072 1,997,559 9,538,663 
2008 1,521,713 1,876,215 9,675,673 
2009 1,149,568 1,412,629 9,040,253 
2010 1,658,027 1,787,694 10,012,706 
2011 2,074,814 2,047,842 10,845,433 
Source: ICE statistics 
 
 
12.  VALUE OF EXPORTS OF THREAD, TEXTILE MATERIALS AND CLOTHING AND ACCESSORIES 
FROM ITALY (1,000 euro) 
 
THREAD TEXTILES CLOTHES 
1997 1,756,888 6,183,855 13,063,168 
1998 1,695,116 6,246,030 13,270,260 
1999 1,672,579 5,783,387 12,712,919 
2000 2,069,480 6,547,431 14,311,550 
2001 2,093,304 7,118,038 15,709,392 
2002 1,930,640 6,655,221 15,315,101 
2003 1,857,827 6,206,785 14,517,349 
2004 1,927,648 6,280,366 14,525,049 
2005 1,733,627 5,960,500 14,845,714 
2006 1,746,312 5,934,393 12,720,674 
2007 1,678,793 5,730,966 13,637,254 
2008 1,408,332 5,118,091 13,863,106 
2009 1,136,108 3,740,830 11,325,181 
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2010 1,395,806 4,177,964 12,194,520 
2011 1,546,377 4,443,472 13,599,895 
Source: ICE statistics 
 
13, DISTRIBUTION OF IMPORTS OF TEXTILE YARN  
FROM ITALY (2011, 1,000 euro) 
CHINA 369,529 
GERMANY 184,130 
TURKEY 170,393 
INDIA 163,005 
ROMANIA 147,885 
BULGARIA 86,168 
CZECH REP, 84,875 
EGYPT 82,997 
POLAND 60,700 
PAKISTAN 59,316 
OTHERS 6,658,16 
Source: ICE statistics 
 
 
14, DISTRIBUTION OF EXPORTS OF TEXTILE YARN  
FROM ITALY (2011, 1,000 euro) 
ROMANIA 169,531 
GERMANY 159,754 
HONG KONG 147,946 
FRANCE 101,739 
TURKEY 81,270 
UK 72,999 
SPAIN 70,876 
CZECH REP, 64,113 
CROATIA 50,725 
PORTUGAL 49,481 
OTHERS 577,943 
Source: ICE statistics 
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15, DISTRIBUTION OF IMPORTS OF FABRICS  
INTO ITALY (2011, 1,000 euro) 
CHINA 676,049 
TURKEY 159,925 
PAKISTAN 151,226 
CZECH REP, 119,038 
GERMANY 107,721 
INDIA 100,550 
FRANCE 87,246 
SPAIN 85,304 
JAPAN 54,359 
UK 45,203 
OTHERS 46,1221 
Source: ICE statistics 
 
16, DISTRIBUTION OF EXPORTS OF FABRICS 
 FROM ITALY (2011, 1,000 euro) 
GERMANY 530,166 
ROMANIA 361,471 
FRANCE 354,150 
TUNISIA 295,280 
SPAIN 243,594 
CHINA 215,454 
UK 185,874 
HONG KONG 178,139 
TURKEY 177,811 
USA 157,128 
OTHERS 1,744,405 
Source: ICE statistics 
 
17, DISTRIBUTION OF IMPORTS OF CLOTHING  
INTO ITALY (2011, 1,000 euro) 
CHINA 2,990,117 
ROMANIA 792,424 
FRANCE 766,712 
TUNISIA 654,995 
SPAIN 557,511 
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TURKEY 496,788 
BANGLADESH 492,886 
BELGIUM 460,291 
INDIA 441,845 
GERMANY 350,246 
OTHERS 2,841,618 
Source: ICE statistics 
 
18. DISTRIBUTION OF EXPORTS OF CLOTHING  
FROM ITALY (2011, 1,000 euro) 
FRANCE 1,611,078 
GERMANY 1,235,968 
SWITZERLAND 1,103,554 
RUSSIA 955,879 
USA 940,810 
SPAIN 795,804 
UK 789,124 
HONG KONG 723,584 
JAPAN 616,887 
NETHERLANDS 412,461 
OTHERS 4,414,746 
Source: ICE statistics 
 
19. IMPORTS AND EXPORTS OF CLOTHING IN PRATO (millions of euro) 
 
TEXTILE INDUSTRY CLOTHING INDUSTRY 
 
IMPORT EXPORT IMPORT EXPORT 
1995 3,753 144,950 24,8 84,1 
2000 610 239,450 45,9 233,9 
2005 5,118 171,070 92,2 187,6 
2010 4,924 114,800 126,3 522,6 
Source: ISTAT, Trading Statistics 
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20. COMPOSITION OF THE TEXTILE INDUSTRY IN PRATO (NUMBER OF FIRMS) 
	  2006 2011* 
SPINNING MILLS	  1,490 755 
YARN TWISTING MANUFACTURERS 1,411 1,136 
DYEING AND FINISHING FACTORIES 885 542 
OTHER TEXTILE MANUFACTURERS 399 580 
KNITWEAR 625 514 
OUTERWEAR 2,729 3,895 
TOTAL 7,539 7,422 
Source: Chamber of Commerce of Prato (*estimates) 
 
21.COMPOSITION OF THE TEXTILE INDUSTRY IN PRATO (NUMBER OF WORKERS) 
	  2006 2011* 
SPINNING MILLS	  8,423 4,268 
YARN TWISTING MANUFACTURERS 7,354 5,921 
DYEING AND FINISHING FACTORIES 8,719 5,340 
OTHERS TEXTILE MANUFACTURERS 2,528 3,675 
KNITWEAR 2,714 2,232 
OUTERWEAR 8,702 12,420 
TOTAL 38,439 33,855 
Source: Chamber of Commerce of Prato (*estimates) 
 
 
22. COMPOSITION OF THE MANUFACTURING ACTIVITIES OF THE DISTRICT OF PRATO (NUMBER 
OF FIRMS) 
 1981 1991 2001 2007 
TOTAL MANUFACTURING ACTIVITIES 13,204 9,419 8,385 5,582 
TEXTILE INDUSTRY 11,246 7,028 4,976 2,913 
CLOTHING INDUSTRY 514 893 1,593 3,213 
MANUFACTURING OF METALS 179 195 263 276 
INDUSTRIAL MACHINERY 280 313 371 156 
ELECTRICAL MACHINERY 140 179 241 67 
CHEMICAL PRODUCTS 31 36 51 50 
Source: ISTAT and ASIA Statistics 
 
23. COMPOSITION OF THE MANUFACTURING ACTIVITIES OF THE DISTRICT OF PRATO (NUMBER 
OF WORKERS) 
 1981 1991 2001 2007 
TOTAL MANUFACTURING ACTIVITIES 56,883 44,302 45,401 28,693 
TEXTILE INDUSTRY 49,033 34,956 32,218 19,546 
CLOTHING INDUSTRY 14,841 2,994 4,971 9,338 
MANUFACTURING OF METALS 609 845 1,134 1,000 
INDUSTRIAL MACHINERY 1,634 1,637 2,185 1,037 
 214 
ELECTRICAL MACHINERY 689 544 723 323 
CHEMICAL PRODUCTS 181 236 339 324 
Source: ISTAT and ASIA Statistics 
 
24. COMPOSITION OF THE SERVICE ACTIVITIES OF THE DISTRICT OF PRATO (NUMBER OF 
FIRMS) 
 1981 1991 2001 2007 
CONSTRUCTION 1,857 2,531 3,237 4,466 
TRADING ACTIVITIES 5,101 6,460 6,328 9,134 
TRANSPORT AND STORAGE 1,081 847 895 809 
RESTAURANTS AND HOTELS 431 517 669 972 
FINANCIAL ACTIVITIES AND INSURANCE 194 368 643 657 
REAL ESTATE ACTIVITIES 164 540 1,622 2,505 
MACHINERY RENTAL 34 59 87 742 
COMPUTER TECHNOLOGY AND  
RELATED ACTIVITIES 
70 332 543 601 
R&D 7 32 49 37 
OTHER BUSINESS SERVICES 785 1,905 2,946 3,401 
Source: ISTAT and ASIA Statistics 
 
25. COMPOSITION OF THE SERVICE ACTIVITIES OF THE DISTRICT OF PRATO (NUMBER OF 
WORKERS) 
 1981 1991 2001 2007 
CONSTRUCTION 4,848 5,885 7,686 9,965 
TRADING ACTIVITIES 12,991 15,846 15,103 27,697 
TRANSPORT AND STORAGE 3,320 3,747 4,195 4,897 
RESTAURANTS AND HOTELS 1,416 1,738 2,220 3,662 
FINANCIAL ACTIVITIES AND INSURANCE 2,075 2,613 3,027 2,781 
REAL ESTATE ACTIVITIES 272 889 2,313 3,624 
MACHINERY RENTAL 55 104 221 4,387 
COMPUTER TECHNOLOGY AND RELATED ACTIVITIES 303 1,059 1,637 1,663 
R&D 34 53 119 66 
OTHER BUSINESS SERVICES 1,880 3,930 6,750 5,778 
Source: ISTAT and ASIA Statistics 
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26, NUMBER OF FIRMS AND WORKERS IN THE TEXTILE SECTOR DISTRICT OF BISHU AND IN 
ICHINOMIYA 
 NUMBER OF FIRMS 
(BISHU) 
NUMBER OF FIRMS 
(ICHINOMIYA) 
NUMBER OF 
WORKERS 
(BISHU) 
NUMBER OF 
WORKERS 
(ICHINOMIYA) 
1988 2,061  969  30,826  13,544 
1990 1,888 881  28,381  12,497 
1995 1,180 621  18,726  9,198 
2000 794 405 12,213  6,044 
2005 718 412 11,239 6,504 
2009 853 363 12,591 6,123 
2010 778 336 11,609 5,666 
Source: METI Industrial Statistics 
 
27, TREND OF SALES AND GROSS VALUE ADDED IN THE TEXTILE SECTOR IN THE DISTRICT OF 
BISHU AND IN ICHINOMIYA (UNIT: 10,000 YEN) 
 SALES  
(BISHU) 
SALES  
(ICHINOMIYA) 
GVA  
(BISHU) 
GVA (ICHINOMIYA) 
1988 56,710,811  25,677,222  12,538,970  3,676,327 
1990 56,060,524  24,224,423  14,125,951  3,996,407 
1995 35,945,332  16,291,549  10,174,600  3,407,926 
2000 22,682,254  10,717,614  6,975,322  2,756,725 
2005 20,958,666 11,699,915  5,858,709 3,555,195 
2009 19,329,187 9,689,687 7,438,313 3,748,407 
2010 18,154,889 8,884,394 6,959,409 3,358,591 
Source: METI Industrial Statistics 
 
28. TREND OF GROSS VALUE ADDED PER HEAD IN THE TEXTILE SECTOR IN THE DISTRICT OF 
BISHU AND ICHINOMIYA  (UNIT: 10,000 YEN) 
 NUMBER OF 
WORKERS 
(BISHU) 
NUMBER OF 
WORKERS 
(ICHINOMIYA) 
GVA PER HEAD 
(BISHU) 
GVA PER HEAD 
(ICHINOMIYA) 
1988 30,826  13,544 406.8 271.4 
1990 28,381  12,497 497.7 319.8 
1995 18,726  9,198 543.3 370.5 
2000 12,213  6,044 571.1 456.1 
2005 11,239 6,504 521.2 546.6 
2009 12,591 6,123 590.7 612.2 
2010 11,609 5,666 599.4 592.8 
Source: METI Industrial Statistics 
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29. COMPOSITION OF TEXTILE INDUSTRY IN ICHINOMIYA (2006) 
 NUMBER OF FIRMS NUMBER OF 
WORKERS 
TEXTILE INDUSTRY 360 100.0% 6,141 100.0% 
SPINNING MILLS, YARN TWISTING 
MANUFACTURERS 
60 17% 603 10% 
TEXTILE MANUFACTURERS 98 27.2 1,755 28.6 
COTTON?STAPLE FIBERS MANUFACTURERS 8 2.2 126 2.1 
WOOL MANUFACTURERS 82 22.8 1,568 25.5 
OTHER TEXTILE MANUFACTURERS 8 2.2 61 1.0 
KNITWEAR 19 5.3 417 6.8 
DYEING FACTORIES 131 36.4 2,721 44.3 
OTHER TEXTILE PRODUCTS MANUFACTURERS 47 13.1 599 9.8 
Source: The Industries of Ichinomiya, Ichinomiya City Council Statistics 
 
 
30. COMPOSITION OF TEXTILE INDUSTRY IN ICHINOMIYA (2006) 
 SALES  COST OF RAW 
MATERIALS 
VALUE ADDED 
TEXTILE INDUSTRY 11,045,044 100.0 6,670,996 100.0 4,111,252   
SPINNING MILLS, YARN TWISTING 
MANUFACTURERS 
? 0% - 0% - 0% 
TEXTILE MANUFACTURERS 4,557,899 41.3 3,188,430 47.8 1,279,525 31.1 
COTTON & STAPLE FIBERS 
MANUFACTURERS 
227,093 2.1 139,572 2.1 80,514 2.0 
WOOL MANUFACTURERS 4,261,914 38.6 3,010,639 45.1 1,169,799 28.5 
OTHER TEXTILE 
MANUFACTURERS 
68,892 0.6 38,219 0.6 29,212 0.7 
KNITWEAR 1,306,587 11.8 999,434 15.0 334,109 8.1 
DYEING FACTORIES 3,234,320 29.3 1,293,285 19.4 1,794,657 43.7 
OTHER TEXTILE PRODUCTS 
MANUFACTURERS 
1,188,623 10.8 779,211 11.7 382,795 9.3 
Source: The Industries of Ichinomiya, Ichinomiya City Council Statistics 
 
31.COMPOSITION OF TEXTILE INDUSTRY IN ICHINOMIYA (2010) 
 NUMBER OF FIRMS NUMBER OF 
WORKERS 
TEXTILE INDUSTRY 336  5,666  
YARN MANIFACTURERS, SPINNING MILLS, YARN 
TWISTING MANUFACTURERS 
42 13% 498 9% 
TEXTILE MANUFACTURERS 73 22% 1,366 24% 
COTTON &	 STAPLE FIBERS MANUFACTURERS 8 2% 118 2% 
WOOL MANUFACTURERS 58 17% 1,215 21% 
OTHER TEXTILE MANUFACTURERS 7 2% 33 1% 
KNITWEAR 16 5% 335 6% 
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DYEING FACTORIES 95 28% 2,064 36% 
(WESTERN) OUTERWEAR MANUFACTURERS 33 10% 411 7% 
OTHER TEXTILE PRODUCTS MANUFACTURERS 39 12% 650 11% 
Source: The Industries of Ichinomiya, Ichinomiya City Council Statistics 
 
32. COMPOSITION OF TEXTILE INDUSTRY IN ICHINOMIYA (2010) 
 SALES  COST OF RAW 
MATERIALS 
VALUE ADDED 
TEXTILE INDUSTRY 8,884,394  5,362,589  3,150,244  
YARN MANUFACTURERS, SPINNING 
MILLS, YARN TWISTING 
MANUFACTURERS 
673,812 8% 363,674 7% 297,600 9% 
TEXTILE MANUFACTURERS 3,022,887 34% 1,852,900 35% 988,796 31% 
COTTON & STAPLE FIBERS 
MANUFACTURERS 
279,496 3% 196,369 4% 76,121 2% 
WOOL MANUFACTURERS 2,710,408 31% 1,634,407 30% 902,334 29% 
OTHERS TEXTILE MANUFACTURERS 32,983 0% 22,124 0% 10,341 0% 
KNITWEAR 1,123,042 13% 924,849 17% 193,971 6% 
DYEING FACTORIES 2,408,280 27% 1,174,825 22% 1,113,287 35% 
(WESTERN) OUTWEAR MANUFACTURERS 341,274 4% 177,660 3% 155,084 5% 
OTHER TEXTILE PRODUCTS 
MANUFACTURERS 
1,048,109 12% 737,997 14% 271,677 9% 
Source: The Industries of Ichinomiya, Ichinomiya City Council Statistics 
 
33. COMPOSITION OF THE MANUFACTURING ACTIVITIES OF THE DISTRICT OF ICHINOMIYA 
(NUMBER OF FIRMS) 
 2010 2006 
FOOD INDUSTRY 53 52 
TEXTILE INDUSTRY 336 360 
PLASTIC MANUFACTURING COMPANIES 100 106 
METAL MANUFACTURING COMPANIES 79 93 
INDUSTRIAL MACHINERY MANUFACTURING COMPANIES 87 136 
TRANSPORT EQUIPMENT 38 43 
ELECTRIC, ELECTRONIC, IT EQUIPMENT AND DEVICES 40 43 
TOTAL 926 1,075 
Source: The Industries of Ichinomiya, Ichinomiya City Council Statistics 
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34. COMPOSITION OF THE MANUFACTURING ACTIVITIES OF THE DISTRICT OF ICHINOMIYA 
(NUMBER OF WORKERS) 
 2010 2006 
FOOD INDUSTRY 4,210 3,444 
TEXTILE INDUSTRY 5,666 6,141 
PLASTIC MANUFACTURING COMPANIES 2,338 2,554 
METAL MANUFACTURING COMPANIES 1,395 1,580 
INDUSTRIAL MACHINERY MANUFACTURING COMPANIES 1,285 2,545 
TRANSPORT EQUIPMENT 1,092 1,339 
ELECTRIC, ELECTRONIC, IT EQUIPMENT AND DEVICES 717 1,644 
TOTAL 20,751 23,235 
Source: The Industries of Ichinomiya, Ichinomiya City Council Statistics 
 
35. COMPOSITION OF THE SERVICE ACTIVITIES OF THE DISTRICT OF ICHINOMIYA (NUMBER OF 
FIRMS) 
 2008 2003 
CONSTRUCTIONS 1,374 203 
TELECOMMUNICATIONS 70 10 
TRANSPORT 281 24 
RETAIL 3,909 572 
FINANCE, INSURANCE 219 24 
REAL ESTATE 536 82 
RESTAURANTS AND HOTELS 2,262 311 
MEDICAL AND WELFARE 781 103 
INSTRUCTION 532 60 
OTHER SERVICES 2,756 365 
TOTAL 16,587 1,598 
MANUFACTURING 3,781 1,284 
Source: The Services of Ichinomiya, Ichinomiya City Council Statistics 
 
36. COMPOSITION OF THE SERVICE ACTIVITIES OF THE DISTRICT OF ICHINOMIYA (NUMBER OF 
WORKERS) 
 2008 2003 
CONSTRUCTIONS 8,716 1,026 
TELECOMMUNICATIONS 693 42 
TRANSPORTS 7,981 458 
RETAILERS 29,022 3,546 
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FINANCE, INSURANCE 2,770 403 
REAL ESTATE 1,578 140 
RESTAURANTS AND HOTELS 13,065 1,711 
MEDICAL AND WELFARE 10,219 1,124 
INSTRUCTION 2,882 235 
OTHER SERVICES 15,277 1,728 
TOTAL 127,089 9,331 
MANUFACTURING 33,033 8,868 
Source: The Services of Ichinomiya, Ichinomiya City Council Statistics 
 
37. COMPOSITION OF THE MANUFACTURING SECTOR OF ICHINOMIYA 
 (1980, UNIT: 10,000 YEN) 
 NUMBER OF 
FIRMS 
NO, OF 
WORKERS 
COST OF RAW 
MATERIALS 
SALES GVA 
FOOD  54  1,097  731,665  1,300,420  564,627  
TEXTILE  1,054  13,668  12,326,590  18,184,716  5,858,126  
APPAREL 176  2,148  945,642  1,619,443  673,801  
LUMBER AND WOOD PRODUCTS 15  112  67,314  97,365  30,051  
FURNITURE AND TEXTILES 44  355  185,021  313,078  128,057  
PULP, PAPER AND PAPER PRODUCTS 14  181  130,869  212,393  81,524  
PRINTING AND ALLIED INDUSTRY 25  285  178,905  317,970  139,065  
RUBBER PRODUCTS 10  193  123,340  233,914  110,574  
LEATHER TANNING, LEATHER PRODUCTS 
AND FUR SKINS 
4  88  53,422  92,193  38,771  
CERAMIC, STONE AND CLAY PRODUCTS 12  144  112,293  184,236  71,943  
IRON AND STEEL 14  100  183,418  231,967  48,549  
NON-FERROUS METAL AND PRODUCTS 4  40  18,688  35,114  16,426  
FABRICATED METAL PRODUCTS 60  487  379,319  589,364  210,045  
GENERAL-PURPOSE MACHINERY, 
EQUIPMENT AND SUPPLIES 
93  1,242  1,157,198  1,782,627  625,429  
ELECTRICAL MACHINERY, EQUIPMENT AND 
SUPPLIES 
14  2,481  7,404,409  7,912,434  508,025  
TRASPORTATION  MACHINERY, 
EQUIPMENT AND SUPPLIES 
21  329  146,206  276,847  130,641  
MISCELLANEOUS MANUFACTURING 
INDUSTRIES 
84  1,018  733,689  1,112,492  378,803  
TOTAL MANUFACTURING ACTIVITIES 1,698  23,968  24,877,988  34,496,573  9,614,457  
Source: METI Industrial statistics 
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38. COMPOSITION OF THE MANUFACTURING SECTOR OF ICHINOMIYA  
(2010, UNIT: 10.000 YEN) 
 NUMBER 
OF FIRMS 
NO. OF 
WORKERS 
COST OF RAW 
MATERIALS 
SALES GVA 
FOOD  53 4,210 4,249,938 6,051,790 1,720,274 
TEXTILE AND APPAREL 336 5,666 5,362,589 8,884,394 3,358,591 
LUMBER AND WOOD PRODUCTS 9 111 140,918 217,283 72,823 
FURNITURE AND TEXTILES 21 212 467,760 612,066 137,249 
PULP, PAPER AND PAPER PRODUCTS 15 223 205,743 358,224 145,262 
PRINTING AND ALLIED INDUSTRY 40 531 324,777 632,631 293,684 
CHEMICAL AND ALLIED PRODUCTS 5 75 99,467 129,687 28,781 
PLASTIC PRODUCTS 100 2,338 2,262,067 3,894,873 1,558,642 
RUBBER PRODUCTS 15 451 403,051 683,251 267,071 
CERAMIC, STONE AND CLAY PRODUCTS 11 161 200,883 341,274 133,937 
IRON AND STEEL 11 167 681,171 923,958 231227 
NON-FERROUS METAL AND PRODUCTS 9 68 19,571 53,929 32,723 
 FABRICATED METAL PRODUCTS 79 1,395 1,192,510 2,158,411 92,1615 
GENERAL-PURPOSE MACHINERY 24 464 228,045 566,180 322,284 
 PRODUCTION MACHINERY 87 1,285 1,554,313 2,465,069 906,669 
BUSINESS ORIENTED MACHINERY 13 598 2,413,396 2,593,065 172,310 
PARTS, DEVICES AND ELECTRONIC 
CIRCUITS 
6 165 50,806 80,062 28,375 
ELECTRICAL MACHINERY, EQUIPMENT 
AND SUPPLIES 
33 520 324,514 629,775 291,184 
TRASPORTATION PARTS, DEVICES AND 
EQUIPMENT 
38 1,092 1,148,507 2,090,507 897,824 
MISCELLANEOUS MANUFACTURING 
INDUSTRIES 
15 919 3,921,376 6,959,667 2,903,836 
TOTAL MANUFACTURING ACTIVITIES 920 20,651 25,251,402 40,326,096 14,424,361 
Source: METI Industrial statistics 
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39. POPULATION OF ICHINOMIYA PER AGE GROUP (2010) 
0?4 18,143 
5?9 19,743 
10?14 20,127 
15?19 18,989 
20?24 19,942 
25?29 21,559 
30?34 26,525 
35?39 33,086 
40?44 28,911 
45?49 23,760 
50?54 20,694 
55?59 24,520 
60?64 28,631 
65?69 27,012 
70?74 21,519 
75?79 15,285 
80?84 9,536 
85?89 5,062 
90?94 2,030 
95?99 596 
100?104 61 
105?109 7 
TOTAL 385,738 
Source: Citizens’ Affairs Division of Ichinomiya City 
 
40. NUMBER OF EMIGRANTS PER AGE GROUP (2010) 
0?4 790 
5?9 353 
10?14 181 
15?19 415 
20?24 1,330 
25?29 1,932 
30?34 1,563 
35?39 1,147 
40?44 608 
45?49 398 
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50?54 222 
55?59 182 
60?64 192 
65? 386 
TOTAL 9,703 
Source: Citizens’ Affairs Division of Ichinomiya City 
 
41. TREND OF NATURAL AND SOCIAL BALANCE OF THE POPULATION OF ICHINOMIYA 
(REGISTERED AS RESIDENT) 
 NATURAL BALANCE SOCIAL BALANCE TOTAL BALANCE 
2001 978 822 1,800 
2002 873 359 1,232 
2003 735 475 1,210 
2004 676 1,467 2,143 
2005 627 973 1,600 
2006 730 1,458 2,188 
2007 547 1,406 1,953 
2008 669 934 1,603 
2009 594 880 1,474 
2010 266 115 381 
Source: Citizens’ Affairs Division of Ichinomiya City 
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